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Abstract 
Despite the preponderance of diversified firms, the diversification–performance (D–P) 
relationship and how insider ownership moderates it in Nigeria remains unclear and a 
concern for decision makers interested in the survival of firms and their contributions to 
society. This quantitative study was conducted to examine the D–P relationship and how 
it is associated with insider ownership in Nigeria. Agency theory and institution-based 
theory formed the theoretical foundation of this study. Four research questions that 
focused on how diversification is related to firm performance and how insider ownership 
moderates this relationship were answered using the panel design variant of correlational 
research. Data were collected from the annual reports of companies (n=109) listed on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange, and the linear mixed model procedure in SPSS 25 was used to 
test the four hypotheses that were stated. No significant difference in performance 
between diversified and focused firms was found and there was no significant 
relationship between level of diversification and firm performance. Insider ownership did 
not distinguish underperforming from outperforming diversified firms and did not 
significantly moderate the D–P relationship in Nigeria. These findings are inconsistent 
with the predictions of institution-based theory and agency theory regarding the 
performance effects of diversification in emerging markets. The social change 
implication of these findings is that firms can improve their sustainability and capacity to 
provide jobs, products, and services society depends on by deemphasizing the 
diversification decision and insider ownership as a governance mechanism.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Businesses generate economic growth and development by creating jobs and 
innovative products and services that society depends on (Banks, 2016; Carroll, 2016; 
Kritikos, 2014; Ucbasaran et al., 2013). Corporate social responsibility (CSR) could be 
detrimental to firm performance. The damaging effects may arise from disingenuous 
motivations, such as when CEOs perform CSR activities to attract attention and praise 
(Cheng et al., 2020; Petrenko et a., 2016). However, there is increasing expectation that 
businesses respond to various social issues through forms of CSR (Banks, 2016; 
Blowfield & Dolan, 2014; Carroll, 2016; Hsieh, 2017; Jose, 2016; Kaplan, 2020; 
Martinez et al., 2017; Santos et al., 2015; Terziev, 2019).  
Businesses contribute to positive social change when they act as development 
agents (Blowfield & Dolan, 2014; Likoko & Kin, 2017). Therefore, their survival and 
growth are essential for them to continue contributing to society (Carroll, 2016). The 
survival and growth of businesses require improvement in firm performance and 
continuous adaptation to face the challenges of an increasingly competitive and dynamic 
environment (Burgelman, 2014; Carroll, 2016; Piao, 2014). 
However, evidence points to a low long-term corporate survival rate (Bakker & 
Josefy, 2018; Burgelman, 2014; Daepp et al., 2015; Govindarajan & Srivastava, 2016; 
Josefy et al., 2017; Murthy, 2014; Reeves et al., 2016). The corporate rate of persistent 
high performance has also been low (Burgelman, 2014; Innosight, 2018; Murthy, 2014; 
Reeves et al., 2020). It is harder today than in the past to persistently rank among the 
most prominent and best-performing companies (Innosight, 2018; Reeves et al., 2020). 
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The low corporate survival and the low persistent high-performance rate are also the case 
in Nigeria (Nnabuife & Onwuzuligbo, 2015; Sam, 2007). 
Some failed firms were high performers and industry leaders (Chen, 2017; Wessel 
& Christensen, 2012; Murthy, 2014; Reeves et al., 2020). The cost of business failures is 
enormous: loss of jobs, loss of investment value, emotional cost, and social stigma 
(Josefy et al., 2017; Napolitano et al., 2015; Nnabuife & Onwuzuligbo, 2015). The costs 
also come in the form of loss of government revenue and scarcity of essential goods and 
services society has come to depend on (Burgelman, 2014; Carroll, 2016; Eckbo et al., 
2016; Josefy et al., 2017; Napolitano et al., 2015; Ucbasaran et al., 2013).  
Whereas many companies have failed or experienced declining growth and 
performance, few have survived long term (Josefy et al., 2017; Murthy, 2014; Napolitano 
et al., 2015; Piao, 2014). As of 2015, only 13 of the Fortune 500 companies were over 
150 years old (Roberts, 2015). These companies have evolved over the years in their 
activities, business models, and technological capabilities to adapt to a changing 
environment and avoid disruption (Burgleman, 2015; Chen, 2017; Josefy et al., 2017; 
Kaulio et al., 2017; Murthy, 2014; Napolitano et al., 2015; Piao, 2014; Reeves et al., 
2016; Sulphey & Alkahtani, 2017). Adaptation may require a change of strategy 
(Innosight, 2018; Khan, 2015a, 2015b; Reeves et al., 2016), and firms are continually 
seeking effective strategies to ensure their survival (Kaulio et al., 2017; Koryak et al., 
2018; Parida et al., 2016; Reeves et al., 2016; Sulphey & Alkahtani, 2017) 
In this study, I looked at diversification, a corporate strategy that has been 
proposed as a survival and growth strategy (Innosight, 2018; Sharma & Dixit, 2017). 
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Many firms in Nigeria and worldwide use the diversification strategy for survival, 
growth, and sustainable performance (Altieri & Nicodano, 2021; Guerras-Martín et al., 
2020; Jeong et al., 2017; Nigam & Gupta, 2018; Setianto, 2020; Oyedijo, 2012). I 
examined the performance effect of this strategy and its relation to firms’ insider 
ownership in Nigeria. This study is urgent given the historically low corporate survival 
rate, low persistent high-performance rate, and the high cost of corporate failure. 
Corporate survival, growth, and profitability are issues of great concern to policymakers 
both at the corporate and government levels (Guerras-Martín et al., 2020; Panza et al., 
2018; Reeves et al., 2016; Verma et al., 2017).  
I organized this chapter into 11 sections. Following this introduction, I give a 
background to the problem and formally state the study’s problem and purpose. 
Subsequently, I present the research questions and hypotheses that I tested to answer 
them. I follow this with the theoretical foundation, nature of the study, definition of 
significant terms, and the assumptions I made in this study. I also delineate the scope of 
this work and its limitations. Finally, I identify the significance of the study to theory, 
practice, and social change. 
Background of the Study 
Diversification is one of the strategies that many firms have adopted as a means of 
ensuring survival, growth, and improved performance (Benito-Osorio et al., 2015; 
Guerras-Martín et al., 2020; Nigam & Gupta, 2018; Sahni & Juhari, 2019; Setianto, 2020; 
Verma et al., 2017). Potential benefits of this strategy include the creation of efficient 
internal markets and productive use of excess capacity in resources (Brahmana et al., 
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2019; Cheng, 2017; Erdorf et al., 2013; De Figueiredo et al., 2019; Khanna & Yafeh, 
2015; Lohwasser et al., 2019; Picone & Dagnino, 2016; Yamoah & Kanyandekwe, 
2014). Another benefit is the coinsurance effect of multiple lines of business, which 
lowers risk, attracts a lower cost of capital, and increases debt capacity (Aivazian et al., 
2015; Bielstein et al., 2018; Borah et al., 2018; Demirci et al., 2020; De Figueiredo et al., 
2019; Franco et al., 2016; Hann et al., 2013; Lewellen, 1971). 
Some authors have questioned the possibility of realizing some of these benefits 
(Wentland, 2020). For instance, some researchers have argued that internal capital 
markets (ICM) are not efficient in allocating resources and would not benefit firms (see 
Cheng & Wu, 2018; Glaser et al., 2013; Klein & Wuebker, 2020; Ozbas & Scharfstein, 
2010). There are still questions whether diversification reduces a firm’s risk in all cases 
(Haug et al., 2018; Jafarinejad et al., 2018; Wu & Chiang, 2019).  
Moreover, as some authors have argued, in developed financial markets and with 
investment instruments such as mutual funds, investors can efficiently achieve the desired 
risk diversification on their own (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Castañer & Kavadis, 2013; 
Erdorf et al., 2013). Consequently, firm diversification aimed at shareholder risk 
reduction might not create value for shareholders (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Castañer & 
Kavadis, 2013; Erdorf et al., 2013; Lacoste et al., 2010). Firms can hardly create value 
for shareholders by doing what the shareholders can efficiently do on their own (Castañer 
& Kavadis, 2013; Erdorf et al., 2013; Lacoste et al., 2010). There is no consensus on 
capital markets efficiency, especially in developing countries (Ayodele et al., 2017; 
Gyamfi et al., 2017; Lawal et al., 2017). However, following this reasoning, some authors 
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have argued that agency problems in corporations cause managers to engage in corporate 
diversification (Castañer & Kavadis, 2013; Denis et al., 1997).  
The agency problem explanation for firm diversification is that managers derive 
greater personal benefits than costs from diversification and are motivated by these 
private benefits to diversify or maintain a diversification strategy even if it is destroying 
shareholder value (Denis et al., 1997). These benefits include increased compensation 
(Wang et al., 2019), power and prestige from managing large corporations, and reduced 
managers’ largely undiversified unemployment risk (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Denis et al., 
1997; Montgomery, 1994). Managers may also become entrenched due to the 
diversification strategy implemented (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Denis et al., 1997; 
Montgomery, 1994). Given the questions about the benefits of diversification, many 
researchers have examined the performance effects of firm diversification (see Andreou 
et al., 2016; Brahmana et al., 2019; Hoechle et al., 2012; Lohwasser et al., 2019; Sturm & 
Nüesch, 2019; Zechser, 2019). 
The evidence from these studies has not been consistent (Ahuja & Novelli, 2017; 
Andreou et al., 2019; Benito-Osorio et al., 2012; Erdorf et al., 2013; Guerras-Martín et 
al., 2020; Jouida et al., 2017; Lawrey & Morris, 2019; Picone & Dagnino, 2016). 
However, since the 1980s and mostly in the developed markets, many researchers have 
found that relative to undiversified firms, diversified firms have underperformed and 
traded at a discount (see Andreou et al., 2016; Berger & Ofek, 1995; Borah et al., 2018; 
Hoechle et al., 2012; Lang & Stulz, 1994). This discount has been estimated at up to 
15.5% (see, Hoechle et al., 2012). Mitton (2012) estimated an average loss in annual 
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sales of $3.3 million for an average-sized firm worldwide by adding one more segment. 
Therefore, on the basis of these findings, the dominant view has been that diversification 
is shareholder value destroying and that diversified firms are inefficient (Erdorf et al., 
2013; Gopal et al., 2021; Pidun et al., 2019).  
Despite the value destruction attributed to diversification, many firms continue to 
employ the diversification strategy (D’Aveni, 2017; Gopal et al., 2021; Hirt et al., 2013; 
Kurtović et al., 2013; Mackey et al., 2017; Pidun et al., 2019; Schommer et al., 2019). 
The result is that diversified firms continue to account for significant economic activity, 
output, and employment in many countries (Basu, 2010; Matvos & Seru, 2014; Matvos et 
al., 2018). For instance, in the United States, diversified firms accounted for about half of 
total sales (Matvos & Seru, 2014) and controlled more than $32 trillion worth of assets in 
2011 (Sambasivan & Asrarhaghighi, 2016). In Germany, diversified firms constituted 
60% of all manufacturing enterprises employing 20 or more people and accounted for 
81% and 85% of total sales and exports, respectively (Braakmann & Wagner, 2011).  
According to Kurtović et al. (2013), diversified firms represent 70% of companies 
in emerging markets. They constitute about 95%, 90%, and 80% of businesses in three 
major emerging markets of India, China, and Brazil, respectively (Kurtović et al., 2013). 
In the decade up to 2010, diversified firms grew by 23% in China and India and 11% in 
South Korea (Hirt et al., 2013; Kurtović et al., 2013; Ramachandran et al., 2013). In 
terms of revenue, these firms constitute 80% of the largest 50 companies in South Korea, 
90% in India, and 40% in China, with the exclusion of state-owned companies (Hirt et 
al., 2013). In Nigeria, Oyedijo (2012) classified 68.76% of the firms surveyed as 
7 
 
diversified. Ugwuanyi (2012) classified 82.35% of banks surveyed in Nigeria as 
diversified.  
Diversification continues to be a preferred growth strategy for many firms 
worldwide (Credit Suisse Research Institute, 2012; Pidun et al., 2019; Ramachandran et 
al., 2013; Schommer et al., 2019) and in Nigeria (Oyedijo, 2012). Seventy-five percent of 
firms surveyed by Credit Suisse Research Institute (2012) indicated that they planned to 
add new products and services. Forty percent planned to diversify into related industries, 
while 20% of the large firms planned to expand into unrelated industries. Many 
companies in Nigeria still indicate their intention to diversify in their annual reports (e.g., 
GlaxoSmithKline Consumer Nigeria Plc, 2014; Transcorp, 2019, p. 6). D’Aveni (2017) 
envisaged increased corporate diversification through “pan-industrial companies” (p. 23) 
as new technologies enable firms to manage complexities and optimize operations at 
different levels along the value chain across multiple product lines. This trend, according 
to D’Aveni (2017), will be to the disadvantage of companies that remain focused. 
The continued diversification of firms all over the world and in Nigeria raises two 
issues. One is whether diversification is value destroying in all countries, at all times, as 
the diversification discount literature has suggested (De la Fuente & Velasco, 2015; Lien 
& Li, 2013; Pidun et al., 2019). The other issue is why firms continue to diversify if 
diversification is value destroying (Hyland & Diltz, 2002; Pidun et al., 2019; Thakur & 
Bhatia, 2021). No consensus has emerged on both these issues (Andreou et al., 2019; 
Bressan & Weissensteiner, 2021; Picone & Dagnino, 2016; Sturm & Nüesch, 2019). 
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Some authors have explained the continued diversification of firms with evidence 
that diversification is or could be a value-creating strategy (e.g., Akbulut & Matsusaka, 
2010; Bhatia & Thakur, 2018; Hoberg & Phillips, 2014; Haug et al., 2018; Hund et al, 
2013; Lawrey & Morris, 2019). Others have explained diversification and the 
underperformance of diversified firms by agency problems from low insider ownership 
and other governance structures assumed to be poor (e.g., Denis et al., 1997; Hoechle et 
al., 2012; Jara-Bertin et al., 2015a). Denis et al. (1997) found that diversified firms are 
valued lower than their focused counterparts and tend to have significantly lower insider 
equity ownership. Dennis et al. interpreted the lower insider ownership as an indication 
of severe agency problems. On the basis of this, the researchers hypothesized that if 
value-reducing diversification is due to agency problems, on average then, adverse 
performance effects of diversification would be expected in lower insider ownership 
firms and positive impact in higher insider ownership ones.  
Nevertheless, this hypothesis’s empirical investigation has not produced 
consistent results (Benito-Osorio et al., 2012; Erdorf et al., 2013; Picone & Dagnino, 
2016). Zechser (2019) has suggested that the influence of ownership on the 
diversification–performance (D–P) relationship is an exciting area for future research (see 
also Picone & Dagnino, 2016). A few researchers have used data on firms in Nigeria to 
investigate the performance effects of diversification (e.g., Adamu et al, 2011; Gunu & 
Gunu, 2019; Mac-Ozigbo & Daniel, 2020; Oyedijo, 2012; Patrick, 2012; Ugwuanyi, 
2012). However, no researchers have studied the relationship between insider ownership 
and the performance effects of firm diversification. As I indicate in the literature review, 
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some methodological issues limit these few studies and the understanding of this 
relationship in the Nigerian context.  
The studies based on developed economies’ data do not shed much light on 
emerging markets such as Nigeria (Ahuja & Novelli, 2017; Manyuru et al., 2017; Picone 
& Dagnino, 2016; Sambasivan & Asrarhaghighi, 2016). This failure is due to institutional 
differences that researchers have found to influence the performance effects of firm 
diversification and corporate governance mechanisms (Benito-Osorio et al., 2012; Berry-
Stölzle, et al., 2013; Erdorf et al., 2013; Lee et al, 2008; Picone & Dagnino, 2016; Selçuk, 
2015). The few studies in emerging markets have concentrated on Asia (Jara-Bertin et al., 
2015a), and little is known about the D–P relationship in the emerging markets of Africa 
(Manyuru et al., 2017). 
These studies conducted in developed countries have also proceeded mainly on 
the wrong premise that diversification is ex ante wrong and value destroying (Ahn, 2009; 
Matsusaka, 2001). The researchers conducting these studies have ignored the finding that, 
in many cases, some diversified firms have outperformed even the best-focused 
organizations (Ahn, 2009; Akbulut & Matsusaka, 2010; Chen & Yu, 2012; Erdorf et al., 
2013; Hund et al., 2013; Villalonga, 2004). Consequently, researchers have largely 
neglected the need to examine the differences between diversified firms that have 
outperformed and the ones that have underperformed their focused counterparts (Basu, 
2010; Erdorf et al., 2013; Hund et al., 2019; Picone & Dagnino, 2016). Because of this 
gap, scholars do not know much about how diversification affects firm performance in 
Nigeria and how insider ownership is related to it. I addressed this gap in this study.  
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There is a consensus that the D–P relationship remains a puzzle that requires 
further studies to resolve (Benito-Osorio et al., 2012; Bressan & Weissensteiner, 2021; 
Erdorf et al., 2013; Grigorieva, 2020; Jara-Bertin et al., 2015b; Manyuru et al., 2017; 
Picone & Dagnino, 2016; Schommer et al., 2019). There is also a consensus that a study 
of the D–P relationship in different institutional contexts is a way forward (e.g., Benito-
Osorio et al., 2012; Erdorf et al., 2013; Picone & Dagnino, 2016; Qiu, 2014; Sun et al., 
2017; Zechser, 2019). Some authors have suggested analyzing factors that moderate the 
D–P relationship (Andreou et al., 2019; De la Fuente & Velasco, 2015; Picone & 
Dagnino, 2016). Others have suggested the study of factors that differentiate between 
diversified firms that have outperformed and those that have underperformed as a way to 
better understand the D–P relationship (e.g., Andreou et al., 2016; Erdorf et al., 2013; 
Hund et al., 2019; Picone & Dagnino, 2016). One of these factors is the agency problem 
arising from the insider ownership level (Selçuk, 2015). As Jara-Bertin et al. (2015a, 
2015b) have posited, whether diversification discount exists and whether it is related to 
agency problems remains a puzzle (see Brahmana et al., 2019; Picone & Dagnino, 2016; 
Zechser, 2019). 
This study was necessary because of its contributions to the literature on 
diversification’s performance effects in developing countries. Developing countries are 
institutionally different from developed countries, where researchers have concentrated 
their efforts (Chen & Yu, 2012; Lee et al., 2008). This study also contributes to better 
policies in corporate strategy and insider ownership as a corporate governance 
mechanism. These factors are essential for the survival, growth, and improved 
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performance of firms that contribute to positive social change by creating employment 
and innovative products society depends on. 
Problem Statement 
Many researchers have found that, on average, diversified firms underperform 
undiversified ones (Borah et al., 2018; Lee & Hooy, 2018a; Liu et al., 2018; Sturm & 
Nüesch, 2019). Borah et al. (2018) estimated a diversification discount that is higher for 
high-technology firms (26.59%) than low-technology firms (7.46%). Mitton (2012) 
estimated an average loss in annual sales of $3.3 million for an average-sized firm by 
adding one more segment. Despite the diversification discount, many firms continue to 
diversify (Gopal et al., 2021).  
The general problem is that the D–P relationship, which remains unclear, is a 
primary managerial and public policy concern (Ahuja & Novelli, 2017; Altieri & 
Nicodano, 2019; Aivazian et al., 2019; Gopal et al., 2021; Grigorieva, 2020; Guerras-
Martín et al., 2020; Schommer et al., 2019; Shen et al., 2018; Sturm & Nüesch, 2019). 
The specific problem is how insider ownership is related to the performance effects of 
diversification in Nigeria. Hoechle et al. (2012) explained the underperformance of 
diversified firms by inadequate corporate governance mechanisms such as low insider 
ownership. Because of the dearth of studies in which researchers have used Nigerian 
firms’ data to address these problems, little is known about these relationships in the 
Nigerian context.  
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine the relationship between 
firm diversification and firm performance and the relationship between insider ownership 
and the performance effects of diversification in Nigeria. I used the panel/longitudinal 
design variant of correlational design to capture these relationships’ variations over time. 
The independent variables were diversification status, level of diversification, and insider 
ownership in the firm, whereas firm performance measured by return on equity and 
approximate Q was the dependent variable. The control variables were firm size, 
leverage, blockholding, and board independence. I explain these variables and how I 
operationalized and measured them further in Chapter 3. The population for this study 
was companies quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). Because these companies 
are required to publish audited annual reports, data are more reliable and accessible. The 
study contributes to positive social change by providing information that firms could use 
to improve corporate strategy and governance to ensure that firms continue to offer 
innovative products and jobs society depends on.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Because of the dearth of research and the deficiencies of the few studies that have 
addressed the D–P puzzle using data on Nigerian firms, some questions remain 
inadequately answered. I addressed these questions in this study by testing hypotheses. 
Below are the research questions, the corresponding hypotheses, and the variables I used 
to test them. 
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RQ1: How is the performance of diversified firms different from that of focused 
firms in Nigeria?  
H01: There is no significant difference between the performance of diversified 
firms and focused firms in Nigeria. 
H11: There is a significant difference between the performance of diversified 
firms and focused firms in Nigeria.  
For this hypothesis, the independent variable was diversification status. I defined 
it as the diversification category in which a firm fell when I classified them as 
focused/undiversified firms or diversified firms. I classified firms on the basis of the 
number of industries/segments defined at the 2-digit SIC level in which they operate. 
Firm performance was the dependent variable, and I operationalized it by ROE and ATQ. 
I sourced the data for these variables from the annual and financial reports of companies. 
RQ2: What is the relationship between the level of diversification and firm 
performance in Nigeria? 
H02: There is no significant relationship between the level of diversification and 
firm performance in Nigeria. 
H12: There is a significant relationship between the level of diversification and 
firm performance in Nigeria. 
The independent variable in this case was the level of diversification measured by 
the number of industries a firm is operating in, with industry measured at the 2-digit SIC 
code level. The dependent variable was firm performance measured by ROE and ATQ. 
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The control variables were firm size, leverage, board independence, and blockholding or 
ownership concentration. 
RQ3: How is the insider ownership level of diversified firms that outperform 
focused firms different from the insider ownership of diversified firms that underperform 
focused firms in Nigeria?  
H03: There is no significant difference in insider ownership level between 
diversified firms that outperform focused firms and diversified firms that 
underperform focused firms. 
H13: There is a significant difference in insider ownership level between 
diversified firms that outperform focused firms and those that underperform 
focused firms.  
To test this hypothesis, I classified diversified firms on the basis of their 
performance as outperforming diversified firms (OPDF) and underperforming diversified 
firms (UPDF). I defined an OPDF as a diversified firm whose performance (measured by 
ROE and ATQ) is greater than focused firms’ mean performance. I defined a UPDF as a 
diversified firm whose performance is lower than focused firms’ average performance. 
RQ4: What is the relationship between insider ownership and the performance 
effects of level of diversification in Nigeria? 
H04: There is no significant relationship between insider ownership and the 
performance effects of level of diversification. 
H14: There is a significant relationship between insider ownership and the 
performance effects of level of diversification. 
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For this hypothesis, I introduced insider ownership and an interaction term of 
level of diversification and insider ownership (level of diversification*insider ownership) 
as predictors in the model estimating the relationship between diversification and firm 
performance. The independent variables here were the level of diversification, insider 
ownership, and the interaction term of level of diversification and insider ownership. The 
variables were measured as defined in the section on research methodology. The 
dependent variable was firm performance measured by ROE and ATQ, as I described 
earlier. I also introduced the control variables here. 
Theoretical Foundation 
Researchers have used many theories to explain firm diversification’s 
performance effects and the relationship between insider ownership and diversified firms’ 
performance (George & Kabir, 2012). Two of these theories formed the theoretical 
foundation of this research to understand how diversification may affect firm 
performance and how insider ownership relates to diversified firms’ performance. These 
are agency theory and institution-based view theory. In this section, I provide a concise 
explanation of the theoretical propositions of these theories, and a more detailed 
discussion follows in Chapter 2. 
Agency Theory 
Many authors credit the development of agency theory to Michael Jensen and 
William Meckling with their 1976 paper “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Cost, and Ownership Structure” (Bendickson et al., 2016; Connelly et al., 2010). 
Mitnick (2019a; 2019b) has disputed the idea that Jensen and Meckling (1976) are the 
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original papers on agency theory but has acknowledged that it is the most widely cited 
paper on agency theory. The basic idea in agency theory related to the firm is that in 
modern corporations characterized by separation of ownership from control, the 
managers (agents) interests and motivations may diverge from those of the owners—
principals (Yusuf et al., 2018). This divergence results in a conflict of interest in decision 
making between the owners and the managers (Bendickson et al., 2016; Connelly et al., 
2010; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theory suggests that when there is such a 
conflict of interest, the managers are more likely to pursue their interests at the expense 
of shareholders (Connelly et al., 2010; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theory also 
suggests that some monitoring and interest alignment mechanisms can prevent 
managerial self-seeking behavior (Connelly et al., 2010; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Yusuf 
et al., 2018). 
Agency theory is related to this study and the research questions because it 
provides a possible explanation for diversification’s performance effects. As some 
authors have pointed out, the reason that dominates the diversification decision influences 
diversification’s performance effects (Basu, 2010; Dey & Banerjee, 2019). If agency 
considerations dominate, diversification will more likely produce negative results (Dey & 
Banerjee, 2019). RQ3 and RQ4 deal with how insider ownership relates to the 
performance effects of diversification. These questions stemmed from agency theory. The 
theory would suggest that increased insider ownership will result in the alignment of 
managers’ interests with that of shareholders and lead to decisions that are likely to be 
more value-creating (Yusuf et al., 2018). 
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Institution-Based Theory 
Peng et al. (2009) credited the introduction of institutionalism—the idea that 
institutions matter—into the economic realm to economists such as North (1990). 
However, researchers have credited the label of the institution-based view and its 
introduction into the business strategy field to Mike Peng (see Peng, 2014; Peng et al., 
2009). The basic idea of this theory is that the institutional framework in countries 
influences the strategic choices made by firms and their outcomes (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 
2019; Duran et al., 2019; Elango et al., 2019; Elango & Dhandapani, 2020; Finchelstein, 
2017; Meyer & Peng, 2016; Murithi et al., 2020). This theory is related to this study 
because it may explain why diversified firms in Nigeria may outperform their focused 
counterparts, contrary to evidence in developed countries. I based RQ1 and RQ2 on this 
theory. 
Nature of the Study 
I used the quantitative research approach in this study because it is most 
appropriate for examining the relationship between variables (Bloomfield & Fisher, 
2019; Field, 2017; Queiros et al., 2017; Rutberg & Bouikidis, 2018; Seeram, 2019). 
Many similar studies have used this approach (Hoechle et al., 2012; Tsai et al., 2011). 
Researchers have identified some research designs, each with variants: experimental 
designs, quasi-experimental, and nonexperimental or correlational design (Asenahabi et 
al., 2019; Bloomfield & Fisher, 2019; Queiros et al., 2017). For this research, I employed 
the panel (longitudinal) design variant of the nonexperimental (correlational) design 
(Seeram, 2019; Wang et al., 2017; Field, 2017).  
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Three factors informed my choice of this design. First, firms (the unit of analysis) 
are naturally formed groups (Field, 2017), which rules out randomization and 
experimental designs that require the random assignment of the units of analysis into 
experimental and control groups as a way of controlling for other variables that may 
confound the observed relationship (Bloomfield & Fisher, 2019; Field, 2017; Wang et al., 
2017). Second, pretesting was not possible as I had no control over the independent 
variables—regarding when and to whom to introduce them—to test before and after their 
introduction to the groups. The nonexperimental design is suitable where the researcher 
lacks control over the independent variables (Bloomfield & Fisher, 2019; Field, 2017; 
Queiros et al., 2017). Third, because the variables in this study and the relationship 
between them change over time, I needed a design that captured these variations. Panel 
design enabled me to capture these changes by examining these variables from 2008 to 
2018 (Field, 2017; Ployhart & Vandenberg, 2010; Wang et al., 2017; West, 2009).  
The independent variables were diversification status, level of diversification, and 
insider ownership; the dependent variable was firm performance. The control variables 
were firm size, leverage, blockholding, and board independence. Researchers have found 
these variables to be multidimensional constructs. Consequently, as has been proposed by 
some authors (e.g., Hoskisson et al., 1993; Sambharya, 2000), I employed multiple 
measures of firm performance. The data I had did not permit me to operationalize 
multiple constructs of the other variables.  
For this study, I collected data on companies listed on the NSE. I did this by 
reviewing and extracting the data necessary to operationalize the variables from these 
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companies’ annual reports and financial statements. I also collected data from NSE 
publications, such as the NSE FactBook. These sources of data were publicly available. I 
used the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), Version 25, to analyze the 
data. Specifically, I used the linear mixed model (LMM) to test the hypotheses. 
Definitions 
I operationalized four main variables in this study. These were level of 
diversification, diversification status, insider ownership, and firm performance. Level of 
diversification, diversification status, and insider ownership were the independent 
variables; firm performance was the dependent variable. Below, I define these variables 
and other constructs and unique terminologies in this study. A more detailed explanation 
of the variables is presented in the literature review section and Chapter 3.  
Approximate Tobin’s q (ATQ): An approximation of Tobin’s Q that Chung and 
Pruitt (1994) and measured as the market value of common shares plus total liabilities 
divided by total assets (Hyland & Diltz, 2002; Villalonga, 2004). 
Blockholding: The shareholding in which people own a significant percentage of a 
firm’s shares (Edmans & Holderness, 2017). 
Board independence: The board members’ ability to exercise independent 
judgment (Bradley & Chen, 2015). 
Diversification discount: The loss of value arising from the act of diversification 
(Berger & Ofek, 1995; Feldman & McGrath, 2016; Kuppuswamy et al., 2014; Lang & 
Stulz, 1994). 
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Diversification premium: The gain in value arising from the act of diversification 
(Berger & Ofek, 1995; Lang & Stulz, 1994). 
Diversification status: The category in which a firm falls when classified as 
undiversified or as diversified. I classified a firm as undiversified if it operates in only 
one industry measured at the 2-digit SIC code level (Basu, 2010) and as diversified firms 
if they operate in two or more industries measured at the 2-digit SIC code level (Basu, 
2010; Pratyaksa et al., 2015; Servaes, 1996). I used undiversified firm (UDF), focused 
firm, single segment firm, single business firm, single industry firm, and standalone firm 
interchangeably in this study. Likewise, I used diversified firm (DF), multisegment firm, 
multibusiness firm, multi-industry firm, multiproduct firm, and conglomerate 
interchangeably (see Wentland, 2020).  
Emerging markets: Countries with features such as lower levels of development 
measured by such indexes as the gross domestic product (GDP) and gross national 
income (GNI), the transition toward free-market systems, and weak exchange facilitating 
institutions (Gao et al., 2017; Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Rottig, 2016). In this study, I used 
the terms developing country, less developed country, and underdeveloped country 
interchangeably with emerging market. 
Excess value (EV): A measure of performance developed by Berger and Ofek 
(1995) and Lang and Stulz (1994) used to measure the difference between the value of 
the DFs and an estimate of what its value would have been had its segments operated as 
standalone firms.  
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Firm diversification: Classified generally into industrial and geographical. 
Industrial or product diversification is the act of a business entering into or having 
operations in two or more different product or service industries at the same time 
(Jafarinejad et al., 2018; Lohwasser et al., 2019; Maksimovic & Philips, 2013; Patrisia et 
al., 2019; Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989; Schommer et al., 2019; Su & Tsang, 2015). 
Geographical diversification is the act of a firm entering or operating in geographically 
separated regions such as beyond the borders of a country, with the same or different 
products (Eukeria & Favourate, 2014; Jafarinejad et al., 2018; Subramaniam & 
Wasiuzzaman, 2019). I used firm diversification, corporate diversification, 
conglomeration, and business or corporate groups interchangeably (Cheng, 2017). I also 
used product, industrial, or activity diversification interchangeably. 
Firm performance: How well a firm does over a period, given its goals and 
objectives (Richard et al., 2009). I operationalized firm performance by ROE and ATQ 
(Chung & Pruitt, 1994).  
Firm size: The magnitude of a firm’s resources and output (Niresh & Velnampy, 
2014).  
Industry: Researchers have usually defined industry at the 1-digit, 2-digit, 3-digit, 
4-digit, or 5-digit SIC code levels. I used industry, segment, industry segment, line of 
business, and activity interchangeably in this study. If industry is defined at the 2-digit 
SIC code level, all products with the same 2-digit SIC codes belong to the same industry 
(Villalonga, 2004) 
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Insider ownership: Ownership in which people have access to firm-specific 
information that is not available to other investors and that can influence firm decisions 
(Connelly et al., 2010; Kim & Lu, 2011). Such people include the directors (both 
executive and nonexecutive directors) and the firm’s top officers (Muller-Kahle, 2015).  
Level/degree of diversification: The extent to which the firm is engaged in 
different activities and the distribution of the firm’s output (measured, for example, by 
sales, assets, or profit) across the various activities/industries/businesses/segments in 
which the company is operating (Wiersema & Beck, 2017).  
Leverage: The use of debt in a firm’s capital structure (Dao & Ta, 2020; Li et al., 
2019). 
Related and unrelated diversification: Related diversification refers to operating 
in two or more industries that are related; unrelated diversification refers to operations in 
two or more industries that are not related (Chen & Keung, 2018; Li et al., 2020; Neffke 
& Henning, 2013; Nguyen, 2018; Patrisia et al., 2019; Wiersema & Beck, 2017). The 
measure of relatedness is usually subjective (Neffke & Henning, 2013) but reflects such 
factors as product knowledge, manufacturing, and marketing capabilities (Lohwasser et 
al., 2019; Nguyen, 2018; Wiersema & Beck, 2017). However, diversification into a 4-
digit industry within a 2-digit industry would be more related than diversification into 
another 2-digit industry (Aivazian et al., 2019; Chen & Yu, 2012; Pangboonyanon & 
Kalasin, 2018). In this research, I used unrelated diversification interchangeably with 
conglomerate diversification (see also Nguyen, 2018). 
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Return on equity (ROE): Earnings after tax divided by total equity. Previous 
researchers have also used this measure (e.g., Adamu et al., 2011).  
Standard industrial classification (SIC) codes: Internationally accepted codes 
prescribed by the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs of the United 
Nations for classifying all economic activities (United Nations, 2008). The code consists 
of five digits with the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth digits signifying the major 
division, the division, major group, group, and subgroup, respectively. For example, 
according to the United Nations (2008), the SIC code 30141 would have the following 
meaning: the first digit is major division, and 3 is manufacturing; the second digit is 
division, and 0 is manufacturer of food products, beverages, and tobacco products; the 
third digit is major group, and 1 is production, processing, and preservation of meat, fish, 
fruit, vegetables, oils, and fats; the fourth digit is group, and 4 is manufacturer of 
vegetables and animal oils and fats; and the fifth digit is subgroup, and 5 is manufacturer 
of crude oil and oilseed cake. 
Assumptions 
I made the following assumptions in this study. The secondary data I used were 
accurate and measured what I intended. I made this assumption because I had no control 
over the financial reporting of firms and could not guarantee their accuracy. I assumed 
the firms used in the analysis were representative of the firms in the market. It was not 
possible to include all the companies in the country, but I would like to generalize the 
results as much as possible. An assumption was made that SIC codes correctly allocate 
different economic activities into different industries. This assumption arises because 
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some researchers have raised concern with the ability of SIC codes to adequately capture 
the relatedness between activities (see Nigam & Gupta, 2018, 2020). I assumed the 
theoretical framework was appropriate to examine the performance effects of 
diversification and its relationship with insider equity ownership. There are other 
theoretical explanations of the performance effects of diversification, which I identify in 
Chapter 2. 
The assumption was made that the control variables I introduced in the analysis 
captured the effect of variables other than the independent variables on the estimated 
relationships in this study. This assumption arises because there could be other 
confounding variables that I could not include in this research. Although there are 
multiple stakeholders with conflicting interests measured differently in a firm, the 
performance measures that I used in this study assumed that the shareholders are the most 
critical stakeholders in a firm and that their interests should be primary. Shareholders are 
key but not the only stakeholders in a firm (Barney, 2020). The performance measures I 
used in this study were assumed to have measured what the firm aimed at achieving as 
related to the shareholders. Shareholders may have other goals that these measures did 
not capture. 
Scope and Delimitations 
In this study, I was interested in comparing the performance of DFs with that of 
focused firms and examining how the level of insider ownership can explain the D–P 
relationship in Nigeria. I chose Nigeria for this study because, as I explain in Chapter 2, 
the country provides an emerging market context for verifying some of the results on the 
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D–P relationship that researchers have obtained in developed countries. This choice was 
necessary because researchers increasingly recognize that diversification’s performance 
effect is context-specific (Benito-Osorio et al., 2012; Erdorf et al., 2013).  
In this study, I covered only firms listed on the NSE between 2008 and 2018. This 
decision was to ensure the availability of reliable data. Listed companies in Nigeria are 
required to publish their audited annual reports and financial statements. Obtaining 
reliable data from unlisted companies in Nigeria is difficult (Adamu et al., 2011). I chose 
the period covered in this study to ensure the results would reflect the country’s current 
situation because segment reporting requirements took effect in 2008.  
Many theories have been used to explain firm diversification and the performance 
consequences of diversification (Erdorf et al., 2013; Fox & Hamilton, 1994; 
Montgomery, 1994). In this study, my focus was on agency theory and institution-based 
theory (IBT). Even with agency theory, my focus was on the use of insider ownership to 
mitigate agency problems in corporations and how this affects diversification’s 
performance consequences. With IBT, my focus was on how the results obtained in 
Nigeria—an institutionally weak country—differ from those obtained in developed 
countries with better-developed institutions. 
Diversification is a multidimensional construct (Ahuja & Novelli, 2017; Pitts & 
Hopkins, 1982; Varadarajan & Ramanujam, 1987); firm performance is as well (Butler et 
al., 2012; Richard et al., 2009). Covering all their dimensions in this study was 
impossible. Therefore, I was not concerned with geographical diversification. The focus 
was on product/industry/activity diversification and, more specifically, on unrelated 
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diversification. For firm performance, I focused on financial measures of performance 
and specifically on ROE, ATQ, and EV. Before generalizing the results of the study, it is 
necessary to take cognizance of its scope. 
Limitations 
As I detail in Chapter 5, this study was limited in some ways. In the first place, 
the study imbibed the biases and shortcomings of its secondary data sources. I tried to 
ensure data reliability by restricting the study to companies listed on the NSE. These 
companies are legally required to publish annual reports and financial statements that 
give an accurate and fair view of the company’s operations for the reporting period. 
Because of noncompliance with reporting requirements, data to operationalize 
some variables for some years were missing for some companies. I tried to mitigate the 
problem of missing data by searching widely for publicly available and reliable 
information. This strategy reduced the cases of missing data. I also employed the LMM 
analytical technique that accommodated missing data cases better than conventional 
methods such as analysis of variance (ANOVA) or standard regression procedures. 
Segment reporting in Nigeria is still in its initial stages. Levels of aggregation of 
activities varied from company to company and were, in many cases, less informative. 
This problem limited the value of interfirm comparison of reported segment information 
(Hund et al., 2019). It made it impossible for me to operationalize some of the 
diversification and performance constructs I would have used for construct validity. I 
addressed this limitation by narrowing down the study to specific constructs as some 
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authors have suggested (Hoskisson et al., 1993; Sambharya, 2000)—constructs the 
validity of which has been attested to by some experts (Hoskisson et al., 1993). 
I excluded nonfinancial firms and private firms from this study. Therefore, the 
results are generalizable to these firms only to the extent that the sample firms are 
representative of them. I also did not use randomization to control for competing 
explanations of the observed relationships. This limitation makes causal inferences less 
convincing. However, I employed statistical techniques and controlled some variables to 
capture the confounding effects of other variables that offer competing explanations. 
Significance of the Study 
I conducted this study against the background that there has been no consensus on 
the performance effects of diversification and how this is related to insider ownership. In 
Nigeria’s case, little is known about these issues due to the dearth of research in this area 
that has used data on firms operating in Nigeria with its peculiar institutional issues. This 
study, therefore, makes valuable contributions to theory, practice, and positive social 
change. 
Significance to Theory 
This study contributes to the literature on the performance effects of 
diversification in developing countries whose institutional contexts are different from 
those of developed countries (Lee et al., 2008; Khanna & Palepu, 1997). The 
performance effects of diversification have been underresearched in developing countries 
(Chen & Yu, 2012; Grigorieva, 2020; Grigorieva & Gorbatov, 2015). This study is the 
first in which the relationship between insider ownership and the performance effects of 
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diversification in Nigeria was examined. Being the most populous and largest economy 
in Africa, Nigeria is essential for understanding Africa’s corporate diversification issues. 
In this study, I investigated insider ownership of DFs that have outperformed 
UDFs and those that have underperformed. This investigation was to see if the level of 
insider ownership or any other factors account for the difference in the performance of 
DFs, as some authors have suggested (e.g., Basu, 2010; Erdorf et al., 2013; Guerras-
Martín et al., 2020; Hund et al., 2019). This approach was in recognition of the fact that 
diversification could either create or destroy value (Ahn, 2009; Andrés et al., 2017a; 
Basu, 2010; Hund et al., 2019). The approach is unlike previous researchers, such as 
Denis et al. (1997), who proceeded from the wrong premise that diversification is ex ante 
value destroying (Singh et al., 2004).  
My approach is similar to that of Singh et al. (2004). However, Singh et al. 
focused on U.S. firms, whereas my focus in this study was on Nigeria, which has an 
institutional context different from that of the United States. Moreover, Singh et al. 
looked at the difference in the number of diversification gainers and losers in low and 
high insider ownership firms and not the difference in the diversification gains and losses 
among these groups of low and high insider ownership firms. I extended the analysis by 
examining the difference in diversification gains and losses among these low and high 
insider ownership firms and how insider ownership is related to the diversification gains 
and losses. The approach is also different from others that have treated DFs as a 
homogenous group, overlooking some significant differences within the group of DFs 
that explain their performance (Ahn, 2009; Basu, 2010; Hund et al., 2019; Kuppuswany 
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& Villalonga, 2016). None of the previous authors in Nigeria has done this kind of 
analysis. 
I also took into consideration the fact that the variables that affect firm 
performance change over time and between firms. This approach is unlike that of 
previous authors who have used data on Nigerian firms but assumed a static firm 
diversification status, level of diversification, ownership structure, and institutions (e.g., 
Adamu et al., 2011; Mac-Ozigbo & Daniel, 2020; Oladimeji & Udosen, 2019; Oyedijo, 
2012). These authors relied on cross-sectional or pooled panel data (e.g., Mac-Ozigbo & 
Daniel, 2020; Oladimeji & Udosen, 2019; Oyedijo, 2012; Patrick, 2012). These analytical 
techniques ignore the within- and between-group variations in these variables over time 
(Benito-Osorio et al., 2012; Erdorf et al., 2013). 
This study is the first D–P relationship study in Nigeria in which a researcher used 
SIC codes to classify firm activities and identify firms as diversified or undiversified. 
Previous authors who have used Nigerian firm data relied on responses to questionnaires 
to classify firms (e.g., Mac-Ozigbo & Daniel, 2020; Oladimeji & Udosen, 2019; Oyedijo, 
2012; Patrick, 2012). Such responses are highly idiosyncratic (Papadakis & Thanos, 
2010) and make interfirm comparison unreliable.  
Significance to Practice 
The results of this study will be helpful to corporate managers who may be 
considering various growth strategies to adopt in their dynamic environment. The results 
may point to the extent to which corporate diversification is a beneficial strategy in 
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Nigeria. Benito-Osorio et al. (2012) noted that appropriate strategic action in a particular 
country or period may not be suitable for another (see also Selçuk, 2015).  
The results of this study are also helpful to policymakers concerned with 
corporate governance issues. The results may point to the extent to which insider 
ownership is useful as a corporate governance mechanism. As some authors have noted, 
researchers and practitioners increasingly recognize ownership as a form of corporate 
governance (Connelly et al., 2010; Muller-Kahle, 2015). Two central regulatory 
authorities in Nigeria—the Central Bank of Nigeria and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC)—encourage insider ownership as a suitable corporate governance 
mechanism in their codes of corporate governance (see Central Bank of Nigeria, 2006, 
para. 5.1.1; SEC, 2011).  
This study is also relevant for corporate governance policies aimed at increasing 
the quality of financial reporting. Chakrabarty (2015) found that unrelated diversification 
increases the probability of fraudulent reporting. Although I did not examine the 
probability of fraudulent reporting, I found that most of my sample firms were DFs. 
Given Chakrabarty’s finding and my finding of a preponderance of DFs, there is the need 
to be alert to the increased possibilities of higher rates of fraudulent reporting to develop 
timely and adequate control measures. 
From an institution-based view of diversification, a prevalence of highly DFs 
might signal failures in market-supporting institutions. These failures require various 
forms of reform that will improve markets’ functioning, thereby improving social welfare 
(Benito-Osorio et al., 2015; Benito-Osorio et al., 2012; Elango & Lahiri, 2014; Staglianò 
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et al., 2013). My finding that more firms in the sample were diversified points to the 
possibility of some institutional failures in the Nigerian system that managers who adopt 
the diversification strategy hope to overcome within a DF structure. Identifying these 
failures and appropriate reforms to fix them will lead to an overall improvement in the 
economy. 
The results of the study also point to the need for improved segment reporting by 
firms in Nigeria. Presently, reported segment data reflect the chief decision maker’s 
discretion on levels of activity aggregation. It is not based on any standard aggregation 
parameter that will make an interfirm comparison of reported segment data more 
informative. Regulatory bodies need to provide standard codes for activity aggregation 
and segment reporting and enforce compliance. 
Significance to Social Change 
This study also has some implications for positive social change because of its 
relevance for economic growth. Suppose it is found that a particular strategy contributes 
to sustainable performance improvement. In that case it may be a suitable policy 
objective to encourage such for the greater good of society regarding jobs and innovative 
products and services (Kritikos, 2014). Various authors have shown how firm 
diversification can improve economic efficiency and productivity of countries and 
translate to improved social well-being (e.g., Aivazian et al., 2019; Cincera & Ravet, 
2014; Cole & Karl, 2016; Lichtenberg, 1992). This study contributes to positive social 
change by providing information that managers and policymakers could use to improve 
corporate strategy and governance, contributing to improved firm performance, growth, 
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and survival into the future. Firm survival, improved performance, and growth will 
ensure that firms continue to create jobs and innovative products and services on which 
the society depends.  
In this study, contrary to the predictions of institution-based and agency theories, I 
found that in Nigeria, diversification is not associated with better firm performance, and 
insider ownership is not significantly related to the performance effects of diversification. 
Therefore, companies in Nigeria may improve performance by not focusing on whether 
to diversify or not. It does not make any significant difference in performance. They 
could improve performance by focusing on monitoring mechanisms such as blockholding 
and leverage, which I found to be significantly associated with firm performance. With 
improved performance, firms can better attract resources and investors to guarantee their 
survival in the future and contribute to society in various ways.  
Investors can increase their returns and economic well-being by investing in firms 
that have significant blockholding and leverage. I found these monitoring governance 
mechanisms to be positively associated with ATQ. On the other hand, investors can also 
improve their returns by selling their holdings in firms with no significant blockholding 
and leverage. The pressure on such firms’ stock prices may force the managers to take 
corrective actions to improve resource allocation efficiency. 
Summary and Transition 
In this chapter, I argued that firms contribute meaningfully to society in various 
ways. This contribution points to the need for strategies and policies that would ensure 
their survival, growth, and improved performance, especially considering the evidence of 
33 
 
low survival and persistent high-performance rates. I showed that despite the importance 
and preponderance of DFs worldwide, the D–P relationship and how it is moderated by 
insider ownership remain a puzzle. I also indicated that little is known about the D–P 
relationship in Nigeria and how it is affected by insider ownership. This problem is partly 
due to the dearth of research conducted using data on Nigerian firms to address this 
puzzle. Due to institutional differences, the studies conducted elsewhere have not shed 
much light on the puzzle in Nigeria’s case. This gap necessitated this quantitative study 
that contributes to the literature on the D–P relationship in developing countries and to 
the formulation of effective corporate strategies and governance policies. This study also 
has implications for positive social change. 
To elaborate on the need for this study, I present a more detailed review of the D–
P literature in Chapter 2. The aim was to further highlight the gap that still exists. In 
Chapter 3, I discuss the methodology used to collect and analyze data to test the 
hypotheses stated in this chapter.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Many researchers have found that, on average, DFs underperform UDFs (Borah et 
al., 2018; Lee & Hooy, 2018a; Liu et al., 2018; Sturm & Nüesch, 2019). Borah et al. 
(2018) estimated a diversification discount that is higher for high-technology firms 
(26.59%) than low-technology firms (7.46%). Mitton (2012) estimated an average loss in 
annual sales of $3.3 million for an average-sized firm by adding one more segment. 
Despite the diversification discount, many firms continue to diversify (Gopal et al., 
2021).  
The general problem addressed in this study is that the D–P relationship, which 
remains a puzzle, is a primary managerial and public policy concern (Ahuja & Novelli, 
2017; Altieri & Nicodano, 2019; Bhatia & Thakur, 2018; Erdorf et al., 2013; Grigorieva, 
2020; Jara-Bertin et al., 2015b; Schommer et al., 2019). The specific problem is how 
insider ownership is related to the performance effects of diversification in Nigeria. 
Hoechle et al. (2012) explained the underperformance of DFs by inadequate corporate 
governance mechanisms such as low insider ownership. Because of the dearth of studies 
in which researchers have used Nigerian firm data to address these problems, little is 
known about these relationships in the Nigerian context.  
The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine the relationship between 
firm diversification and firm performance and the relationship between insider ownership 
and the performance effects of diversification in Nigeria. There is a consensus that the D–
P relationship remains a puzzle that requires further studies to resolve (Ahuja & Novelli, 
2017; Altieri & Nicodano, 2019; Benito-Osorio et al., 2012; Bhatia & Thakur, 2018; 
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Erdorf et al., 2013; Jara-Bertin et al., 2015b; Schommer et al., 2019). There is also a 
consensus that examination of the D–P relationship in different institutional contexts is a 
way forward to resolving the puzzle (e.g., Ahuja & Novelli, 2017; Benito-Osorio et al., 
2012; Erdorf et al., 2013; Grigorieva, 2020; Qiu, 2014).  
Some authors have suggested moving beyond the relationship to examining the 
factors it depends on (Ahuja & Novelli, 2017; Martinez-Campillo, 2016; Schommer et 
al., 2019). Erdorf et al. (2013) suggested the analysis of factors that differentiate between 
DFs that have outperformed and those that have underperformed as a way to better 
understand the D–P relationship. One of these factors is the agency problem arising from 
the insider ownership level (Selçuk, 2015). As Jara-Bertin et al. (2015a, 2015b) have 
posited, whether diversification discount exists and whether it is related to agency 
problems remains unclear. 
In this chapter, I present the strategy used to search the literature for this study 
and the theoretical foundation that guided the study. After these, I review the literature on 
the variables I used in this study and their relationship. I also review Nigeria’s 
institutional context and the Nigeria-specific literature. Finally, I summarize the chapter. 
Literature Search Strategy 
I searched the literature on the D–P relationship using the Walden University 
Library research databases and other libraries I have access to. Databases searched 
included EBSCOhost Business Source Complete, ProQuest ABI/INFORM Complete, 
ProQuest Central, Elsevier SD Business Management and Accounting, LexisNexis 
Academic, Gale Cengage Expanded Academic ASAP, Sage Premier 2013, Emerald 
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Management 200, Annual Reviews, DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals, and Free 
E-Journals. I also searched the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) and Google 
Scholar. 
The keywords I used to search were diversification, conglomeration, firm 
performance, ownership structure, corporate governance, leverage, blockholding, and 
ownership concentration. However, given that there are articles that would use words like 
diversified, I followed Schommer et al. (2019) and searched for diversif*, conglomerat*, 
and perform*. Using diversif* turned out more articles than diversification. Some of the 
articles dealt with workforce diversity and portfolio diversification. These were not of 
interest in this study and, therefore, not considered.  
When I started the literature search in preparation for this study in February 2014, 
I specified the period 2009 to 2014. However, I set up a Google Scholar alert with the 
above keywords, which alerted me to any new scholarly article on these keywords and 
enabled me to update my reading list with the most current literature in the area. I also 
looked at the articles’ reference lists for relevant works that my search strategy may not 
have picked up, especially the seminal works in the area. 
Theoretical Foundation 
Two theories formed the theoretical foundation of this research: agency theory 
and IBT. These theories help understand how diversification could affect firm 
performance and how insider ownership may relate to diversification’s performance 
effects.  
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Agency Theory 
Some authors credit the development of agency theory to Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). However, Mitnick (2019a, 2019b) has argued that despite Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) having been widely cited and greatly influential in this area, its citation as the 
original paper on this theory is inaccurate. According to Mitnick, this is because there had 
been published works on agency theory by such scholars as Stephen Ross and Barry 
Mitnick (see also Panda & Leepsa, 2017)  
Agency theory is based on the assumption that the principal economic participants 
in a corporation (the owners and managers) are risk-averse individuals who aim at 
maximizing their utilities (Connelly et al., 2010; Castañer & Kavadis, 2013; Lacoste et 
al., 2010; Schillemans & Bjurstrøm, 2020; Yusuf et al., 2018). The managers of these 
corporations are usually not the owners or, at best, own only a proportion of the shares; 
have motivations that are different from those of the owners; and do not bear the total 
cost of their decisions (Connelly et al., 2010; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Lacoste et al., 
2010; Pande & Ansari, 2014; Rashid, 2015; Yusuf et al., 2018). The owners’ and 
managers’ divergent motivations may lead to a conflict of interest in decision making 
(Bendickson et al., 2016; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Rashid, 2015; Schillemans & 
Bjurstrøm, 2020; Yusuf et al., 2018).  
Agency theory predicts that when there is such conflict of interest, the managers 
will likely pursue their interests even when shareholder value destroying (Bendickson et 
al., 2016; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Schillemans & Bjurstrøm, 2020; Yusuf et al., 2018). 
Agency theorists, therefore, prescribe two types of corporate governance mechanisms to 
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prevent managers from such opportunistic behavior: interest alignment and 
controlling/monitoring mechanisms (Davis et al., 1997; Panda & Leepsa, 2017; Pande & 
Ansari, 2014; Rashid, 2015; Schillemans & Bjurstrøm, 2020; Yusuf et al., 2018). Interest 
alignment mechanisms are aimed at aligning managerial interest with that of the 
shareholders and include managerial equity ownership and performance-based executive 
compensation schemes (Davis et al., 1997; Panda & Leepsa, 2017; Pande & Ansari, 
2014; Schillemans & Bjurstrøm, 2020; Yusuf et al., 2018). Controlling (monitoring) 
mechanisms such as independent boards, blockholding, and increased leverage aim to 
control managers’ self-serving behavior (Davis et al., 1997; Panda & Leepsa, 2017; 
Pande & Ansari, 2014; Rashid, 2015; Yusuf et al., 2018).  
Denis et al. (1997) used this theory to explain firms’ continued diversification 
even in the face of underperformance of DFs relative to their focused counterparts. Denis 
et al. (1997) put forward an “agency cost hypothesis” (p. 135) of firm diversification and 
argued that managers derive personal benefits that are greater than their costs from the 
diversification strategy. Managers, therefore, have the incentive to continue diversifying, 
even if it is shareholder value destroying, except if checked by such control mechanisms 
as block share purchases.  
On the basis of agency theory, Denis et al. (1997) predicted that as managers’ 
ownership in a firm increases, they bear more of the costs of their value-destroying 
diversification decisions. Therefore, managers would be less likely to make such 
decisions (see also Lin et al., 2014). Denis et al. (1997) also predicted that managers 
would reduce value-destroying diversification only if pressured by some governance 
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structures. Agency theory was also the theoretical basis of studies conducted by 
Anderson et al. (2000), Hoechle et al. (2012), and Lien and Li (2013).  
Agency theory suggests that diversification is a strategy motivated by managerial 
self-interest and will not likely create value. Consequently, DFs would be expected to 
underperform focused firms. DFs with inadequate corporate governance structures would 
also be expected to underperform those with adequate corporate governance structures. 
Some authors consider low managerial equity ownership, less block/concentrated 
shareholding, less independent boards, and low leverage as inadequate corporate 
governance structures (Denis et al., 1997; Hoechle et al., 2012). 
Institution-Based Theory 
The idea that institutions matter has been rooted in economics and sociology since 
the last decades of the 19th century (Garrido et al., 2014; Meyer & Peng, 2016; Peng et 
al., 2009; Puffer et al., 2015; Rottig, 2016). Douglas North pioneered the theory’s recent 
development in the broader economic realm with his 1990 work “Institutions, 
Institutional Change, and Economic Performance” (Peng, 2014; Peng et al., 2009). 
However, Peng et al. (2009) has credited the institution-based view’s label and its 
introduction into the business strategy realm to Mike Peng (Garrido et al., 2014; Peng, 
2014). Many other authors, such as Tarun Khanna and Krishna Palepu, have also made 
valuable contributions in this area, especially with their 1997 work titled “Why Focused 
Strategy May Be Wrong for Emerging Markets” (Khanna & Palepu, 1997, p. 41). 
The basic assumption in IBT is that different countries and stages of development 
present different formal and informal institutional contexts, and firms dynamically 
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interact with these institutions (Elango & Lahiri, 2014; Garrido et al., 2014; Meyer & 
Peng, 2016; Murithi et al., 2020; Peng, 2014; Peng et al., 2009; Rottig, 2016). The theory 
makes two predictions. The first is that the dynamic interaction of firms with these 
institutions shape the strategic choices managers and firms make and the outcomes of 
such choices (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2019; Duran et al., 2019; Elango et al., 2019; Elango 
& Dhandapani, 2020; Elango & Lahiri, 2014; Finchelstein, 2017; Garrido et al., 2014; 
Peng et al., 2009; Meyer & Peng, 2016; Murithi et al., 2020; Rottig, 2016). Therefore, a 
strategy would not be expected to perform similarly in all contexts and periods. The 
second prediction is that the lack of clarity or failure of formal institutions make the 
informal institutions play a more significant role in reducing uncertainty, providing 
direction, determining legitimacy, and how managers and firms are rewarded 
(Chowdhury et al., 2019; Meyer & Peng, 2016; Murithi et al., 2020; Peng et al., 2009).  
Lee et al. (2008), Kuppuswamy et al. (2014), Lien and Li (2013), Lohwasser et al. 
(2019), and Berry-Stölzle et al. (2013), among others, have used this theory to explain 
performance differences in DFs across countries and over time. Kuppuswamy et al. and 
Berry-Stölzle et al. found that DFs performed better in institutionally weak environments. 
Lee et al. (2008) found that as the economy and its institutions developed, a 
diversification strategy tended to move from a value-creating strategy to a value-
destroying one. On the basis of this theory, a diversification strategy in developing 
countries such as Nigeria would be expected to be a value-creating strategy, and DFs in 
Nigeria would be expected to outperform their focused counterparts (Khanna & Palepu, 
1997; Kuppuswamy et al., 2014).  
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Literature Review 
In this section, I review the literature as it relates to the variables in this study. I 
review the literature relating to the conceptualization and measurement of firm 
diversification, and some of the theories researchers have used to explain it. I also review 
the literature on the conceptualization and measurement of firm performance, insider 
ownership in the context of agency theory and corporate governance, and on the control 
variables—namely, firm size, leverage, blockholding, and board independence. 
Following these, I review the literature on the relationship between diversification and 
firm performance, insider ownership and the performance effects of firm diversification, 
and Nigeria as an emerging market. I also review the literature on the D–P relationship 
specific to Nigerian firms and finally summarize the chapter.  
Meaning and Measurement of Firm Diversification 
The conceptualization, definition, and measurement of diversification seem to 
have varied a great deal (Garcia et al., 2013; Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989; 
Wiersema & Beck, 2017). Various definitions have emphasized different things (Zechser, 
2019). These include operating in or entry into new/different industries or markets (with 
or without new products) and the extent of involvement in each industry or market 
(Lahiri & Purkayastha, 2017; Lee & Hooy, 2018a; Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989; 
Santarelli & Tran, 2016; Sun & Govind, 2017; Wiersema & Beck, 2017; Zechser, 2019). 
However, irrespective of the perspective adopted, the idea of dissimilarities in the 
activities, businesses/industries, or markets in which a firm is engaged seems to run 
through the definitions (Gort, 1962; Pitts & Hopkins, 1982; Santarelli & Tran, 2016; 
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Wiersema & Beck, 2017). Given the various conceptualizations of diversification, it 
becomes necessary that the measurement of diversification in any study should be 
clarified. The measurement should allow the use of available data and make interfirm 
comparison possible by ensuring consistency across firms (Zechser, 2019). 
Depending on how researchers conceptualized and defined diversification, several 
approaches, varying in strengths and weaknesses, have been developed in the literature to 
measure diversification. According to Gort (1962), the measure will depend on the 
problem of interest. Researchers have measured diversification recognizing the different 
activities a firm is engaged in, each activity’s contribution to the firm’s output, the 
primary activity’s contribution, and the extent to which the different activities of the firm 
are related (Gort, 1962; Pitts & Hopkins, 1982; Wiersema & Beck, 2017). Pitts and 
Hopkins (1982) identified two main approaches to measuring diversification, each with 
several variants. These include the business count approach and the strategic approach 
(Pitts & Hopkins, 1982; Wiersema & Beck, 2017).  
Business Count Measures 
Concerning the business count measure, researchers have identified several 
variants. These include the simple numerical count approach, comprehensive or 
composite indexes approaches (Pitts & Hopkins, 1982; Wiersema & Beck, 2017), and the 
discrete two-dimensional categorical diversification measure (Varadarajan & 
Ramanujam, 1987). The business count measures could also be discrete or continuous. 
Simple Numerical Count. The simple numerical count approach is a discrete 
measure where the number of different industries in which a firm operates is employed to 
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define diversification (Pitts & Hopkins, 1982; Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989; 
Wiersema & Beck, 2017). One system for defining industry is the SIC code system to 
define industry (Pitts & Hopkins, 1982; Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989). This measure 
has two variants. In one variant, researchers measure diversification as a dummy 
(categorical) variable to indicate the firm’s diversification status. It may be measured to 
classify firms as diversified or undiversified, moderately diversified, or highly diversified 
(Oweis, 2012; Shen et al., 2018)  
In the case of DF and UDF status, diversification may be measured as a dummy 
variable equal to 1 or 0. In this case, firms that operate in two or more industries are 
diversified and take the value of 1; those that operate in one industry are undiversified 
and take the value of 0 (Lee & Hooy, 2018a, 2018b; Mackey, Barney, & Dotson, 2017; 
Oweis, 2012; Shen et al., 2018). The industry may be defined at different levels using 
SIC codes – say at 2-digit, 3-digit, or 4-digit SIC code levels. Many authors have 
employed this measure (see Brahmana et al., 2019; Custódio, 2014; Kuppuswamy et al., 
2014; Lawrey & Morris, 2019; Lee & Hooy, 2018a, 2018b; Liebenberg & Lin, 2019; 
Mackey et al., 2017; Nguyen et al., 2017; Sener & Akben-Selcuk, 2020; Sturm & 
Nüesch, 2019; Villalonga, 2004). 
The second variant of the simple numerical count approach is to count the number 
of industries in which a firm is operating using industry classification codes such as SIC 
codes. Many authors have used this measure (see for instance Berger & Ofek, 1995; 
Custódio, 2014; Giachetti, 2012; Lang & Stulz, 1994; Lawrey & Morris, 2019; Lee & 
Hooy, 2018a, 2018b; Liebenberg & Lin, 2019; Murphy & Tocher, 2017; Shen et al., 
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2018; Sun & Govind, 2017). While the dummy variable (diversification status) measure 
does not consider the degree of diversification but only identifies whether diversification 
exists or not, the count of the number of industries identifies the degree/level of 
diversification (Oweis, 2012). The more the number of industries in which a firm 
operates, the higher its diversification (Wiersema & Beck, 2017). For the diversification 
dummy approach, there is no distinction between a firm that operates in two industries 
and another that operates in five industries. 
Consequently, the diversification dummy is only appropriate if one is interested in 
assessing the effect of being diversified. It is not applicable when the interest is in the 
effect of being more or less diversified (Mackey et al., 2017; Oweis, 2012). If the interest 
is in the latter, the number of industries will be more appropriate (Gort, 1962; Oweis, 
2012). 
The simple business count approach has the advantage of reflecting the full extent 
of dissimilarity in the activity, businesses, or industries in which a firm is engaged (Pitts 
& Hopkins, 1982). The data for this measure are also more readily available (Pitts & 
Hopkins, 1982), and it does not require segment/business-level data (Lubatkin et al., 
1993). However, it does not recognize the size differences of these activities and their 
contribution to the firm’s total output (Berry, 1971; García et al., 2013; Lawrey & Morris, 
2019; Pitts & Hopkins, 1982). It also says little about the relatedness of the various 
activities – relatedness of activities being at the heart of diversification definition (Nigam 
& Gupta, 2018, 2020). However, as Gort (1962) suggested, the number of industries is an 
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appropriate measure if the interest is on the extent to which the firm is engaged in 
unrelated activities.  
Comprehensive Index/Weighted Business Count Measure. This is a 
continuous measure of diversification. The approach calculates an index of 
diversification by weighting the contributions of each of the firm’s activities with an 
assigned weight (Pitts & Hopkins, 1982), as follows: 
𝐷 = ∑𝑃𝑖𝑊𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                                                                                                                   (1) 
Where D is the diversification index, Pi is the contribution of activity i to the firm output, 
Wi is the weight assigned to activity i, and n is the number of activities in which the firm 
is engaged.  
In the comprehensive index measure, researchers typically assign weights in two 
ways. The first is to apply the Herfindahl Index of industrial concentration modified to 
represent the distribution of the firm’s activities or businesses. A firm’s activities are 
usually differentiated with SIC codes (García et al., 2013; Wiersema & Beck, 2017). The 
index is modified to increase with increasing diversification. The higher the index, the 
higher the diversification (Berry, 1971; De la Fuente & Velasco, 2015; Lawrey & Morris, 
2019; Lee & Hooy, 2018b). This approach weights each activity’s share by itself. Thus, 
𝐷𝐻 = 1 − ∑𝑃𝑖
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                                                                                                             (2) 
Where 𝐷𝐻 is the diversification Herfindahl Index, Pi is the contribution of activity i to 
total firm output and n is the total number of activities. This approach has been employed 
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in many studies (e.g., Berger &Ofek, 1995; Lang & Stulz, 1994; Lawrey & Morris, 2019; 
Lee, 2017; Liebenberg & Lin, 2019; Setianto, 2020; Villalonga, 2004; Wu & Chiang, 
2019). 
The Herfindahl Index approach has the advantage of reflecting all the activities of 
the firm and their contributions to the firm’s output. It is also relatively easy to compute 
(García et al., 2013; Sambharya, 2000). However, has some limitations. It cannot be 
decomposed to indicate related and unrelated diversification (García et al., 2013; 
Sambharya, 2000). It also does not capture the relatedness of activities very well because 
it is based on the SIC codes. By using SIC codes, the researcher assumes that activities in 
the same SIC code have the same degree of relatedness. This assumption is not always 
realistic (Nigam & Gupta, 2018, 2020; Wiersema & Beck, 2017). Moreover, relatedness 
between two activities may come from factors other than common SIC codes, such as 
resources and markets (Nigam & Gupta, 2018, 2020). 
The second weight assignment approach is the Entropy Index, 𝐷𝐸, in which 
researchers weight each activity’s contribution, 𝑃𝑖, by the natural logarithm of its inverse, i.e., 
the natural logarithm of 1 𝑃𝑖
⁄  . Thus, 
𝐷𝐸 = 1 − ∑𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔
1
𝑃𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                                                                                                                  (3) 
By using 𝑙𝑜𝑔
1
𝑃𝑖
, larger activities get proportionally lesser weight (Pitts & Hopkins, 1982). 
As 𝐷𝐸 approaches zero, the more focused the firm becomes. The advantage of the 
Entropy Index over the Herfindahl index is that it can be decomposed into an index for 
measuring related and unrelated diversification (García et al., 2013; Sambharya, 2000). 
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However, like the Herfindahl Index approach, the Entropy Index is also based on SIC 
codes which, as Nigam and Gupta (2018, 2020) have identified, does not capture activity 
relatedness adequately. Authors such as Custódio (2014), Ramaswamy et al. (2017), 
Sturm and Nüesch (2019), Sener and Akben-Selcuk (2020), Wu and Chiang (2019), and 
Zúñiga-Vicente et al., (2019), among others, have employed Entropy Index.  
The problem with measures that are based on the contribution of different 
activities is that they are data-intensive, requiring data at the segment level. Therefore, it 
will be challenging to apply such measures in situations where segment reporting is not 
well-developed (Varadarajan & Ramanujam,1987). In many developing countries, 
segment reporting is still in its rudimentary stages, and there is hardly reliable 
information at the segment level (García et al., 2013; Jouida et al., 2017; Sambharya, 
2000). Where segment information exists, interfirm segment data are hardly comparable 
due to differences in the definition and levels of aggregation of activities. However, as 
Gort (1962) suggested, the weighted business count measure is appropriate if the purpose 
is to determine the extent the firm depends on each of the activities. 
Two-Dimensional Categorical Diversification Measure. Varadarajan and 
Ramanujam (1987) developed this measure to mitigate the data requirements of the 
comprehensive index measures and the strategic approach while still capturing the 
relatedness concerns of Rumelt (1982). In this approach, Varadarajan and Ramanujam 
distinguished two patterns of diversification: broad-spectrum diversification (BSD) and 
narrow spectrum diversification (NSD). BSD refers to the number of 2-digit SIC code 
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industries that a firm operates in; NSD is the number of 4-digit SIC code industries that 
the firm is active.in. 
 The mean NSD (MNSD) is the average number of 4-digit SIC code industries in 
every 2-digit SIC industry that a firm operates in (García et al., 2013; Sambharya, 2000; 
Varadarajan & Ramanujam, 1987). In this approach, Varadarajan and Ramanujam (1987) 
conceived NSD as related diversification and BSD as unrelated diversification. 
Varadarajan and Ramanujam pointed out that this approach leads to a categorization of 
firms as High BSD-High MNSD, High BSD-Low MNSD, Low BSD-High-MNSD, and 
Low BSD-Low MNSD, similar to Rumelt’s (1982) classification. 
Chao et al. (2012) used the measure. The advantage of this measure is that it does 
not require extensive segment data that are usually not available, especially in developing 
countries. It also provides insights into the degree of diversification that is of concern to 
the proponents of the weighted business count approach and indicates the direction of 
diversification (related or unrelated) that is of interest to proponents of the strategic 
approaches (Chao et al., 2012; Varadarajan and Ramanujam, 1987). However, it relies on 
industry classification codes, with all its limitations, as identified by Rumelt (1982) and 
Nigam and Gupta (2018, 2020). Its validity and reliability are still questionable (García et 
al., 2013; Sambharya, 2000). 
Strategic Approach 
With this approach, researchers operationalize diversification by the logic 
underlying its development (Pitts & Hopkins, 1982). Rumelt (1982) criticized the 
business count measures on the ground of their failure to recognize the variations in the 
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breadth of the SIC classes that are often used (see also Hauschild & zu Knyphausen-
Aufseß, 2013; Nigam & Gupta, 2018, 2020). Another criticism is the implicit assumption 
that the dissimilarities between different SIC classes are equal (Nigam & Gupta, 2018, 
2020). There are two major measures under the strategic approach: Rumelt’s measure and 
the correlation-based diversification measure.  
Rumelt’s Measure. Against the criticisms, of the business count measures, 
Rumelt (1982) developed six major diversification categories, namely, single business, 
dominant vertical, dominant linked unrelated, related constrained, related linked, and 
unrelated business (p. 360). Rumelt based these classifications on specialization and 
relatedness ratios. The specialization ratio measures the contribution of a firm’s largest 
activity to the total firm output; the relatedness ratio measures the extent to which 
activities are related in one form or the other, such as in the sharing of resources, 
technologies, or markets (Adamu et al., 2011; Varadarajan & Ramanujam, 1987). Adamu 
et al. (2011) and Yigit and Behram (2013), among others, used this approach 
The weakness of the Rumelt’s measure is that it is data-intensive, and data are not 
readily available in many countries. It is also highly subjective because it depends on a 
qualitative assessment of patterns of diversification and degree of relatedness (García et 
al., 2013; Nigam & Gupta, 2018, 2020; Sambharya, 2000; Varadarajan & Ramanujam, 
1987). Consequently, there may be an almost unmanageable number of classes. 
Correlation-Based Diversification (CBD) Measure. Because of the limitations 
of the business count measures, Nigam and Gupta (2018, 2020) developed the CBD 
measure of diversification. Nigam and Gupta argued that the measure captures the 
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relatedness of activities more objectively than other measures such as Rumelt’s. The 
measure allows researchers to decompose diversification into related and unrelated and 
further dividing related diversification into positively related diversification (PRD) and 
negatively related diversification (Nigam & Gupta, 2018, 2020). The idea behind PRD 
and negatively related diversification (NRD) is that two activities may be related based 
on a particular factor whose impact on the activities is not always in the same direction 
but could be positive or negative (Nigam & Gupta, 2018, 2020). Consequently, PRD and 
NRD could have divergent relationships with firm performance (Nigam & Gupta, 2018, 
2020). 
On the basis of the CBD measure, the total diversification (𝐷𝑇) measure is 
calculated as follows (Nigam & Gupta, 2018, p. 5): 
𝐷𝑇 = 1 −
[
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                                                                           (4) 
Where, 
 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗 = the correlation coefficient between the sales of a pair of the firm’s products i and 
j, where i ≠ j; 
𝑃𝑖 = the proportion of total firm sale accounted for by product i; 
𝑁 = total number of products of the firm. 
To calculate PRD and NRD, the related diversification (𝐷𝑅) needs to be 
calculated first (Nigam & Gupta, 2020). Doing so requires calculating the correlation 
between each pair of the firm’s products first and then using this correlation as input for 
the diversification score (𝐷𝑖𝑗) for the pair of the firm’s products (Nigam & Gupta, 2020). 
The diversification score is calculated as 
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𝐷𝑖𝑗 = {1 − [𝑃𝑖
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2
                                                     (5) 
Where, 
 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗 is the correlation coefficient between the sales of products i and j; 
𝑃𝑖 and 𝑃𝑗  are the proportions of sales of the pair of i and j that are accounted by products i 
and j, respectively. 
Related diversification (𝐷𝑅) is then calculated by summing the diversification 
score (𝐷𝑖𝑗) of each pair of the firm’s products as follows: 
∑𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑗=1
                                                                                                                                             (6) 
where n is the number of pairs of products of the firm 
PRD and NRD are calculated as the sum of 𝐷𝑖𝑗’s of all pairs of products with positive 
and negative correlation coefficients, respectively. In contrast, unrelated diversification 
(𝐷𝑈) is computed as the sum of 𝐷𝑖𝑗’s of all pairs of products with no correlation (Nigam 
& Gupta, 2020). 𝐷𝑇  is calculated by summing PRD, NRD, and 𝐷𝑈 . Nigam and Gupta 
(2018, 2020) pointed out that 𝐷𝑇 will range from 0 to 1; if the correlation coefficient 
between all products is 1, 𝐷𝑇 = 0; if the correlation is negative, 𝐷𝑇 will be higher, and the 
higher the 𝐷𝑇, the higher the level of diversification. 
No researcher other than the developers (Nigam & Gupta, 2018, 2020) has 
employed the CBD measure. Researcher do not yet know much about the usefulness of 
this measure. However, the measure suffers from the same subjective judgment the 
developers accused the other measures of suffering because the definition of product and 
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product groups is subjective. The measure also seems more tedious and data-intensive; it 
requires data at the product level to compute correlation coefficients and the 
diversification scores for each pair of products. This can run into many hundreds for 
multiple product firms. It is also impossible for new firms without history of sales to 
compute correlation coefficients for pairs of products. 
In summary, the way researchers measure diversification depends on how they 
conceptualize it (Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989) and the purpose of its measurement 
(Gort, 1962; Pitts & Hopkins, 1982). Pitts and Hopkins (1982) recommend the use of 
business count when considering differences between groups of diversified and focused 
firms (see also Gort, 1962). They also recommended strategic approaches when the 
consideration is intergroup differences. On the basis of the finding of little support for the 
construct validity of the different diversification measures, Sambharya (2000) 
recommended the use of more than one measure of diversification to avoid spurious 
results.  
It appears that the application of any measure will also depend on the availability 
of data. Rumelt (1982) acknowledged this when he pointed out that firms rarely give 
detailed reports that can permit some precision in measuring their specialization and 
related ratios (see also Pitts & Hopkins, 1982). Chao et al. (2012) cited the lack of most 
of the information necessary to operationalize the other diversification measures as their 
reason for using the BSD-MNSD approach.  
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Theories of Firm Diversification 
Researchers proposed several theories explaining the motives for firm 
diversification (García et al., 2013; Lahiri & Purkayastha, 2017; Ljubownikow & Ang, 
2020; Picone & Dagnino, 2016). However, Fox and Hamilton (1994) identified two 
major groups of these theories: the stewardship theory and agency theory. Whereas 
agency theories assume that managers pursue diversification strategy for personal 
benefits (Fox & Hamilton, 1994; García et al., 2013; Montgomery, 1994), the 
stewardship theories see diversification as an initiative with which managers aim at 
improving organizational performance (Fox & Hamilton, 1994).  
Fox and Hamilton (1994) included under the stewardship theory such positive 
reasons as the achievement of economies of scale, growth, preservation of market power 
(García et al., 2013; Montgomery, 1994), risk reduction, and creation of ICMs. Fox and 
Hamilton classified negative reasons for diversification under agency theory. These 
reasons include increased managerial compensation, empire-building for power and 
prestige, entrenchment, and manager unemployment risk reduction (see also García et al., 
2013; Montgomery, 1994). By integrating the Montgomery (1994), García et al. (2013), 
and the Fox and Hamilton’s views, I summarize the motives for firm diversification into 
six theories: market power theory, defensive diversification theory, debt coinsurance 
theory, excess capacity in resource theory, internal markets theory, and agency theory.  
The question of why firms diversify is of interest for the D–P relationship. The 
reason is that, to some extent, the result from the diversification initiative will depend on 
the motive that dominates the diversification decision (Ahuja & Novelli, 2017; Basu, 
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2010; Dey & Banerjee, 2019; López-Zapata et al., 2019). If agency considerations 
dominate, diversification will more likely produce negative results (Dey & Banerjee, 
2019; López-Zapata et al., 2019; Staglianò et al., 2013; Taĝ, 2017). The results will be 
more positive if stewardship motives are dominant (Dey & Banerjee, 2019). Given the 
lack of consensus on effects, of diversification on performance, it is hard to say which 
motive dominates the diversification decision. I address these hypotheses in the following 
sections. 
Market Power Hypothesis  
This hypothesis posits that the conglomerate’s size is a source of power that 
enables the DFs to withstand and suppress competition through predatory pricing 
practices (Cheng, 2017; Khanna & Yafeh, 2015). The cross-subsidization of different 
businesses with profits from more profitable units facilitates predatory pricing 
(Montgomery, 1994). For big firms as diversified companies (Hund et al., 2013), another 
source of market power is that the practices of such firms tend to be cooperative rather 
than competitive with each other but aimed at squeezing out smaller firms (Cheng, 2017; 
Khanna & Yafeh, 2015; Montgomery, 1994).  
The collaborative practices (mutual forbearance) that reduce competition and 
improve firm performance is the case for firms with multimarket contacts such as DFs 
(Degl’Innocenti et al., 2014). However, Chuang et al. (2018) found evidence supporting 
an inverted U-shaped relationship between multimarket contacts and firm performance in 
their analysis of 233 global semiconductor firms competing in 52 market segments in the 
period 2000 to 2009. Chuang et al.’s explanation for this relationship is that the 
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development of mutual forbearance between rival firms with multimarket contacts 
depends on the level of multimarket contacts. According to Chuang et al., the 
development of mutual forbearance is complex at low levels of multimarket contacts. 
This complexity stems from the lack of opportunities for competing firms to learn and 
monitor each other’s behaviors to determine the credibility of their threat for cross-
market retaliation (Chuang et al., 2018). Nevertheless, as multimarket contact increases 
to moderate levels, the opportunities for developing mutual forbearance also increases, 
thereby, lowering competition and increasing firm performance (Chuang et al., 2018).  
Chuang et al. (2018) also argued, that at high levels of multimarket contact, the 
difficulties of monitoring and coordinating across multiple markets to prevent unintended 
competition with rivals make it harder to develop and maintain mutual forbearance 
between the firm and its rivals. The difficulties of developing and maintaining mutual 
forbearance at low and high levels of multimarket contact results in the inverted U-
shaped multimarket contact-firm performance relationship (Chuang et al., 2018). 
However, it is questionable whether Chuang et al.’s findings can be replicated in other 
settings. Chuang et al. also premised their work on the assumption that multimarket 
contact leads to mutual forbearance that affects firm performance. However, Chuang et 
al. failed to test this assumption by empirically measuring mutual forbearance. 
Generally, proponents of the market power theory expect increased market power 
and reduced competition to lead to a linear improvement in firm performance as the level 
of diversification increases (Montgomery, 1994; Palich et al., 2000). However, Palich et 
al., (2000) pointed out that empirical evidence does not seem to support the relationship 
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between the level of diversification and the anticompetitive practices hypothesized by the 
market power theory (see also Güth et al., 2016). Palich et al. also indicated that the 
evidence relating to collaborative practices (mutual forbearance) between firms with 
multimarket contacts, is at best, inconclusive (see also Chuang et al., 2018; 
Degl’Innocenti et al., 2014).  
Defensive Diversification Hypothesis 
The defensive diversification hypothesis essentially says that firms diversify to 
defend themselves against adverse developments in the marketplace (Bhatia & Thakur, 
2018; Yamoah & Kanyandekwe, 2014). These adverse developments include sales and 
profit instability, unfavorable competitive shifts, and antitrust regulations (Bhatia & 
Thakur, 2018; Yamoah & Kanyandekwe, 2014). Consistent with this hypothesis, 
Mangani and Tarrini (2017) found that diversification increases the probability of 
survival in recession among Italian firms in the digital publishing industry. Murphy and 
Tocher (2017) argued that diversification is a survival strategy for small firms given their 
greater vulnerability to changes in one product market.  
Mendoza-Abarca and Gras (2019) found that although diversification in newly 
founded nonprofit organizations reduces organizational efficiency, it increases their 
survival chances. Altieri and Nicodano (2016) found that the average default probability 
of DFs is 3.20% to 7% lower than that of focused firms. According to Altieri and 
Nicodano, this result is supportive of the idea that diversification increases firm survival 
rate. Many other authors also found evidence supporting the defensive diversification 
57 
 
hypothesis (e.g., Arikan & Stulz, 2016; Gatzer et al., 2015; Holder & Zhao, 2015; King et 
al., 2015).  
Debt Coinsurance/Pure Financial Rationale Hypothesis 
The argument here is that the less dependence of the DFs on one or few activities 
and the imperfect correlation between these activities and their cash flows create a kind 
of coinsurance that portfolio theorists expect to reduce the firm’s overall risk (Haug et al., 
2018; Lewellen, 1971). Ibekwe (2017) found that the attitude of bank credit managers 
and analysts in Mozambique to corporate diversification is generally positive; a 
significant majority of the bank managers and analysts agreed that the probability of loan 
default is lower amongst DFs than UDFs. The respondents attributed this lower 
probability of default to reasons related to the coinsurance effect of diversification. This 
is also the case with group-affiliated firms in times of crisis, as Avramidis et al. (2017) 
and Santioni et al. (2020) found in Greece and Italy cases respectively. Consistent with 
the coinsurance effect hypothesis, Nußmann (2018) found that diversification leads to 
more predictable earnings, and DFs with less correlated segment earnings have higher 
earnings quality.  
The coinsurance tends to reduce a DF’s bankruptcy risk and attract lower cost of 
capital that enables it to accommodate more debt (Aivazian et al., 2015; Demirci et al., 
2020; Franco et al., 2016; Hann et al., 2013; Haug et al., 2019; Lewellen, 1971; Mooney 
& Shim, 2015). Chief finance officers and credit analysts cited these as the essential 
financial effects of diversification (Gatzer et al., 2014; Ibekwe, 2017). Greater debt 
capacity increases the capability to fund positive net present value projects, that are 
58 
 
expected to improve firm performance (Erdorf et al., 2013; Franco et al., 2016). If used 
efficiently, the increased debt capacity also yields tax benefits because interest on debt is 
tax-deductible (Lewellen, 1971; Wentland, 2020). Indeed, Wentland (2020) found that 
DFs have lower tax liabilities than focused firms. This finding may not be due to DFs 
engaging in more tax avoidance practices; as Zheng (2017) found, DFs engage in fewer 
tax avoidance practices than focused firms. 
Whether firms diversify for coinsurance and to increase debt capacity is still not 
firmly established. For instance, Haug et al. (2018) found that DFs are associated with 
lower bankruptcy risk than focused firms. However, contrary to the coinsurance effect of 
diversification on the cost of capital (lower cost of debt), Altieri (2020) found that 
compared to focused firms that continued to report single segments following the 
introduction of SFAS 131 in 1997, the firms that started reporting multiple segments 
suffered an increase in the cost of debt. Altieri explained this finding by investors’ 
perception of inefficiency in ICMs following perceived diversification. On the basis of 
the diversification discount literature, Altieri assumed that DFs suffer from inefficient 
capital allocation in ICMs and that bondholders perceive this to exacerbate default risk. 
However, Altieri did not consider the diversification premium literature that shows many 
DFs are more efficient in capital allocation than focused firms.  
Banal-Estañol et al. (2013) criticized the coinsurance hypothesis for not 
addressing what they called “risk contamination losses” (p. 3143). Risk contamination 
loss arises when a project’s failure drags down other successful projects (Banal-Estañol et 
al., 2013, p. 3143). This situation increases the probability of default and bankruptcy cost 
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as the combined returns of the jointly financed projects may no longer be sufficient to 
meet the obligations arising from the joint financing (Banal-Estañol et al., 2013). The 
increased probability of default results in negative financial synergy and makes 
conglomeration bad. Consequently, diversification’s ability to lower the cost of capital 
and increase debt capacity seems to depend on whether it is coinsurance or risk 
contamination that dominates (Banal-Estañol et al., 2013). This conjecture has not been 
tested empirically, but bank credit managers surveyed by Ibekwe (2017) expressed 
concerns for this risk associated with diversification. The respondents also showed a 
more positive attitude towards DFs than focused ones. 
Excess Capacity in Resource Hypothesis  
The view here is that firms diversify to gain a competitive advantage by using the 
excess capacity they have in some productive resources. Due to transaction costs and 
imperfect mobility, it is hard to efficiently trade excess capacity in the market (Hauschild 
& zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2013; Montgomery, 1994; Neffke & Henning, 2013). Some of 
these resources include managerial skills, financial resources, brand name, proprietary 
information, technologies, customer loyalty, and political connections (Deng et al.,2012; 
Li et al., 2012). Many researchers have explained some successful diversification 
initiatives by this hypothesis (e.g., Dutta & Bhawsar, 2019; Kim et al.; Srinivasan, 2015) 
and others found empirical support for this explanation (e.g., Bowen et al., 2015; Gatzer 
et al., 2015; Sakhartov & Folta, 2014). 
60 
 
Institution-Based/Internal Market Hypothesis 
This hypothesis posits that firms diversify to create internal capital, labor, and 
product markets. Internal markets enable firms to mitigate the failures in the external 
markets and other institutions of many countries (Benito-Osorio et al., 2012; Bhatia & 
Thakur, 2018; Erdorf et al., 2013; George & Kabir, 2012). For instance, efficient ICMs, 
enable DFs to finance positive net present value projects in their cash-deficit but growth 
segments with funds from cash-surplus segments (Cheng & Wu, 2018). By so doing, DFs 
avoid the external capital markets and the associated costs (Cheng & Wu, 2018; Erdorf et 
al., 2013; Maksimovic & Philips, 2013). Due to the lower likelihood of loan default in 
DFs, lending institutions tend to perceive and value DFs more positively (Avramidis et 
al., 2017; Ibekwe, 2017). The extent to which firms benefit from internal markets will 
largely depend on the efficiency of these markets. However, there is no consensus among 
scholars on the efficiency of internal markets in the allocation of productive resources 
(Glaser et al., 2013; Cheng & Wu, 2018; Kuppuswamy & Villalonga, 2016; Maksimovic 
& Phillips, 2013; Ozbas & Scharfstein, 2010; Tate & Yang, 2015). 
Agency Cost Hypothesis 
Denis et al. (1997) put forward the agency cost hypothesis of corporate 
diversification. The hypothesis is that managers derive from diversification some 
personal benefits that exceed private costs and diversify for such private benefits even if 
doing so destroys shareholder value (see also Nguyen, 2018). Such benefits include 
increased compensation which some scholars found to be related to firm size (Wang et 
al., 2019). Other private benefits include power and the prestige associated with 
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managing larger firms, managerial entrenchment, and reduction of the manager’s highly 
undiversified unemployment risk (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Denis et al., 1997; Feldman & 
McGrath, 2016). As I show later, researchers have obtained mixed results from testing 
the agency cost hypothesis of diversification (e.g., Alessandri & Seth, 2014; Amihud & 
Lev, 1981; Anderson et al., 2000; Denis et al., 1997; Castañer & Kavadis, 2013; Chen & 
Yu, 2012; Nguyen, 2018). Matvos et al. (2018) found that firms tend to diversify more in 
periods of external capital market friction. On the basis of this finding, they concluded 
that agency problems might not be the only explanation for corporate diversification. 
Meaning and Measurement of Firm Performance 
Performance is the outcome of interest in all areas of an organization (Singh et al., 
2016). Despite its relevance, there is disagreement regarding its conceptualization and 
measurement (Butler et al., 2012; Hamann et al., 2013; Richard et al., 2009; Ştefanescu & 
Logofatu,2018; Wach et al., 2020). However, performance has usually been 
conceptualized in terms of the extent of goal accomplishment (Richard et al., 2009; Singh 
et al., 2016; Wach et al., 2020). 
Organizational performance has been identified as a multidimensional construct 
(Butler et al., 2012; Hamann et al., 2013; Miller et al., 2013; Richard et al., 2009; Singh 
et al., 2016; Ştefanescu & Logofatu, 2018; Vij & Bedi, 2016; Wach et al., 2020). The 
multidimensionality of the performance construct stems from three primary sources. 
These include the multiplicity of stakeholders with conflicting interests and claims that a 
firm must deal with (Barney, 2020a, 2020b; Kaplan, 2020; McGahan, 2020; Ştefanescu 
& Logofatu, 2018; Vij & Bedi, 2016) and differences in organizational resources, 
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environment, and strategic choices that are based on them (Miller et al., 2013; Richard et 
al., 2009). The multidimensionality also stems from the timeframe over which 
performance is measured and the variation in performance over time (Richard et al., 
2009). Given these differences, it seems that a single measure of performance will hardly 
capture the interests of all the competing stakeholders of the organization (Barney, 2020a, 
2020b; Kaplan, 2020; McGahan, 2020; Richard et al., 2009; Ştefanescu & Logofatu, 
2018).  
Although scholars do not seem to disagree that firm performance is a 
multidimensional construct, there is, however, a disagreement as to its dimensions 
(Hamann et al., 2013). Consistent with the multidimensionality of the performance 
construct, researchers have measured and classified performance in different ways such 
as objective and subjective measures (Richard et al., 2009; Ştefanescu & Logofatu, 2018; 
Williams, 2018). In the following section, I will explore some of the measures of 
performance that researchers frequently used in the D–P literature.  
Measurement of Firm Performance in the Diversification Literature 
Researchers have used both objective and subjective measures of performance in 
the diversification literature. The objectives measures include accounting measures, 
financial market measures, and hybrid measures (Carini et al., 2017; Wach et al., 2020; 
Williams, 2018) Each of these measures has its strengths and limitations as it relates to 
the D–P studies. 
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Accounting Measures 
Accounting measures involve computing some measures of performance based on 
accounting information. The most frequently used accounting measures in the literature 
are the return on assets (ROA), the ROE, and the return on sale (Williams, 2018). These 
measures have been criticized as not valuable measures of the performance of an 
investment strategy such as diversification because they do not consider risk and timing 
of cash flows that are essential factors in valuation (Aliabadi et al., 2013; El‐Sayed Ebaid, 
2012). Accounting measures also focus on shareholders and hardly capture the interest of 
other stakeholders in the business (Barney, 2020a, 2020b). 
Other criticisms of accounting measures include the fact that they do not 
adequately consider intangible assets (Aliabadi et al., 2013) that have become essential 
components of firms’ balance sheets (Frey & Oehler, 2014). The difference in accounting 
practices and regulations and the ease of manipulating accounting data make comparison 
across countries, regions, and even firms less informative (Aliabadi et al., 2013; Richard 
et al., 2009; Singh et al., 2016; Singh et al., 2018). Accounting measures are also 
backward looking and therefore of limited importance for planning in a highly dynamic 
environment (Aliabadi et al., 2013; Butler et al., 2012; Carini et al., 2017; Richard et al., 
2009; Vij & Bedi, 2016).  
Early studies on the D–P relationship predominantly used accounting profitability 
measures (see Gort, 1962). The use of accounting profitability measures has also 
persisted despite their shortcomings. This is because, relative to financial market 
measures, data to operationalize accounting measures are available for all firms, and the 
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metrics are easy to compute and understand. For the D–P studies and especially for 
countries with well–developed segment reporting systems, accounting measures are 
helpful in assessing segment performance since segment accounting items are observable. 
In contrast, except in tracking stocks, the market value of segments is not observable 
(Richards et al., 2009). Accounting measures are also objective measures of performance 
to the extent that they are not affected by the market’s inefficiencies and perceptions 
(Wach et al., 2020; Williams, 2018). In the following sessions, I discuss some of the 
accounting measures—ROA, ROE, and return on sales—in more details. 
Return on Assets. This measure of performance is an indicator of the 
effectiveness in the use of a firm’s assets. It indicates the returns to the suppliers of the 
capital used to acquire the assets, namely lenders and shareholders (Butler et al., 2012; 
Williams, 2018). There are three versions of the ROA that researchers have used in the 
D–P literature. Some researchers defined ROA as the ratio of earnings before interest and 
after taxes to total assets (e.g., Chen & Yu, 2012; Patrick, 2012). Others defined it as the 
ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets (Giachetti, 2012). The other 
definition is earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation to total assets (George & 
Kabir, 2012; Nigam & Gupta, 2018). Because profitability—the numerator in the 
computation of ROA—is measured over a period, the total assets, which is the 
denominator, may also be based on the average of the beginning and ending book values 
of total assets (e.g., Deng et al., 2012).  
In addition to the general advantages of the accounting measures, ROA is not 
affected by the firm’s financial strategies and thus, avoids the distortions introduced by 
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the management’s manipulation of financial strategies to arrive at artificially impressive 
results (Williams, 2018). However, added to the limitations associated with accounting 
measures of performance (Butler et al., 2013), it does not indicate the returns to the 
shareholders who are the residual claimants to the firm’s profits. 
Return on Equity (ROE). Researchers’ focus in this measure is the return to the 
shareholders who are the residual claimants to the firm’s profits. ROE is computed as the 
ratio of earnings after taxes (net income) to the book value of equity that comprises paid-
up capital, share premium, and reserves (Richard et al., 2009). Chen and Chu (2012), 
Oyedijo (2012), and Berry-Stölzle et al. (2013), among others researchers, used the ROE. 
As other accounting measures, ROE is easy to compute and understand and also indicates 
the returns to shareholders who are the residual claimants to the firm’s profits.  
However, managers who want to show good performance, even when operating 
profitability is being eroded, can more easily manipulate the ROE (at least in the short 
run) to achieve this (Williams, 2018). The ease in manipulation is because the ROE is 
affected by the firm’s financial strategies (Williams, 2018; Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2019). 
Management might use accumulated cash to buy back shares and engage in excess 
leverage that reduces relative equity in the firm—the denominator in the ROE formula—
thereby artificially increasing the ROE (Williams, 2018). By looking at just the ROE, the 
greater financial risk resulting from this financial strategy is obscured (Williams, 2018). 
Competitive pressure to show high performance provides incentives for managers to 
engage in this kind of practice (Williams, 2018). 
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Return on Sales. The return on sales is a measure that indicates the profit made 
per unit of sales by the firm. It is computed as the ratio of net operating profit to sales 
(Richard et al., 2009). Among other authors, George and Kabir (2012), Giachetti (2013), 
and Yigit and Behram (2013) used this measure. Although it is easy to compute and 
understand, it does not show the profit due to the providers of capital. Butler et al. (2012) 
found that this measure did not load into any of their two factors of the financial 
performance construct (see also Aliabadi et al., 2013). Therefore, Butler et al. suggested 
that this threatens the construct validity of return on sales as a measure of financial 
performance. 
Financial Market Measures and Event Studies Approach 
In financial market measures, researchers use the financial market information to 
assess firms’ performance (Richards et al., 2009). These measures include the beta 
coefficient that measures the firm’s systematic risk and Jensen’s alpha that measures a 
firm’s excess return over the firm’s expected return given its systematic risk (Carini et al., 
2017; Richard et al., 2009). Nigam and Gupta (2018) used the Jensen’s alpha. Other 
financial market measures are the market value and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). 
The market value indicates the value stock market investors place on the firm’s common 
stock as reflected in the stock price; CAR measures the changes in the stock price over a 
period as a result of an event (Carini et al., 2017; Richard et al., 2009).  
The strengths of the financial market measures of performance include the fact 
that they are forward looking and incorporate the market’s valuation of a firm’s future 
(Aliabadi et al., 2013; Carini et al., 2017). They reflect both the market’s valuation of the 
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firm’s tangible and intangibles assets. Financial market measures are also less prone to 
manipulation and therefore, more objective (Aliabadi et al., 2013). However, these 
measures assume that the firm exists as an instrument for the shareholders and capital 
providers (Richard et al., 2009). As resource dependency theorists argued, in cases where 
other stakeholders dominate the shareholders regarding resource criticality, such 
dominant stakeholders’ performance criteria should be given primacy (Barney, 2020a, 
2020b). Moreover, financial market measures assume that the markets are efficient in 
incorporating all relevant information into prices. This assumption is far fetched, at least 
for emerging markets (Ayodele et al., 2017; Gyamfi et al., 2017; Lawal et al., 2017). 
The financial market measure that has been used more frequently in the D–P 
literature is CAR. In an event study, researchers attempt to assess the impact of an event 
on the firm’s performance (Dionysiou, 2015; De Jong & Naumovska, 2016; Bergmann et 
al., 2015). They estimate the effect of the event by computing the difference between the 
expected return on the stock without the event and the actual return around the time of the 
event (Dionysiou, 2015; Li et al., 2020; De Jong & Naumovska, 2016; Bergmann et al., 
2015). Some versions of the asset pricing model are used to estimate the expected return.  
The difference between the actual return on the stock on a particular day and the 
expected return for that day is the abnormal return or excess return for that day 
(Dionysiou, 2015; Li et al., 2020; De Jong & Naumovska, 2016; Bergmann et al., 2015). 
The sum of the abnormal returns for the announcement window chosen is called the CAR 
(Li et al., 2020; Dionysiou, 2015; Bergmann et al., 2015). For a D–P relationship study, 
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the event could be the announcement of a diversifying mergers and acquisitions, 
diversification through internal development, or refocusing.  
The event study approach and CAR measure have been used in many studies such 
as Hyland and Diltz (2002), Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010), and Hoechle et al. (2012), 
among others. According to Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010), this approach provides 
reasonable estimates of the changes in values expected from the diversification event. 
This is because the confounding effects of other variables are better isolated from those 
of the diversification event (see also De Jong & Naumovska, 2016). Unlike the 
accounting profitability measures, CAR is less prone to manipulations, and for listed 
companies, it is easier to measure (De Jong & Naumovska, 2016). Richard et al. (2009) 
classified CAR as an objective measure of performance (Richard et al., 2009).  
Apart from the shortcomings of financial markets measures, such as the 
assumption of market efficiency, one of the issues with the event study approach using 
CAR is that it does not capture and measure the actual value effect of diversification 
beyond the announcement window. Papadakis and Thanos (2010) pointed out that for 
events such as the announcement of a new strategy, CAR do not show the strategy’s 
value, but only short-term market expectations of the strategy that reflect on the price of 
shares. CAR is not able to predict future performance. As such, a strategy that will create 
value for shareholders may be discounted (or overvalued) if the value falls short of (or 
exceeds) market expectations (Papadakis, & Thanos, 2010). Also, CAR cannot be used 
for firms that are not listed since they do not have share prices (Papadakis & Thanos, 
2010). The choice of the announcement window to measure the announcement effects is 
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arbitrary and may bias the results (Papadakis & Thanos, 2010), and bias exacerbates as 
the window increases (Dionysiou, 2015). 
Hybrid Measures  
These are measures with which researchers attempt to leverage the strengths of 
accounting data and financial market data by combining them (Carini et al., 2017; 
Hamann et al., 2013; Richard et al., 2009). These measures capture the risk consideration 
that is lost when accounting measures are used while also capturing operational 
performance issues lost in financial market measures (Richard et al., 2009). Some of the 
hybrid measures are Tobin’s q (and its approximation, the ATQ), market-to-book value, 
EV, economic value added, etc. There are also variants of these approaches that have 
been used in many studies. In the following section, I will review Tobin’s q, ATQ, and 
the EV measures that are the most frequently used hybrid measures in the D–P literature. 
Tobin’s q is the “ratio of the firm’s market value to the replacement cost of its 
assets” (Chung & Pruitt, 1994, p. 70). Linderberg and Ross (1981) were the first to use 
the q ratio to measure performance. According to them, while the price data on securities 
issued by the firm provides information on the market’s valuation of the firm, the 
accounting data give information on the resources the firm has used. They noted that 
comparing the financial market valuation data and the accounting data offers a 
performance measure, performance being the difference between output and input. The 
output, in this case, is the market valuation, and the input is the replacement cost 
(Linderberg & Ross, 1981).  
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Lang and Stulz (1994), Lien and Li (2013), and Thakur and Bhatia (2021) among 
others, used Tobin’s q. Tobin’s q has the advantage over accounting measures and stock 
returns of not requiring risk adjustment to compare value across firms (Lang & Stulz, 
1994). The numerator in the Tobin’s q ratio—the present value of future cash flow—
implicitly captures the appropriate risk-adjusted capitalization rate (Lang & Stulz, 1994). 
By combining financial market data and accounting data, q minimizes the distortions 
arising from accounting conventions, tax laws, and managerial discretions (Montgomery, 
1994). Tobin’s q is also a point in time measure of performance. Unlike accounting 
measures and stock market measures that assess performance over a period, the sample 
period does not influence Tobin’s q (Lang & Stulz, 1994). 
However, some issues limit Tobin’s q and its use as a measure of performance. In 
using Tobin’s q, an implicit assumption is that the capital market is efficient and can 
appropriately capitalize and reflect the expected cash flows and other information on 
share prices (Berger & Ofek, 1994; Lang & Stulz, 1994). However, many authors have 
shown that the markets are less efficient, especially in developing countries (Ayodele et 
al., 2017; Gyamfi et al., 2017; Lawal et al., 2017).  
Chung and Pruitt (1994) also pointed out that despite the potentials of Tobin’s q 
in many aspects of corporate finance and management, many financial managers do not 
rely on it due to its unavailability. Chung and Pruitt further pointed out that although 
Tobin’s q can be computed, the computational procedure is complicated and cumbersome 
(see also Berger & Ofek, 1995). The replacement cost of assets, that is denominator in the 
Tobin’s q formula, is not readily available. Using the Lindenberg and Ross (1981) 
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approach to compute Tobin’s q, requires lengthy calculations and arbitrary assumptions 
about depreciation and inflation rates (Berger & Ofek, 1995; Chung & Pruitt, 1994). 
Berger and Ofek (1995) also noted that despite the significant variations in Tobin’s q 
across industries, researchers using Tobin’s q do not usually adjust q for industry effects. 
Dybvig and Warachka (2015) have questioned whether Tobin’s q is a measure of 
firm performance. Their perspective is that shareholder wealth maximization requires 
optimal increases in investment. Therefore, they argued that Tobin’s q does not measure 
firm performance because Tobin’s q does not translate to firm value maximization. The 
reason for Dybvig and Warachka’s argument is that underinvestment—which they argued 
is suboptimal—increases rather than decreases Tobin’s Q. 
Because of the unavailability of many of the data required to compute Tobin’s q 
and the computational difficulties, Chung and Pruitt (1994) developed a simple 
approximation of Tobin’s q (called ATQ). Readily available information such as 
accounting and stock market information are used to compute ATQ. The ATQ is 
calculated as 
𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑞 (𝐴𝑇𝑄) =
𝑀𝑉𝐸 + 𝐷
𝑇𝐴
                                                                                        (7) 
Where, MVE = the market value of equity, D = debt, and TA = total assets. Chung and 
Pruitt found that the ATQ explained 96.6% of the variability in Tobin’s q. Many 
researchers such as Hyland and Diltz (2002), Villalonga (2004), Lien and Li (2013), 
Custódio (2014), and Singh et al. (2018) have employed this approach and its variants. 
However, whereas the ATQ simplifies the computation of Tobin’s q and makes it more 
relevant, it still, on its own, does not adjust q for industry effects.  
72 
 
D–P researchers have predominantly used the EV measure, especially since the 
1990s (Oweis, 2012). This measure quantifies the difference between the DF’s actual 
value and the sum of value of its segments operated or traded as standalone firms. 
According to Lang and Stulz (1994), LeBaron and Speidell pioneered this approach in 
1987. Two approaches to the measure of EV have come to dominate in the literature: 
Lang and Stulz (1994) approach and the Berger and Ofek (1995) approach (Oweis, 
2012). 
In the Lang and Stulz approach, EV is the difference between a DF’s actual value 
measured by Tobin’s q and its imputed value (its imputed q) or what Lang and Stulz 
called “pure-play or the industry–adjusted q” (p. 1263). If diversification adds value, EV 
is supposed to be positive, and if it destroys value, EV is supposed to be negative. A zero 
EV indicates that diversification has no impact on firm value (Lang & Stulz, 1994). A 
firm’s imputed q is the weighted average of the firm’s segments’ qs. The weight is the 
proportion of the firm’s total asset, sales, earnings (or any other measure of output being 
used) in each segment. Since the qs of a DF’s segments are not observable, the average q 
of standalone firms in the same industry is the proxy for the segment’s q (Lang & Stulz, 
1994). 
Using the Lang and Stulz (1994) approach, EV of a firm is expressed 
mathematically as: 
𝐸𝑉 = 𝑞𝑎 − ∑𝑎𝑖𝑞𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                                                                                                        (8) 
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Where EV is the firm’s excess value, 𝑞𝑎 is the firm’s actual q, 𝑎𝑖 is the proportion of the 
firm’s total asset (sales or revenue) in segment i, 𝑞𝑖 is segment i’s imputed q, and n is the 
number of segments in the firm. 
A segment’s imputed q could be expressed as follows: 
𝑞𝑖 =
1
𝑚
∑ 𝑞𝑘
𝑚
𝑘=1
                                                                                                                                  (9) 
Where 𝑞𝑖 is the inputed q of segment i of the DF, 𝑞𝑘 is the q of standalone (single-
segment) firm k operating in the same industry as segment i, m is the number of single-
segment firms in that industry. 
Villaonga (2004) and Custódio (2014), among others, have used this approach 
and its variants. In computing q, Lang and Stulz (1994) used a modified version of the 
Lindenberg and Ross (1981) algorithm. However, researchers are increasingly using the 
ATQ (Chung & Pruitt, 1994) and its variants in place of the more complicated and 
cumbersome Lindenberg and Ross approach (e.g., Custodio, 2014; Villalonga, 2004). 
Berger and Ofek (1995) developed their approach against the criticisms of 
Tobin’s q and Tobin’s q-based measures. These criticisms include the cumbersome 
process of computing Tobin’s q using the Lindenberg and Ross (1981) algorithm and 
especially its reliance on assumptions about depreciation rates and inflation to estimate 
the replacement value of assets, one of its data requirements (Berger & Ofek, 1995). 
Berger and Ofek further pointed out that valuation studies that are based on Tobin’s q do 
not adequately industry-adjust q. Berger and Ofek’s reason is that available data do not 
allow for the direct computation of segment market values and replacement costs since 
74 
 
segment market values are not observable except for tracking stocks. However, with the 
development of less cumbersome and less data-intensive ATQ, the criticism of 
computational difficulties of Tobin’s q is no longer tenable.  
Unlike the Lang and Stulz (1994) approach where researchers rely on q to 
calculate the EV, in the Berger and Ofek (1995) approach, researchers use sales-, 
earnings-, and asset-based multipliers. These multipliers are accounting information that 
are more readily available. With Berger and Ofek (1995) method, the EV is the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of the firm’s total value to its imputed value. The procedure is to 
compute the single-segment firms’ median valuation ratios in each of the industries that 
the DF’s segments operate. Each segment of the DF is then assigned the median 
valuation ratio of its industry. For example, if a sales multiple is used, a value equal to the 
segment’s sales multiplied by its median industry capital to sales ratio is assigned to the 
segment. The result is the segment’s imputed value (Berger & Ofek, 1995)  
By summing up all its segments’ imputed values, the DF’s imputed value is 
obtained. Berger and Ofek (1995) referred to the natural logarithm of the ratio of the 
DF’s actual value to its imputed value as the firm’s EV. Therefore, if the EV is negative, 
the firm is trading at a discount and destroying value. If the EV is positive, the firm is 
trading at a premium and creating value. Many authors used this approach to EV (e.g., 
Denis et al., 1997; George & Kabir, 2012; He, 2012; Hoechle et al., 2012; Kuppuswamy 
et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2008; Villalonga, 2004). 
The Berger and Ofek (1995) approach has the advantage of industry-adjusting for 
differences in value on the basis of observable segment information. However, it relies on 
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a highly developed segment reporting system to efficiently allocate the sales, assets, and 
earnings of the DF to its segments. For many emerging markets, segment reporting is 
nonexistent, or at best, in their initial stages. Therefore, it is impossible in many cases to 
determine a firm’s sales, assets, or earnings attributable to each segment.  
Apart from the issues with segment reporting in developing countries, accounting 
items which it relies on are prone to manipulation. Therefore, assessing firm value based 
on accounting information will be valid only because the information disclosed by 
management reflects the firm’s economic reality (Berger & Ofek, 1995). Berger and Ofek 
(1995) pointed out the strengths and limitations of each of the accounting multipliers 
used in computing EV. On the basis of these strengths and limitations, Berger and Ofek 
recommended the use of the three to give a comprehensive picture. 
All the variants of the EV measure assume that single-segment firms exist in all 
industries in which a DF operates. As Berger and Ofek (1995) pointed out, many 
industries exist without single segment firms in their study (see also Lee & Hooy, 2018a). 
In the nonexistence of single-segment firms, the approached researchers have used to 
imput values to segments of DFs has been to redefine industries at different SIC code 
levels (e.g., Berger & Ofek, 1995). This approach makes the basis for imputing values 
less consistent. Researcher who use this approach also assume that the value of 
standalone firms operating in a DF segment’s industry reflects the segment’s value.  This 
assumption is despite unobservable differences that may exist between standalone firms 
and segments of DFs and, therefore, unrealistic (Boguth et al., 2021; Hund et al., 2019; 
Lee & Hooy, 2018a) 
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For other reasons, some authors have raised doubts about EV’s appropriateness as 
a measure of value. Some researchers have shown that EV is weakly correlated with 
actual value (Ahn, 2015; Matsusaka &Wang, 2015). For instance, Matsusaka and Wang 
(2015) estimated a correlation of only 13% between EV and actual value. There is also 
the tendency to overestimate conglomerate values if the researcher does not adjust for 
intersegment transfer of profits (You, 2014). According to You (2014), the need for 
adjustment for intersegment transfer of profits stems from the fact that this method 
depends on sum-of-the-parts valuation. This valuation method provides incentives for 
managers—whose compensation depends on stock price performance—to manipulate 
segment earnings to achieve an artificially higher valuation of the conglomerate (You, 
2014). Managers do this by transferring earnings from segments with low industry 
multiples to ones with high industry multiples (You, 2014). Despite these criticisms, the 
EV measure and, in particular, the Berger and Ofek (1995) variant has remained probably 
the most used measure of performance in the D–P literature since the 1990s. 
Subjective Measures  
The subjective measures of performance are based on the subjective assessment 
of people who are supposedly well informed about the performance of the firm, such as 
its managers and financial analysts (Meier & O’Toole, 2013; Richard et al., 2009; Singh 
et al., 2016; Vij & Bedi, 2016; Wach et al., 2020; Williams, 2018). Subjective measures 
are helpful when it is impossible to access objective measures of performance. This 
situation includes privately held firms and business units in a DF (Meier & O’Toole, 
2013; Richard et al., 2009; Singh et al., 2016; Vij & Bedi, 2016; Williams, 2018). 
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Moreover, with the multiplicity of organizational stakeholders with different performance 
criteria, dimensions of performance that cannot be objectively measured are increasing 
(Meier & O’Toole, 2013; Richards et al., 2009; Vij & Bedi, 2016; Williams, 2018). 
Examples of subjective measures include the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini index and 
scores on Fortune’s America’s Most Admired Companies (Richard et al., 2009).  
Some researchers have employed subjective measures in the diversification 
literature. For instance, Lee and Gaur (2013) used subjective measures to compare the 
performance of divisions of Korean business groups with those of U.S. DFs, while 
Bowen et al. (2015) used it in the study of managerial perspectives of the antecedents and 
performance effects of diversification in the United States.  
However, subjective measures have some limitations. These include the fact that 
the assessment is idiosyncratic to the person making it, which increases bias and error 
(Meier & O’Toole, 2013; Richard et al., 2009; Singh et al., 2016; Vij & Bedi, 2016). It 
also relies on the respondent’s recollections of the firm’s operations and decision 
objectives to assess its performance accurately after a period. Despite the various 
techniques to ensure reliability, it is evident that the manager can hardly recollect vividly 
everything that happened in the past (Meier & O’Toole, 2013; Richard et al., 2009; Singh 
et al., 2016; Vij & Bedi, 2016). 
Some authors have found a strong positive correlation between subjective and 
objective performance measures (e.g., Singh et al., 2016; Vij & Bedi, 2016). However, 
many authors suggested that subjective measures are not preferable to or substitute for 
objective measures when objective measures are available (e.g., Meier & O’Toole, 2013). 
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William (2018) found that researchers employed the subjective measures in only 16.77% 
of articles surveyed in the family business literature.  
To summarize this section, there is a need for any performance measure to capture 
the short-term value effects of diversification and its long-term effects. It is also 
necessary to consider the data requirements of each measure. Because of the multiplicity 
of performance measures, some authors have recommended using multiple measures 
(e.g., Ahuja & Novelli, 2017; Aliabadi et al., 2013). However, Krishnakumar and Sethi 
(2012) proposed that researchers should consider the aspects of the performance of 
interest and the availability of data in deciding the measures to employ.  
Insider Ownership  
Insider ownership refers to the equity holding of people who have access to firm-
specific information that is not available to other people and can influence firm decisions 
(Chen & Yu, 2012; Connelly et al., 2010; Kim & Lu, 2011; Rose & Sharfman, 2015). 
These include the CEO, the directors (executive and nonexecutive), and the firm’s 
employees (Connelly et al., 2010). However, there is the question of the extent to which 
some of these people could be considered insiders regarding possession of adequate 
information about the firm and their ability to use such information (Brickley & 
Zimmerman, 2010; Connelly et al., 2010).  
The terms insider ownership and managerial ownership have been used 
interchangeably in the literature (e.g., Berķe-Berga et al., 2017; Chen & Yu, 2012; Denis 
et al., 1997; Im & Chung, 2017; Lin & Servaes, 1999; Muller-Kahle, 2015). Researchers 
have measured insider ownership in different ways, including as the equity holding of 
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CEOs, directors and officers, and board members (Ali et al., 2018; Boyd & Solarino, 
2016; Fabisik et al., 2021; Im & Chung, 2017). For instance, Kim and Lu (2011) 
measured it as the proportion of the outstanding shares of the firm held by the officers 
and directors of the firm (see also Anderson et al., 2000; Chen & Yu, 2012; Chou, 2015; 
Denis et al., 1997; Hoechle et al., 2012).  
Kim and Lu (2011) argued that to define insider ownership in terms of influence 
on decision making and, if insider ownership has any identifiable impact, then it is the 
CEO ownership that should have the most visible impact. Kim and Lu, therefore, 
measured insider ownership as the proportion of the firm’s outstanding shares held by the 
CEO (see also Anderson et al., 2000; Castañer & Kavadis, 2013; Hoechle et al., 2012; 
Lacoste et al., 2010). Kim and Lu also measured insider ownership by the proportion of 
the top five executives’ combined ownership (see also Anderson et al., 2000; Castañer & 
Kavadis, 2013; Hoechle et al., 2012).  
It appears that the measure of insider ownership used will depend on the available 
data. For instance, many of the authors in Nigeria measured managerial ownership by the 
proportion of outstanding shares held by members of the Board of directors (e.g., Akpan 
& Amran, 2014; Usman & Yakubu, 2019). The reason is that it is the only insider 
ownership information disclosed in the annual report as required by law. Other 
researchers have also measured it similarly (e.g., Ali et al., 2018; Al-Matari et al., 2017; 
Berķe-Berga et al., 2017; Marimuthu, 2017; Mukaria, 2020; Rashid, 2020).  
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Insider Ownership in the Context of Corporate Governance and Agency Theory 
The agency theory argument for insider ownership as an effective corporate 
governance mechanism is that as the insiders’ shareholding increases, they bear more of 
the cost of their value-destroying decisions. Therefore, they will more likely make value-
enhancing decisions (Boateng et al., 2017; Hoechle et al., 2012; Im & Chung, 2017; Shan, 
2019). Proponents of agency theory, therefore, expect firm performance to increase with 
insider ownership.  
There is, however, a counter-argument that increasing insider ownership give the 
insider enough votes that facilitate managerial/insider entrenchment. Entrenchment 
makes the insider immune to any disciplinary measures for poor performance and 
expropriation of minority shareholders (Chou, 2015; Im & Chung, 2017; Muller-Kahle, 
2015; Shan, 2019; Tsai et al., 2011). Also, as the managers’ ownership in the firm 
increases, their wealth and risk—both financial and human capital—become tied to the 
company’s fate. This undiversified risk increases the manager’s risk aversion and 
motivates him to take a suboptimal risk that will not benefit the minority shareholders 
(Amihud & Lev, 1981; Castañer & Kavadis, 2013; Kim & Lu, 2011; Lacoste et al., 
2010). The entrenchment hypothesis reflects another form of agency problem between 
the majority shareholders and the minority shareholders (Shan, 2019; Tsai et al., 2011). 
Given the interest alignment and entrenchment hypotheses, it is plausible to 
expect an inverted U-shaped insider ownership–performance relationship. Some 
researchers have found support for both sides of the argument. Consistent with the 
interest alignment hypothesis, Boateng et al. (2017) in the case of firms in China, Gugong 
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et al. (2014) in the case of Nigeria, and Rashid (2020) in the case of Bangladesh, amongst 
others, found that insider ownership has a significant positive relationship with firm 
performance. Other researchers found a negative insider ownership–performance 
relationship (e.g., Adamu & Haruna, 2020; Fabisik et al., 2021; Marimuthu, 2017; 
Mukaria, 2020; Shan, 2019).  
The negative insider ownership–performance relationship seems to support the 
entrenchment hypothesis (Shan, 2019). Fabisik et al. (2021) also found a negative insider 
ownership–performance relationship. However, Fabisik et al. did not link the negative 
relationship to the entrenchment hypothesis. Instead, they interpreted the findings in 
terms of the firm’s past performance that reflects on the stock’s liquidity. According to 
Fabisik et al., better–performing firms have more liquid stock, enabling insider 
shareholders—who would want to diversify their risk by reducing their holding in the 
firm— to sell their shares quickly. In contrast, poorly performing firms have less liquid 
stock, making it difficult for insiders to sell shares. Consequently, high–q firms tend to 
have lower managerial shareholding, whereas low–q firms tend to have a higher 
managerial stake. The question, however, remains as to what causes poor performance in 
the first place and how managerial ownership is related to that. 
Apart from the positive and negative insider ownership–performance relationship 
strands of the literature, some researchers have found a nonsignificant relationship 
between insider ownership and firm performance (e.g., Al-Matari et al., 2017; Usman & 
Yakubu, 2019). According to Basu (2014), the results of the studies on insider 
ownership–performance relationships remain inconclusive. However, Basu also noted 
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that recent literature in this area has been more consistent that the relationship is a 
curvilinear inverted U one (e.g., Kim & Lu, 2011).  
Some authors have argued that the insider ownership–performance relationship 
depends on factors such as the external governance environment (Kim & Lu, 2011) and 
the industrial context. Other factors would be whether it is a large complexity–large scale 
industrial setting or low complexity–small scale contexts (Chou, 2015). For instance, on 
the basis of their findings, Kim and Lu (2011) concluded that insider ownership measured 
by CEO equity holding and external governance are substitutes for corporate governance 
purposes. They measured external governance by institutional ownership concentration 
and by industry concentration that indicates the level of product market competition (Kim 
& Lu, 2011). Overall, it appears that there is yet no consensus on the relationship 
between insider ownership and firm performance.  
Some authors have examined the relationship between insider ownership and the 
performance effects of firm diversification. As in the broader insider ownership–firm 
performance literature, the results, however, have also not been consistent. I review these 
studies in a later section of this chapter. 
Control Variables 
Researchers have found some variables to be related to firm performance. These 
include firm size, leverage, blockholding/concentrated ownership, and board 
independence. If not controlled, the effects of these variables may confound the D–P 
relationship. Therefore, I controlled for their effects in this study. In the following 
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sections, I explore the literature on the measurement of these variables and their 
relationship with firm performance.  
Firm Size  
Researchers have measured firm size differently, including by total assets, 
turnover, the market value of equity, and employees (C. Dang et al., 2018; Ha et al., 
2020; Hashmi et al., 2020; Wakil, 2020). Various arguments suggest different directions 
of the possible relationship between firm size and firm performance. One of the 
arguments is that larger firms have the advantage of economies of scale and market 
power (Bolarinwa & Obembe, 2019; Hashmi et al., 2020; Khatun & Siddiqui, 2016; 
Nakatani, 2019; Olaniyi et al., 2017; Olawale et al., 2017; Pangboonyanon & Kalasin, 
2018; Yadav et al., 2019). They have advantages in such areas as negotiating with clients 
and suppliers of resources, including material, human, and financial (Hashmi et al., 2020; 
Mule et al., 2015; Pangboonyanon & Kalasin, 2018). They can also engage in division of 
labor and reduce unit fixed costs by spreading costs across different firm divisions 
(Khatun & Siddiqui, 2016). These benefits are likely to improve firm performance. 
However, larger firms also exhibit characteristics that tend to limit the benefits of 
economies of scale. For instance, some scholars argued that complexity, agency, and 
coordination costs increase with size because management and control become 
increasingly separated from ownership (Hashmi et al., 2020; Isik et al., 2017; Khatun & 
Siddiqui, 2016; Olaniyi et al., 2017). Larger firms also tend to be more hierarchical and 
bureaucratic, making them less flexible and inefficient in adapting to changing business 
environments (Isik et al., 2017). These shortcomings limit firm profitability and value.  
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Empirical studies on the firm size–firm performance relationship have produced 
mixed results. Some researchers found a positive firm size–firm performance relationship 
(e.g., Hashmi et al., 2020; Isik et al., 2017; Mule et al., 2015; Pangboonyanon & Kalasin, 
2018). Bolarinwa and Obembe (2019) and Olaniyi et al. (2017) found a positive but 
bidirectional causal relationship between size and profitability among listed companies in 
Nigeria. Other researchers showed a relationship that is either negative (Mertzanis et al., 
2019; Olawale et al., 2017) or not significant (e.g., Khatun & Siddiqui, 2016; Mule et al., 
2015). Differences in the sample, variable proxy, industry sector, time horizon, the 
business environment, and the analytical technique employed could explain the 
inconsistent results (Bolarinwa & Obembe, 2019; Hashmi et al., 2020; C. Dang et al., 
2018; Mule et al., 2015; Olaniyi et al., 2017).   
Although there is still no consensus on the direction of the relationship, what is 
clear is that firm size impacts firm performance (C. Dang et al., 2018). It is, therefore, 
necessary to control for its confounding effect on the relationship between diversification 
and firm performance (Mitra & Pattanayak, 2013). Many authors have controlled firm 
size in their studies on the D–P relationship (e.g., Brahmana et al., 2019; Custódio, 2014; 
Hoechle et al., 2012; Kuppuswamy et al., 2014; Ljubownikow & Ang, 2020; Sturm & 
Nüesch, 2019). 
Leverage 
Leverage refers to the extent of debt in a firm’s capital structure (Dao & Ta, 2020; 
Li et al., 2019). Authors have measured it in many ways. These include the total debt to 
total assets (total debt) ratio (Dalci, 2018; Ihejirika et al., 2020) and long-term debt to 
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total assets (long-term debt) ratio (Ihejirika et al., 2020; Li et al., 2019; Yazdanfar & 
Öhman, 2015). Other measures include the short-term debt to total assets (short-term 
debt) ratio (Dalci, 2018; Yazdanfar & Öhman, 2015) and the debt-equity ratio (Ihejirika 
et al., 2020). Firms employ leverage for various reasons such as the avoidance of dilution 
of ownership and control that arises from the issue of new equity and the shielding of 
corporate revenue from tax since interest payments on debt are tax-deductible expenses 
(Chandra et al., 2019; Dalci, 2018; Li et al., 2019).  
Debt can act as a suitable corporate governance mechanism to mitigate manager–
shareholder agency costs. For instance, dependence on debt rather than retained earnings 
necessitates managers returning to the capital market for funding, thereby, facing the 
scrutiny and discipline of the markets (Dalci, 2018; Dao & Ta, 2020; Li et al., 2019; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The required interest payments on debt mitigate the agency 
cost of free cash flow and force managers to become more prudent and efficient in 
picking projects so as to improve firm performance and protect their jobs (Dalci, 2018; 
Dao & Ta, 2020; Li et al., 2019).  
However, leverage also comes with some costs. The obligatory interest payment 
on debt increases the probability of bankruptcy with the associated direct and indirect 
costs, especially in periods of cash flow problems (Chandra et al., 2019; Dalci, 2018; Li 
et al., 2019). The use of leverage also leads to loss of flexibility due to restrictive bond 
covenants that bondholders use to protect their interests (Dalci, 2018). Given these 
arguments, the leverage–firm performance relationship will depend on which of these 
effects dominate.  
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There is mixed empirical evidence on the leverage–firm performance relationship. 
Whereas some evidence point to a negative relationship (e.g., Dao & Ta, 2020; Li et al., 
2019; Yazdanfar & Öhman, 2015), others point to a positive one (e.g., Chandra et al., 
2019). There is also evidence of a curvilinear, inverted U-shaped leverage–performance 
relationship (Dalci, 2018) and U-shaped one (Bae et al., 2017).  
Some researchers point to differences in the measure of leverage and performance 
used (Ihejirika et al., 2020; Yazdanfar & Öhman, 2015). The results also differed on the 
analytical approach used. For instance, in their study of a sample of Nigerian firms, 
Ihejirika et al. (2020) used total debt to asset ratio and ROA as measures of leverage and 
performance respectively. They employed the fixed effects analytical approach and found 
a negative leverage–performance relationship. In contrast, Ganiyu et al. (2019) employed 
the two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) and found an inverted U-
shaped relationship. Other authors have argued that the leverage–firm performance 
relationship depends on the institutional context (Dalci, 2018; Yazdanfar & Öhman, 
2015) and the credit risk status of firms (Li et al., 2019).  
Although the direction of the leverage–performance relationship has not been 
consistent across studies, there is substantial evidence that leverage is significantly 
related to firm performance. Therefore, it is necessary to control for its confounding 
effects on the D–P relationship. Previous researchers of the D–P relationship have 
controlled for leverage (see Hoechle et al., 2012; Lee, 2017; Ljubownikow & Ang, 2020; 
Ramaswamy et al., 2017; Sener & Akben-Selcuk, 2020), whereas O’Brien et al. (2014) 
have studied how leverage shapes the performance effects of diversification.  
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Blockholding/Ownership Concentration 
Ownership concentration is used interchangeably with blockholding (Edmans & 
Holderness, 2017). A blockholder usually refers to a shareholder that owns a significant 
percentage of a firm’s shares (Boyd & Solarino, 2016; Edmans & Holderness, 2017). 
However, what is considered significant may vary from country to country. In the United 
States, for instance, a blockholder in a firm is typically defined as a shareholder who 
holds at least 5% of the firm’s shares (Connelly et al., 2010; Edmans & Holderness, 
2017). As Edmans and Holderness (2017) noted, this definition is not motivated by 
theory but by the fact that shareholders who happen to acquire 5% or more of a firm’s 
shares are required to disclose this by filing a prescribed form (see also Holderness, 
2017).  
Researchers have measured blockholding in different ways. These include the 
existence of a blockholder, the number of blockholders, the percentage of shares held by 
all blockholders, the proportion of shares owned by the largest blockholder (Edmans & 
Holderness, 2017; Holderness, 2017, Yasser & Al Mamun, 2017), and by a concentration 
ratio of blockholding measured by the Herfindahl index of blockholders (Machek & 
Kubíček, 2018; Sautner & Villalonga, 2010). Holderness (2017) adopted the 5% 
threshold and measured blockholding as the percentage of shares held by all shareholders 
owning at least 5% of the shares of a company (see also Benamraoui et al., 2019; 
Hadlock & Schwartz-Ziv, 2019; Fattoum-Guedri et al., 2018; Kao et al., 2019; Nguyen et 
al., 2015; Odewale & Kamardin, 2015). Some authors have measured blockholding as the 
percentage of a firm’s shares held by the largest shareholders. These could be the largest, 
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three largest, five largest, and ten largest shareholders, as the case may be (Ali et al., 
2018; Boateng et al., 2017; Crisóstomo et al., 2020; Kao et al., 2019; Yasser & Al 
Mamun, 2017). The problem with this approach is that they do not establish a threshold 
for determining largeness. Overall, it appears that the measure used in various studies has 
depended on the availability of relevant data.  
Blockholding impacts the two types of agency problems that many authors have 
identified (Iwasaki & Mizobata, 2020; Sautner & Villalonga, 2010; Wang & Shailer, 
2015). In some settings, such as weak investor right protection environments, 
stakeholders rely on blockholders to provide the monitoring that is necessary to check 
self-seeking behavior of managers (Iwasaki & Mizobata, 2020; Machek & Kubíček, 
2018; Nguyen et al., 2015; Yasser & Al Mamun, 2017). As Basu (2014) noted, the 
general assumption is that blockholders have the incentive and power to monitor 
managerial actions and positively influence firm performance (Edmans & Holderness, 
2017; Iwasaki & Mizobata, 2020; Yasser & Al Mamun, 2017). In contrast, at high levels 
of blockholding, blockholders may become entrenched and use their positions to extract 
private benefits at the expense of firm performance and minority shareholders (Edmans & 
Holderness, 2017; Iwasaki & Mizobata, 2020; Machek & Kubíček, 2018; Nguyen et al., 
2015; Yasser & Al Mamun, 2017). Given the two possible effects of blockholding, there 
is the possibility of an inverted U-shaped blockholding–performance relationship where 
performance improves with blockholding up to a point and starts to decline afterward 
(Machek & Kubíček, 2018).  
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There is empirical support for both arguments (van Essen et al., 2020; Yasser & 
Al Mamun, 2017). In a meta-analysis of the effect of blockholding on firm performance 
in the emerging markets of Eastern Europe and the former Societ Union, Iwasaki and 
Mizobata (2020) found a significant positive effect of blockholding on firm performance. 
Other researchers have also found support for the positive blockholding–performance 
relationship (e.g., Benamroui et al., 2019; Nguyen et al., 2015; Ozili & Uadiale, 2017; 
Singh et al., 2018; Yasser & Al Mamun, 2017; van Essen et al., 2020). Thraya (2015) and 
Wang and Shailer (2015) found adverse effects. In contrast, ElGhouty and El-Masry 
(2017) and Nobanee et al. (2017) found no significant blockholding–performance 
relationship in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, respectively. Machek and Kubíček (2018), Altaf 
and Shah (2018), and Guerrero-Villegas et al. (2018) in the cases of Czech Republic, 
Indian, and European firms respectively found an inverted U-shaped relationship.  
Some researchers found that the institutional contexts such as investor right 
protection quality, the judicial system (Altaf & Shah, 2018; Balsmeier and Czarnitzki, 
2015; Lepore et al., 2017; Nguyen et al., 2015), and egalitarianism (Holderness, 2017) 
determine the extent of blockholding and moderates the blockholder–performance 
relationship. However, researchers have indicated that the relationship in each context 
also depends on other factors. These include whether the blockholder is an insiders or 
outsiders (Benamraoui et al., 2019), domestic or foreign (Lee et al., 2020; Liu et al., 
2018; Odewale & Kamardin, 2015; van Essen et al., 2020), and institutional or individual 
(Hadlock & Schwartz-Ziv, 2019; van Essen et al., 2020). Researchers have found that 
blockholding characteristics such as the number of blockholders and the contest for 
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power among the blockholders affect the blockholding–performance relationship 
(Benamraoui et al., 2019; Boateng & Huang, 2017; Fattoum-Guedri et al., 2018; Wang, 
2017). The mechanism employed to influence management—voice/shareholder activism 
or exit and threat of exit—is another moderating factor (Basu, 2014; Filatotchev & 
Dotsenko, 2015; Hope et al., 2017; Rose & Sharfman, 2015).  
The empirical evidence on all these issues is conflicting (Basu, 2014). There is, 
however, increasing consensus that the blockholder–performance relationship depends on 
the identity and motivation of the blockholder (Edmans & Holderness, 2017; Hautz et al., 
2013; Wang & Shailer, 2018) and the skills and experience of the blockholder (Saghi-
Zedek, 2016). As Hautz et al. (2013) argued, blockholders are heterogeneous, and the 
assumption of a homogenous expectation of different block ownership groups is 
misleading (see also Edmans & Holderness, 2017; Hadlock & Schwartz-Ziv, 2019; Hautz 
et al., 2013; van Essen et al., 2020; Wang & Shailer, 2018). This heterogeneity reflects 
divergently on blockholders’ motivation, tactics, and performance outcomes (Edmans & 
Holderness, 2017; van Essen et al., 2020). Therefore, as Sautner and Villalonga (2010) 
contended, it is not appropriate to work on the premise that ownership concentration is or 
is not a suitable corporate governance mechanism as many authors have done. 
Some authors have either directly or indirectly examined the relationship between 
blockholding and the performance effects of diversification (e.g., Brahmana et al., 2019; 
Lee & Hooy, 2018b; Lin & Servaes, 1999, Sautner & Villalonga, 2010; Tsai et al., 2011). 
However, the results are mixed. Whereas some researchers found positive effects due to 
effective monitoring by blockholders (e.g., Lin & Servaes, 1999; Pratyaksa et al., 2015; 
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Sautner & Villalonga, 2010), others found an adverse effect due to entrenchment (e.g., 
Brahmana et al., 2019; Lee & Hooy, 2018a, 2018b; Tsai et al., 2011). Saghi-Zedek 
(2016) found that the effect depends on the skills and experience of the blockholder. 
Saghi-Zedek showed that controlling shareholding involving banks, institutional 
investors, and industrial companies is associated with a positive performance. In contrast, 
family and state ownership associate negatively with performance (see also Hernández-
Trasobares & Galve-Górriz, 2017). These results are consistent with studies that show 
that corporate governance is related to the performance of DFs (e.g., Boumosleh et al., 
2012; Gleason et al., 2012; Hoechle et al., 2012).  
Board Independence 
Corporate governance scholars have usually conceptualized board independence 
as the degree to which the directors are outsiders to the firm in the sense of having a 
limited relationship with the company that enables them to exercise independent and 
objective judgment (Bradley & Chen, 2015; Grosman et al., 2019; Koerniadi & Tourani-
Rad, 2012). Authors have measured board independence in various ways (Rutledge et al., 
2016). However, the proportion of independent directors on the Board has been the 
dominant measure (Al-Saidi, 2021; Altuwaijri & Kalyanaraman, 2016; Jiraporn et al., 
2018; Rahman & Saima, 2018; Rutledge et al., 2016; Sarkar & Sarkar, 2018; Sener & 
Akben-Selcuk, 2020).  
There have been variations based on different regulatory regimes on how 
independence is defined. Rashid (2015, 2018) defined independent directors as outside 
directors and measured board independence as the proportion of outside directors on the 
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Board (see also Akpan & Amran, 2014; Boumosleh et al., 2012; Gleason et al., 2012). 
However, Rashid did not indicate what qualifies a director as an outsider. Muller-Kahle 
(2015) measured board independence principally by the proportion of nonexecutive 
directors on the Board of directors (see also To et al., 2020; Khosa, 2017; Nguyen et al., 
2015; Singh et al., 2018; Yasser & Al Mamun, 2017). Koerniadi and Tourani-Rad (2012) 
extended this definition by establishing maximum ownership of less than 5% by the 
nonexecutive director. Brickley and Zimmerman (2010) pointed out that researchers have 
commonly viewed outside directors as independent and have often measured board 
independence as the proportion of outside directors on the Board. They have generally 
defined outside directors as nonexecutive directors (Brickley & Zimmerman, 2010; To et 
al., 2020; Koerniadi & Tourani-Rad, 2012; Muller-Kahle, 2015; Terjesen et al., 2016; 
Zattoni et al., 2017). 
The agency, resource dependency, and institution-based theories are three critical 
theoretical perspectives for conceptualizing how independent directors can positively 
impact firm performance (Grosman et al., 2019; Terjesen et al., 2016; Uribe-Bohorquez 
et al., 2018; Zattoni et al., 2017). The agency theory-based argument is that independent 
directors can provide effective monitoring that prevents managers’ and controlling 
shareholders’ opportunistic behavior (Jiraporn et al., 2018; Pan et al., 2018; Rashid, 
2018; Terjesen et al., 2016; Uribe-Bohorquez et al., 2018; Yusuf et al., 2018; Zattoni et 
al., 2017). Agency theorists assume that independent directors have their reputation to 
protect and therefore, motivated to provide performance-enhancing monitoring (Uribe-
Bohorquez et al., 2018; Yusuf et al., 2018; Zattoni et al., 2017).  
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The resource dependency perspective is that outside directors bring valuable 
knowledge, experience, and connections that are not readily available to insiders (Lai et 
al., 2019; Terjesen et al., 2016). The institution-based view suggests that the effectiveness 
of independent directors is context-specific, influenced by such institutional factors as the 
financial system, legal system, the extent of state intervention, trust levels, and the type of 
blockholders the directors face (Grosman et al., 2019; Uribe-Bohorquez et al., 2018; 
Zattani et al., 2017). Influenced by these perspectives, many countries have incorporated 
independent directorship in their corporate governance codes (Al-Saidi, 2021; Brickley & 
Zimmerman, 2010; Rashid, 2018; Zattoni et al., 2017).  
However, the assumption that outsiders provide effective monitoring and advice 
is flawed on some grounds. It assumes away the outside director’s incentives that may 
diverge from those of the shareholders, thus, compounding the agency problems they 
were supposed to mitigate (Brickley & Zimmerman, 2010). It also assumes that the 
outside directors are always sufficiently independent from the managers or controlling 
shareholders to offer objective opinions (Brickley & Zimmerman, 2010; To et al., 2020; 
Khosa, 2017; Rashid, 2018; Yusuf et al., 2018).  
The proponents of independent directorship also assumed that the directors have 
the expertise and access to the necessary information to monitor and advise the 
management effectively (Brickley & Zimmerman, 2010; To et al., 2020; Khosa, 2017; 
Rashid, 2018; Yusuf et al., 2018). These assumptions are hardly realistic. Consequently, 
the appointment of independent directors may end up as mere formality to comply with 
regulatory requirements and one that drains resources (Brickley & Zimmerman, 2010). 
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Stewardship theorists have also suggested that supervision could become excessive with 
independent directors’ monitoring and result in demotivation, suboptimal managerial 
risk-taking, and poor performance (Davis et al., 1997; Nguyen et al., 2017; Shan, 2019). 
Consistent with these opposing views, researchers on this relationship have 
produced conflicting results (Nguyen et al., 2017; Rashid, 2018; Uribe-Bohorquez et al., 
2018). Zattoni et al. (2017) and Uribe-Bohorquez et al. (2018) conducted cross-country 
studies and found a significant positive relationship between board independence and 
firm performance. Others have also found a positive board independence–performance 
relationship in country-specific studies (e.g., Boateng et al., 2017; Kao et al., 2019; Pan et 
al., 2018).  
There are other indications of the value of independent directorship. For instance, 
Fahlenbrach et al. (2017) found that a significantly higher probability of worse stock and 
operating performance following an independent director’s surprise departure. Balsmeier 
et al. (2017) found that the strengthening of board independence improves innovation 
performance. Jiraporn et al. (2018) showed that board independence is a substitute for a 
high-quality external audit required for monitoring and reducing opportunistic managerial 
behavior. Jiraporn et al. based this substitution argument on their finding that firms with 
more robust board independence have more effective governance than those with less 
robust governance, reducing the propensity to hire a Big-4 external auditor.  
In contrast, there is also evidence that board independence impacts firm 
performance negatively. Nguyen et al. (2017) sampled 217 nonfinancial firms in Vietnam 
over 2010–2014 and found a negative board independence–performance relationship. 
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Other researchers have also found a negative board independence–performance 
relationship in different countries and periods (e.g., Al-Saidi, 2021; R. A. Dang et al., 
2018; Shan, 2019; Singh et al., 2018).  
Apart from the positive and negative board independence–performance strands of 
the literature, there is also evidence that board independence is not significantly related to 
firm performance (e.g., Akpan and Amran, 2014; Rahman & Saima, 2018; Rashid, 2018; 
Rutledge et al., 2016). Terjesen et al. (2016) showed that board independence has no 
significant impact on firm performance except if the Board is gender diversified. Rashid 
(2015) argued that the curtailment of agency costs should impact performance positively. 
Rashid measured agency cost in three ways and found that board independence does not 
reduce all facets of agency cost in Bangladesh. These results show the lack of consensus 
on the direction of the Board independence–performance relationship. 
Researchers have identified some factors that moderate the Board independence–
performance relationship. One such factor is differences in the institutional context (e.g., 
Koerniadi & Tourani-Rad, 2012; Uribe-Bohorquez et al., 2018; Yusuf et al., 2018; 
Zattoni et al., 2017). Zattoni et al. (2017) and Uribe-Bohorquez et al. (2018) found that 
institutional context positively moderated the positive board independence–performance 
relationship they found in their study. However, whereas Uribe-Bohorquez et al. found 
that the legal and judicial protection positively moderated the relationship, Zattoni et al. 
found that the legal system showed no significant effect. Zattoni et al.’s measures of the 
national business system—financial system, trust, skills development, and state 
intervention—positively moderated the board independence– performance relationship.  
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Zattoni et al. (2017) and Uribe-Bohorquez et al. (2018) differ in the performance 
and board independence measures used. Whereas Zattoni et al. measured performance by 
the buy-hold abnormal return over the market return, Uribe-Bohorquez et al. measured it 
by technical efficiency. Also, whereas Zattoni et al. measured board independence by the 
ratio of nonexecutive directors to the total number of directors, Uribe-Bohorquez et al.’s 
measure captured more of board diversity in terms of race, gender, experience, and 
ethnicity. These differences could account for the divergent results relating to the 
moderation effect of the legal system.  
Koerniadi and Tourani-Rad (2012) pointed out that countries may differ regarding 
ownership concentration and firms’ size. They argued that in countries with high 
ownership concentration and weak investor protection, ownership concentration could 
substitute interest alignment governance mechanisms, making independent directors’ 
monitoring irrelevant. Koerniadi and Tourani-Rad argued that there is usually a strong 
network connection in small-sized firms that makes it difficult for directors to be truly 
independent. In the view of Akpan and Amran (2014) the impact of independent directors 
on performance depends on the purpose of appointing the directors. The purpose could be 
to improve performance (in which case they are appointed voluntarily) or to meet a 
regulatory requirement (Akpan & Amran, 2014; Grosman et al., 2019). In the later case, 
the firm will hardly experience any positive impact of the director (Akpan & Amran, 
2014; Grosman et al., 2019). 
Some researchers have shown that factors such as the presence and type of 
blockholding moderate the board independence–performance relationship. For instance, 
97 
 
Khosa (2017) found a significant negative relationship between board independence and 
market value per share in India’s group-affiliated firms. Khosa interpreted this result as 
evidence that the market discounts independent directors’ presence since such directors 
often have allegiance to the controlling family. This allegiance might impair the 
directors’ monitoring function. Nguyen et al. (2017) found that the negative board 
independence–performance relationship in their study worsens where the state is the 
controlling shareholder. 
Contrary to Nguyen et al. (2017), Grosman et al. (2019) found that in Russia, 
independent directors are less effective in mitigating blockholder expropriation in private 
firms than in state-owned enterprises where the state is usually the blockholder. As 
Grosman et al. argued, in Russian private firms, the blockholders are oligarchs who use 
independent directors’ appointments to put on a semblance of credibility that enables 
them to access more resources. Consequently, these so-called independent directors serve 
the interest of the blockholder who appoints them (Grosman et al., 2019). In contrast to 
private firms in Russia, Grosman et al. pointed out that independent directors in state-
owned enterprises are usually professionally appointed to address performance and 
governance challenges in the firms. These independent directors in state-owned 
enterprises exert effort to perform well because such performance could provide more 
lucrative opportunities in Russian politics (Grosman et al., 2019). On the basis of these 
differences in the performance effects of board independence and the moderating factors, 
Bradley and Chen (2015) argued that there is no monotonic impact of board 
independence that would justify a one-size-fits-all proposal for board independence. 
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Some authors have examined the relationship between board independence and 
the performance effects of diversification. Boumosleh et al. (2012) found a positive 
relationship between board independence and Tobin’s Q and EV, pre and post-Sarbanes-
Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002. Gleason et al. (2012) found that board independence 
positively moderates the performance effects of diversification. They, therefore, 
concluded that firms with high-quality governance represented by such mechanisms as 
strong independent boards and outside blockholding make better diversification 
decisions. 
In summary, researchers have found many variables related to firm performance 
other than diversification and insider ownership. These include firm size, leverage, block 
shareholding, and board independence. Although there is no consensus on the direction of 
the relationships, these variables are likely to confound the relationship between firm 
diversification and firm performance. Therefore, there is a need to control for their effects 
to arrive at meaningful statements about the D–P relationship. 
Performance Effects of Firm Diversification 
Researchers have studied the D–P relationship a great deal. However, there is still 
no consensus on the performance effects of diversification (Ahuja & Novelli, 2017; 
Aivazian et al., 2019; Borah et al., 2018; Erdorf et al., 2013; Gopal et al., 2021; Guerras-
Martín et al., 2020; Ljubownikow & Ang, 2020; Schommer et al., 2019). The lack of 
consensus is due to differences in the theoretical frameworks, samples, variables, sources 
of data, analytical techniques, and differences in institutional settings (Benito-Osorio et 
al., 2015; Benito-Osorio et al., 2012; Borah et al., 2018; Grigorieva & Gorbatov, 2015; 
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Ljubownikow & Ang, 2020; Rojahn & Zechser, 2019). Despite the lack of consensus, 
researchers have identified six principal strands of the literature (Benito-Osorio et al., 
2012; Dey & Banerjee, 2019; Erdorf et al., 2013).  
One strand of the literature finds diversification as a value-destroying strategy that 
results in diversification discount (see Ammann et al., 2012; Berger & Ofek, 1995; Borah 
et al., 2018; Hoechle et al., 2012; Lang & Stulz, 1994). A second strand finds 
diversification a value-creating strategy that results in a diversification premium (He, 
2009; Villalonga, 2004), while another strand finds no relationship (see Hoberg & 
Phillips, 2014; Mansi & Reeb, 2002). Another strand accepts the existence of a 
diversification discount but argues that it is either magnified or not wholly attributable to 
diversification per se (e.g., Andrés et al., 2017a; Custódio, 2014; Glaser & Mueller, 2010; 
Klein & Saidenberg, 2010; Rudolf & Schwetzler, 2014; Ushijima, 2016). One other 
strand of the literature finds that diversification has a curvilinear relationship with firm 
performance (Palich et al., 2000). Finally, an emerging strand of the literature is that the 
D–P relationship is context-specific (Benito-Osorio et al., 2012; Berry-Stölzle et al., 
2013; Kuppuswamy et al., 2014; Kuppuswamy & Villalonga, 2016).  
Diversification Discount Literature  
The favorable view of diversification held during the conglomerate merger wave 
of the 1960s and early 1970s was replaced in the late 1980s and 1990s with a more 
negative view of diversification as a value-destroying strategy view (Benito-Osorio et al., 
2012; Nazarova, 2015). This view followed many researchers’ finding that DFs trade at a 
discount relative to their focused counterparts and their value had they been operated as 
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standalone firms (e.g., Berger & Ofek, 1995; Lang & Stulz, 1994). The 1980s and 1990s 
witnessed a trend towards increased refocusing that Comment and Jarrell (1995) found to 
be associated with significant positive announcement effects. 
For instance, Lang and Stulz (1994) used Tobin’s q and their version of the EV as 
measures of value to examine the effect of corporate diversification on performance 
during the period 1978 to 1990. They employed the Compustat database and three 
diversification measures, namely, sales-based Herfindahl index, asset-based Herfindahl 
index, and the number of segments. Using yearly cross-sectional OLS regression for all 
the years in their sample period, they found that in the 1970s and 1980s, DFs were valued 
lower than their focused counterparts or their imputed values. Imputed value is an 
estimate of the value of a DF assuming its segments operated as standalone firms (Berger 
& Ofek, 1995; Lang & Stulz, 1994).  
Lang and Stulz (1994) also found that the discount does not significantly increase 
with the level of diversification. They concluded that it is the act of diversifying (from 
one to more industries) and not increasing diversification from two or more segments that 
causes the diversification discount (see also Andreou et al., 2016; Hoechle et al., 2012). 
Lang and Stulz also concluded that their results support the view that diversification does 
not lead to higher performance but is less definitive about the extent to which 
diversification reduces performance. They based this conclusion on their finding that DFs 
appeared to be poor performers before they diversified. 
Consistent with Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995) found that DFs 
traded at a discount of 13% to 15% during their sample period. Berger and Ofek used the 
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EV measure of performance and Compustat database of nonfinancial firms in the United 
States from 1986 to 1991. They found that the discount was smaller when firms engaged 
in related diversification, which they defined as diversification within the same 2-digit 
SIC code industries. They attributed the value loss to overinvestment and inefficient 
cross-subsidization in ICMs of diversified firms. 
The evidence of a diversification discount is not limited to the studies conducted 
in the 1990s. It extends to more recent ones and cuts across countries, methodologies, and 
measures of variables (see Borah et al., 2018; Espinosa et al., 2018; Gleason et al., 2012; 
Jouida et al., 2017; Lee & Hooy, 2018b; Liu et al., 2018; Mazur & Zhang, 2015; 
Ushijima, 2015). However, this evidence is by no means consistent across studies, as I 
show in the section on the diversification premium. 
Researchers have explained the diversification discount by some factors and their 
combinations. For instance, some researchers have presented evidence that the ICMs 
created by DFs are inefficient in the allocation of capital (e.g., Berger & Ofek, 1995; 
Glaser et al., 2013; Klein & Wuebker, 2020; Ozbas & Scharfstein, 2010). Cline et al. 
(2014) found that when DFs that operate inefficient ICMs issue bonds, the market 
charges them considerably higher than those that operate efficient ICMs. They also found 
that these firms experience seasoned equity offering announcement return significantly 
more negative than those operating efficient ICMs. Bielstein et al. (2018) showed that 
inefficiency of firms’ ICMs leads to a seven basis points increase in the cost of capital, 
while Klein and Wuebker (2020) showed that it reduces innovation by discouraging 
investment in research and development. 
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Some authors have attributed the inefficiency of investments within ICMs to 
capital allocation that favors powerful and connected segment CEOs rather than segments 
with better projects (Duchin & Sosura, 2013; Glaser et al., 2013). Glaser et al. (2013) 
found that the ex-post performance and productivity of the investments by more powerful 
managers were lower than comparable ones. This finding is consistent with Boumosleh et 
al. (2012), who found that of all the corporate governance variables examined, CEO 
power influenced inefficient resource allocation and the diversification discount most. 
This power of divisional managers and CEOs emerges from the fact that CEOs possess 
critical information and the decision rights (Graham et al., 2015; Schneider & Spalt, 
2016).  
However, the efficiency or inefficiency of ICMs is still a contentious issue. Some 
have argued or found that ICMs are efficient (see Giroud & Mueller, 2015; Maksimovic 
& Philips, 2014; Saeed & Sameer, 2015). Others argued that ICMs’ efficiency depends 
on the external capital market condition (Hovakimian, 2011; Kuppuswamy & Villalonga, 
2016). I review some of these studies in the section on institution-based view of 
diversification.  
However, some other authors do not subscribe to the idea of efficient or 
inefficient ICMs. Gugler et al. (2013) argued that a priori, ICMs are neither good nor bad, 
but their efficiency and impact on performance are dependent on some factors. Gugler et 
al. identified the size of the parent company’s ownership in the subsidiary and the 
institutional context in which the subsidiary operates as some of the factors. The factors 
also include the level of internal information asymmetry (Duchin & Sosyura, 2013) and 
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the amount of business-relevant information flowing into the firm (Anjos & Fracassi, 
2015). Cheng and Wu (2018) argued that financial statement comparability is a form of 
corporate governance that enhances information flow and monitoring that improves the 
efficiency of ICMs. Consistent with this argument, Cheng and Wu found that financial 
statement comparability is associated with greater ICM efficiency and lower 
diversification discount. These factors cast doubt on the inefficient ICM explanation. 
This doubt stems from the evidence that the assumption inefficiency of ICMs is not 
always validated. 
Mitton (2012) has explained the diversification discount by lower labor 
productivity in DFs. Mitton based this explanation on finding that DFs have lower labor 
productivity compared to focused firms. He found that the lower labor productivity is due 
to misallocation of capital in the ICMs of DFs and agency problems (Hoechle et al., 
2012; Jara-Bertin et al., 2015a). However, the lower productivity explanation of the 
diversification discount is questionable in the light of Gyan (2017). In a sample of 
Malaysian firms for the 2009 to 2014 period, Gyan found no significant moderating 
effect of productivity on the D–P relationship with Tobin’s q as the measure of 
performance.  
Another explanation for the diversification discount is the refocusing costs that 
force firms to persist with the diversification strategy even when it is no longer value 
maximizing (Anderson et al., 2000; Smith & Coy, 2018). This persistence compounds the 
diversification discount (Anderson et al., 2000). These costs include those of breaking 
and rewriting contracts—some implicit—with various stakeholders (Anderson et al., 
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2000; De Figueiredo et al., 2019). These costs also increase with the number of 
stakeholders, which is a function of the extent of the firm’s diversification (Patrisia & 
Dastgir, 2017; Patrisia et al., 2019; Su & Tsang, 2015; Xu & Liu, 2017). Refocusing 
costs also include the high costs of organization adjustment and synergy destruction (De 
Figueiredo et al., 2019). 
Overall, as with the idea that DFs underperform focused firms, there is no 
consensus about why this could be the case. The explanations that researchers have put 
forward range from the inefficiency of internal markets, low labor productivity, and 
agency problems to the cost of refocusing. The lack of consensus indicates the need for 
further studies to explain the diversification discount if indeed there is one. 
Diversification Premium Literature 
The conclusion that diversification is value destroying is by no means consistent 
across studies. There are reasons to expect diversification to be a value-creating strategy. 
The reasons include the possibility of establishing efficient ICMs, coinsurance effects 
that reduce firm risk and enhance debt capacity that can increase investment and provide 
tax shield if efficiently used (Aivazian et al., 2019; García et al., 2013; Lawrey & Morris, 
2019). Others are the potential of achieving economies of scale and scope; and the 
productive use of excess resource capabilities (Aivazian et al., 2019; García et al., 2013; 
Lawrey & Morris, 2019).  
The fact that firms continue to diversify despite the documented diversification 
discount casts doubt on the conclusion that diversification destroys value (De la Fuente & 
Velasco, 2015; Hyland & Diltz, 2002). Therefore, many authors have questioned the 
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existence of a diversification discount and whether diversification per se is its cause. The 
authors raised question related to the methodology in many studies in the diversification 
discount literature (see Campa & Kedia, 2002; Hyland & Diltz, 2002; Mansi & Reeb, 
2002; Villalonga, 2004).  
Hyland and Diltz (2002) pointed out that firms’ reported segment changes are the 
basis of Compustat data, and many of the studies in the diversification discount literature 
use Compustat data. Hyland and Diltz found that only 72% of these reported segment 
changes were economically meaningful diversification events. This fact suggests that 
some of the firms that Compustat classified as diversified could have been focused firms, 
and this could have biased the results. Hyland and Diltz used only economically 
meaningful diversification events—including diversification through acquisition and 
internal growth—for a sample of 173 firms that changed their number of segments from 
one to more than one during the period 1978 to 1992 to analyze the performance effect of 
diversification. They found evidence that is inconsistent with the view that diversification 
destroys value. 
Villalonga (2004) raised further concerns with the segment data of previous 
diversification discount studies. One of these concerns segments underreporting because 
before the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 131, Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 14 obligated U.S. firms to satisfy the 10% 
materiality requirement in their segment reporting (Villalonga, 2004). This requirement 
restricted the maximum reportable segments to 10. Consequently, managers had to decide 
on the aggregation level and activities they aggregated under the same segment 
106 
 
(Villalonga, 2004; see also He, 2012). Managerial discretion over the aggregation of 
activities under different segments makes the interfirm comparison of reported segments 
harder (Hund et al., 2013, 2019; Villalonga, 2004). Villalonga (2004) argued that this 
might cause misclassification of firms as focused even when they are diversified. This 
misclassification would bias the mean and median q of focused firms from which 
researchers input segment values to DFs. It is, therefore, possible that the documented 
diversification discount may be an artifact of segment reporting bias (Villalonga, 2004). 
To overcome the concerns with Compustat segment data, Villalonga (2004) used 
the Business Information Tracking Series (BITS) of the U.S. Census Bureau as an 
alternative source of segment data. Villalonga found a statistically significant 
diversification premium for the period 1989 to 1996. This diversification premium is 
contrary to a diversification discount she found when she used Compustat segment data. 
Therefore, Villalonga concluded that the discount found in previous studies might be an 
artifact of the source of segment data used. According to Villalonga, this result calls to 
question the received wisdom on the existence of a diversification discount and the 
adequacy of segment data for research in corporate finance and strategy.  
Campa and Kedia (2002) argued that the diversification decision is an 
endogenous one because firm characteristics that affect firm value also influence 
diversification decision. Therefore, the diversification discount could be due to the failure 
to control the endogeneity of the diversification decision. Without controlling for 
endogeneity, Campa and Kedia (2002) found a diversification discount, consistent with 
Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995). However, when they controlled for 
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the endogeneity of the diversification decision, they found that the discount always 
dropped, and in some cases, turned to a premium (see also Bhatia & Thakur, 2018). 
Campa and Kedia, therefore, concluded that the diversification discount is partly due to 
the failure to control for the endogeneity of the diversification decision.  
Like Villalonga (2004) and Campa and Kedia (2002), He (2009) also concluded 
that the pre-SFAS 131 (1998) diversification discount is an artifact of the source of data 
or failure to control for endogeneity. He based this conclusion on the diversification 
discount in the pre-1998 data, contrary to a diversification premium in the post-1997 
data. However, He used a measure of diversification that is different from the measures 
that researchers have traditionally employed. It is, therefore, an issue whether his study 
and its results are comparable to others. Ahn (2015) does not entirely support He. Unlike 
He, Ahn found a diversification discount in both the pre- and post-SFAS 131 segment 
data but the discount was greater, post SFAS 131. Ahn, however, made the point that the 
discount was not attributable to diversification per se but to the impact of reporting 
changes since there were no fundamental changes in firm value or investment efficiency 
during the period. The difference between Ahn’s result and He’s could lie in differences 
in the measurement of diversification and the failure of Ahn to control for endogeneity.  
Many authors have also found a diversification premium (see Aivazian et al., 
2019; Akbulut & Matsusaka, 2010; Bhatia & Thakur, 2018; Cole & Karl, 2016; Hund et 
al., 2019; Lawrey & Morris, 2019; Qiu, 2014). Against the background of the difficulties 
and inconsistent results obtained using the EV measure of Berger and Ofek (1995), as an 
alternative approach to valuation, Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010) conducted an event 
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study of the announcement returns from diversifying mergers and acquisitions for the 
period 1950 to 2006. They found a significantly positive combined return from 
diversifying acquisition announcement in the magnitude of 1.6% over a three-day 
window. The combined returns from diversifying acquisitions were as large as that from 
related acquisitions and is evidence that investors did not consider diversifying 
acquisition as value destroying.  
In an event study of 98 acquisitions by Turkish firms listed on the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange between 2000 and 2011, Selcuk and Kiymaz (2015) obtained results consistent 
with Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010). Chiu et al. (2016) classified Google’s 2011 
acquisition of Motorola as a conglomerate merger and analyzed the acquisition 
announcement return. They obtained results that support Akbulut and Matsusaka and 
Selcuk and Kiymaz. Lawrey and Morris (2019) compared the buy and hold abnormal 
return of portfolios of DFs and focused ones over 12, 24, and 36-month windows from 
1976 to 2009 and found that the DFs portfolios outperformed their focused firm 
counterparts over the 36-month window. According to Lawrey and Morris, this result 
indicates that firm diversification benefits accrue over a longer investing horizon. These 
results cast doubt on the dominant view that diversification is a value-destroying strategy. 
No Relationship Literature  
Apart from the evidence that diversification is a value-creating strategy, some 
authors have argued that there is no relationship between diversification and firm 
performance (see Hoberg & Phillips, 2014; Mackey et al., 2017; Mansi & Reeb, 2002; 
Schommer et al., 2019). Mansi and Reeb (2002) pointed out that while reducing 
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shareholder value, diversification also reduces firm risk, thereby enhancing bondholder 
value (see also Mammen, 2020). On the basis of this finding, Mansi and Reeb put 
forward the wealth transfer hypothesis that diversification does not destroy value but 
instead transfers value from one supplier of capital to another (from shareholders to 
bondholders). Therefore, in aggregate, there should be no diversification discount (Mansi 
and Reeb, 2002). Using a sample of 18,898 firm-year observations, Mansi and Reeb 
found no significant relationship between diversification and EV.  
Hoberg and Phillips (2014) identified three limitations with existing methods for 
creating benchmarks for evaluating the performance of DFs as used in Lang and Stulz 
(1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995). One of these limitations is the use of only SIC codes 
to identify the universe of single-segment firms to create the benchmark despite evidence 
of inconsistency in segment classification (Hyland & Diltz, 2002; Villalonga, 2004). 
Another of these limitations is the focus on a single accounting characteristic of the firm 
(say sales) when firms could differ along other dimensions such as age (see also Hund et 
al., 2013). Hoberg and Phillips also identified the equal weighting of all single-segment 
firms in computing segment discount or premium despite additional information that 
might exist in the nature of the products of each single segment firm (see also Hund et al., 
2019). 
Hoberg and Phillips (2014) developed a text-based method for identifying peer 
firms and accounting for the firm’s uniqueness and organizational form to address some 
of these limitations. Using this new methodology, Hoberg and Phillips addressed whether 
product uniqueness explains valuation differences between diversified and focused firms. 
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They found that product uniqueness and other firm characteristics were the factors that 
explained differences in market valuation for both diversified and focused firms. They 
also found that the persistence of product uniqueness over time is a function of the firm’s 
patents, branding, research and development intensity, and the entry into the firm’s 
product space by rivals financed by venture capitalists. These findings imply that the 
market places value on a firm’s uniqueness but not on its organizational form, diversified 
or focused.  
Mackey et al. (2017) arrived at a similar conclusion as Hoberg and Philips (2014). 
Mackey et al. reexamined the relationship between a firm’s diversification strategy and 
its performance using the hierarchical Bayesian modeling approach. Mackey et al. found 
that any strategy—diversification or focus—could be value-creating depending on a 
firm’s resources and operating context (see also Pidun et al., 2019; Schommer et al., 
2019). Garcia-Feijoo and Smith (2017) also found that long-run differences in 
performance between diversifying and focusing firms were not explained by 
diversification but by differences in firm characteristics known to impact firm 
performance. Therefore, the no relationship literature casts down on the relevance of the 
diversification decision. 
Diversification Discount Magnified or Not Caused by Diversification 
Some authors have argued that the inconsistent findings stem from reasons such 
as data-related biases, methodological issues, and the presence of moderating factors 
(Andrés et al., 2017a). According to Andrés et al. (2017a), moderating factors suggest 
that the performance effects of diversification will not be the same across firms. These 
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data-related biases, methodological issues, and moderating factors have led some authors 
to argue that, although there might exist a diversification discount, researchers cannot 
attribute it to diversification per se. Some authors have posited that inadequate 
measurement of variables magnify the discount, and other factors reduce the discount. I 
explore these data-related and methodological issues subsequently. 
One methodological issue that some researchers have raised is the use of the book 
value rather than the market value of debt in computing firm value. Mansi and Reeb 
(2002) found that the loss of value experienced by shareholders in diversification is a 
function of firm leverage and that all equity firms do not experience diversification 
discount. Mansi and Reeb also found that diversification reduces firm risk (see also 
Franco et al., 2016; Mammen et al., 2021; Wu & Chiang, 2019; Yücel & Önal, 2015) and 
that the book value of debt does not appropriately proxy its market value. These findings 
support the wealth transfer hypothesis, implying that using book value rather than the 
market value of debt in computing firm value and EV systematically undervalues DFs, 
resulting in the documented diversification discount. 
Mansi and Reeb (2002) worked on the premise that diversification reduces firm 
risk. However, some studies have cast doubt on this premise. There is evidence that 
diversification either has no significant relationship with firm risk (see Rojahn & 
Zechser, 2019) or increases firm risk (see Braakmann & Wagner, 2011). Jafarinejad et al. 
(2018) showed that diversification’s risk reduction ability depends on the type of 
diversification, risk, and external capital market condition. Consistent with Jafarinejad et 
al., Wu and Chiang (2019) showed that related diversification reduces ROA variability 
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whereas unrelated diversification reduces systematic risk. Haug et al. (2018) showed that 
corporate diversification significantly reduces bankruptcy risk but does not significantly 
impact systematic risk. Sun and Govind (2017) found that the level of market turbulence 
and the firm’s market emphasis—in terms of the level of concentration of marketing and 
sales expenses—moderates the risk effects of diversification. At best, it appears that the 
evidence on the risk effects of diversification is not conclusive. 
However, granting that diversification reduces risk and enhances bondholder 
value—necessitating the use of market rather than the book value of debt in computing 
firm value—there is still no consensus on whether the use the market value of debt causes 
the diversification discount to disappear. Some authors have found that the use of book 
rather than the market value of debt underestimates the value of DFs relative to UDFs. 
However, these authors also found that the diversification discount only decreases but 
does not disappear when they used estimates of debt’s market value (see Ammann et al., 
2012; Glaser & Mueller, 2010; Hoechle et al., 2012). Therefore, the conclusion is that 
although important, the use of book value of debt rather than market value is not the only 
explanation for the diversification discount (Ammann et al., 2012; Glaser & Mueller, 
2010; Hoechle et al., 2012). However, given that most of these studies used data from 
developed countries, the question remains whether researchers would observe the 
discount in different institutional contexts. 
Rudolf and Schwetzler (2014) pointed out that conglomerate EV will be biased 
downward if researchers do not adjust for the conglomerate’s cash holding. Although not 
all DFs hold less cash than focused firms (Atanasova & Li, 2019), on average, 
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conglomerates in developed markets hold significantly less cash than standalone firms 
(Bakke & Gu, 2017; Nguyen et al., 2017; Ushijima, 2020). Rudolf and Schwetzler also 
noted that to average industry multipliers, geometric mean is more reliable than the 
arithmetic mean or median used by Berger and Offek (1995). On the basis of the 
differences in cash holding between DFs and UDFs, Rudolf and Schwetzler suggested the 
use of enterprise value rather than the firm value given that enterprise value treats cash as 
negative debt and subtracts it from firm value. They also proposed the use of geometric 
mean rather than arithmetic mean or median of industry multipliers in computing the 
Berger and Ofek (1995) EV.  
In a sample of U.S. firms from 1998 to 2009 and their enterprise value and 
geometric mean approach to computing EV, Rudolf and Schwetzler (2014) found that the 
diversification discount decreased significantly by about 16% compared to when they 
employed the firm value–median industry multiplier model. Therefore, they concluded 
that the traditional Berger and Ofek (1995) EV measure distorts the value of DFs and 
argued that this distortion partly explains the documented diversification discount. 
Custódio (2014) identified purchase accounting used in mergers and acquisitions 
as another magnifier of the diversification discount. In purchase accounting, firms report 
acquired assets at their transaction value that typically exceeds their premerger book 
values because of the inclusion of goodwill in the firm’s postmerger value (Custódio, 
2014). By subtracting goodwill, Custódio found a 30% to 76% reduction in the 
diversification discount. However, Custódio assumed that mergers and acquisitions are 
the only channels for realizing diversification. Although mergers and acquisitions are the 
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principal vehicle of diversification, firms achieve substantial diversification through 
internal growth (Ekkayokkaya & Paudyal, 2016; Hyland & Diltz, 2002; Sahni & Juhari, 
2019) that does not require purchase accounting. Çolak (2010) identified the 
nonsimultaneous consideration of the diversification and refocusing decisions in 
estimating the valuation consequences of corporate restructuring given that firms take 
these decisions jointly. Çolak found no systematic diversification or refocusing discount 
or premium when they considered the diversification and refocusing decisions 
simultaneously. 
Altieri and Nicodano (2019) showed that the probability of default is higher for 
UDFs than for DFs and argued that the chances of survival are higher for DFs than for 
UDFs. As the authors pointed out, firms delist when they default and go bankrupt. 
Therefore, on average, the group of DFs will have more underperforming firms than the 
group of UDFs because more underperforming UDFs delist, leaving only higher-
performing UDFs (Altieri & Nicodano, 2019; see also Schommer et al., 2019). The result 
of the delisting of underperforming UDFs is that, on average, the group of surviving 
UDFs will tend to have a higher valuation than the group of surviving DFs, which include 
more underperformers (Altieri & Nicodano, 2019). Altieri and Nicodano found a 
significant positive relationship between the probability of survival and the 
diversification discount. Altieri and Nicodano (2021) accounted for the survivorship bias 
and found that between 25% to 75% of the diversification discount—depending on the 
bankruptcy prediction model—disappeared. These results are consistent with the view 
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that differential probability of survival is one explanation for the diversification discount 
(Altieri & Nicodano, 2019, 2021). 
Hund et al. (2019) concluded that the diversification discount that researchers 
who used the Berger and Ofek (1995) EV method documented is an artifact of poor 
matching of diversified and focused firms on the size and age dimensions. Hund et al. 
showed that DFs are much larger and older than focused firms and that the market-to-
sales ratio in the Berger and Ofek method of EV declines with size and age. According to 
Hund et al., the result is that comparing larger and older DFs to smaller and younger 
focused firms—as the Berger and Ofek did—is bound to produce a diversification 
discount. Given this possibility, Hund et al. developed the strata-matched EV measure 
that closely matches DFs to focused firms on the size and age dimensions and found that, 
on average, the valuation difference between DFs and UDFs disappeared. These findings 
suggest a need to understand what makes the difference between DFs that outperform and 
those that underperform. 
The evidence in the preceding section is that methodological issues related to the 
computation of the EV measure may have magnified or created the diversification 
discount documented in many studies. However, granted that the Berger and Ofek (1995) 
EV measure had been the dominant measure of DF performance, it is by no means the 
only measure that researchers have employed. These issues do not say much about the 
underperformance of DFs when researchers used accounting measures such as ROA and 
ROE (Lang & Stulz, 1994). Some factors moderate the D–P relationship (Ahuja & 
Novelli, 2017).  
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Some scholars have examined the effects of some moderating factors.  For 
instance, Andrés et al. (2017a) argued that the outcome of diversification depends on its 
implementation. Andrés et al. identified two divergent approaches to implementing 
diversification. The first approach is a one-step (asset-in-place) strategy—that is a now or 
never approach (exercise now or abandon)—where the firm commits fully now or 
abandons the option to invest. The second approach is the growth options strategy which 
is a gradualist method. Here, the firm approaches the diversification investment by 
making minor investments in selected industries to explore these industries before 
significant commitments (Andrés et al., 2017a). However, the firm builds-in some 
flexibility that allows it to adjust (expand further or abandon) with developments and new 
information.  
Andrés et al. (2017a) found that the flexibility built into the growth options 
approach leads to a more value-enhancing diversification. Deligianni et al. (2017) arrived 
at similar conclusions as Andrés et al. Deligianni et al. found that the effectuation 
processes positively moderated the D–P relationship. Deligianni et al. conceptualized 
effectuation in four dimensions: experimentation, affordable loss, flexibility, and 
precommitment. Except for affordable loss, all these effectuation measures had a 
significant positive moderating effect on the D–P relationship.  
Andreou et al. (2016) identified firms’ diversification profile as another factor that 
moderates the D–P relationship. According to the authors, firms could be single-time 
diversifiers or multiple-time diversifiers. Andreou et al. found that without accounting for 
a firm’s diversification profile, diversification reduced firm value, a result that is 
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consistent with the diversification discount literature. However, they also found that one-
time diversifiers —from a single-segment to multiple segments—were responsible for the 
value loss (see also Hoechle et al., 2012; Lang & Stulz, 1994). Andreou et al. also found 
that multisegment firms that further diversified once experienced insignificant value loss 
whereas multisegment firms that diversify multiple times experienced diversification 
premium. Andreou et al. attributed this premium to the experience and knowledge gained 
from previous diversifications (see also Tran et al., 2015). This conclusion is consistent 
with the advantages of the growth option diversification strategy, as Andrés et al. (2017a) 
identified.  
Related to Andreou et al. (2016) is Kim and Kim (2015), who showed that the 
diversification discount is an early stage diversification phenomenon. Kim and Kim 
argued that as a firm adjusts to its new status in the early stages of diversification, it loses 
comparative advantage due to increases in adjustment costs. However, as the firm 
consolidates its diversification, the discount turns to premium (Kim & Kim, 2015). The 
evidence so far is that many factors moderate the D–P relationship and more moderating 
factors may also be identified as scholars continue to research the relationship. 
Some authors have argued that the diversification discount does not imply that it 
is diversification per se that the market discounts. Instead, as they argued, the market 
might be discounting other firm features and its environment (see Andreou et al., 2019; 
Espinosa-Méndez et al., 2018; Matsusaka & Wang, 2015). Therefore, it would be 
necessary to distinguish between the effects of diversification from those of the firm’s 
other features in assessing the diversification discount. For instance, Tsai et al. (2011) 
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and Matsusaka and Wang (2015) found that the market discounted the expropriating 
tendencies of entrenched controlling shareholders and Espinosa-Méndez et al. (2018) 
showed that family ownership positively moderated the D–P relationship (see also 
Espinosa et al., 2018). Wu (2013) found that the market considers demand dynamics and 
the opportunity cost of reallocating the excess capacity in each firm. Harper et al. (2017) 
used a rational learning framework and found that investor sentiment explains the 
diversification discount, with the discount increasing when investor sentiment is high and 
decreasing when investor sentiment is low.  
Andrés et al. (2017b) argued that diversification generates growth options whose 
values researchers should account for in computing the DF’s total market value. 
Researchers’ failure to incorporate such growth options’ value might be one explanation 
for the diversification discount (Andrés et al., 2016, 2017b). Andrés et al. (2016) found 
that relevant growth opportunity partially mediates the D–P relationship in that part of the 
effect of diversification on firm value goes through the relevant growth opportunity. 
Andrés et al. showed that diversification becomes less value destroying when it increases 
relevant growth opportunity.  
Klein and Saidenberg (2010) and Ushijima (2015a) found evidence of 
“organizational-structure discount” (Klein & Saidenberg, 2010, p. 128), that what the 
market discounts in DFs is not diversification per se but the organizational structure of 
the firms. Investors may discount firms’ organizational structure due to information 
gathering difficulty and cost (Borah et al., 2018). This difficulty increases with 
organizational complexity (Borah et al., 2018; Chen & Liao 2015; Feldman et al., 2014; 
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Lai & Liu, 2018; Schaberl, 2014). Complexity increases with diversification (Borah et 
al., 2018; Hutzschenreuter & Horstkotte, 2013; Kim & Rasheed, 2014; Klein & 
Saidenberg, 2010). The increased cost of information gathering either reduces analysts’ 
incentive to cover DFs or causes them to produce less quality reports (Feldman et al., 
2014; Pattnaik et al., 2013).  
In the absence of useful information, investors tend to place less value on DFs, 
and this partly explains the diversification discount observed (Borah et al., 2018; Lai & 
Liu, 2018). Consistent with this view, Borah et al. (2018) found that DFs suffer a 
diversification discount of up to 15.34%. This discount is higher for diversified high-
technology firms than low-technology firms (Borah et al., 2018). Borah et al.’s 
explanation for this difference is the severity of information asymmetry, which is more in 
technology firms than nontechnology ones due to the higher level of difficult-to-value 
intangible assets in high-technology firms than low-technology ones. 
The need to improve the quality of financial reports and signal credibility to 
attract higher market valuation from investors may explain why complex organizations 
such as DFs are more likely to hire high-quality auditors (Lai & Liu, 2018). Lai and Liu 
(2018) found that DFs that hire quality auditors (Big N auditors) and auditors with longer 
tenure have higher financial reporting and disclosure quality and are valued more than 
those that do not. As further evidence of the importance of information quality in the 
valuation of DFs, Schaberl (2014) found that the change in the United States from FASB 
14 to SFAS 131 improved segment reporting, led to reduced analysts’ information 
gathering cost, and improved precision of analysts’ forecasts. Chen and Liao (2015) 
120 
 
found that compliance with SFAS 131 is negatively and significantly associated with the 
firm cost of debt. 
Because diversification per se is not the explanation for the diversification 
discount, Andreou et al. (2019) developed a theoretical model that predicts that CEO 
overconfidence will be associated with value loss in DFs. Consistent with this prediction, 
Andreou et al. (2019) found an economically significant loss of value of between 12.5% 
and 14.1% in DFs run by overconfident CEOs relative to those run by rational CEOs. On 
the basis of these findings, Andreou et al. proposed that CEO overconfidence is the 
unifying explanation of the pursuit of value-destroying diversification and subsequent 
refocusing aimed at restoring value. 
In summary, the preceding section shows that there are divergent views on the 
performance effects of diversification. There is no consensus or validation in other 
settings on many of the issues surrounding D–P relationship. As a result, whether 
diversification is related to firm performance and the nature of this relationship is yet 
unsettled. The lack of consensus calls for further studies. 
Curvilinear Diversification-Performance Relationship  
The diversification premium and diversification discount models leave scholars 
with some puzzles. Whereas the diversification discount model leaves researchers with 
the question of why firms continue to diversify (de la Fuente, & Velasco, 2015), the 
diversification premium model leaves unexplained the increases in firm value following 
refocusing (Ahn, 2009; Comment & Jarrell, 1995; Huang, 2014). A possible resolution to 
these puzzles may be that diversification results in premium (discount) up to a point 
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before it turns to a discount (premium). Palich et al. (2000) identified two primary shifts 
in diversification in the U.S. economy over the three decades up to the 1990s: the 
increased rate of diversification in the 1960s and the decrease in diversification in the 
1980s. Palich et al. argued that these two shifts suggest a tacit rejection of the linear 
premium/discount models of the D–P relationship. This argument necessitates another 
explanation of the relationship—one that will account for these shifts in diversification.  
Palich et al. (2000) reviewed 55 studies in the D–P literature, and through a meta-
analytic approach, derived and tested the curvilinear model of the relationship. This 
model essentially posits that firm performance increases as a firm moves from focused 
strategies to related diversification strategy but decreases as the firm moves away from 
related to unrelated diversification (see also Lohwasser et al., 2019). Palich et al. used 
various diversification and performance measures and found support for the inverted-U 
model of the D–P relationship. Nejadmalayeri et al. (2017) showed an optimal level of 
diversification that is a function of the number of segments and their relative sizes 
beyond which adding more segments destroys value, a result that is consistent with the 
inverted-U model. 
Many researchers have found support for the inverted-U D–P relationship in 
various studies (e.g., Benito-Osorio et al., 2015; Ekkayokkaya & Paudyal, 2016; Gálvan 
et al., 2014; Lien & Li, 2013; Sajid et al., 2016; Santarelli & Tran, 2016). However, 
Schommer et al. (2019) found that the level of unrelated diversification has decreased 
over time while related diversification has increased since the 1990s, after an initial 
decrease in the 1970s and 1980s. Simultaneously, the performance effects of unrelated 
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diversification have improved over time while that of related diversification have 
remained relatively stable. On the basis of these findings, Schommer et al. challenged the 
idea of an inverted U-shaped D–P relationship. 
Schommer et al. (2019) attributed the inverted-U D–P relationship to a weak 
selection environment that allowed underperforming unrelated DFs to survive. Schommer 
et al. argued that with the strengthening of the selection environment over time through 
increased capital market and shareholder pressures, the market forced out these 
underperforming unrelated-DFs, leaving unrelated DFs that are average or outstanding 
performers only. According to Schommer et al., the results indicate an overall 
improvement in the performance of unrelated diversification such that the right-hand side 
of the inverted U curve has, at least, flattened over time. 
 However, the inverted-U relationship is not consistent across studies (see Park & 
Jang, 2012; Setianto, 2020). The shape of the D–P relationship’s curve appears to depend 
on the type of diversification, related or unrelated (Park & Jang, 2012). Park and Jang 
(2012) studied 308 U.S. firms in the restaurant industry from 1980 to 2008. They found 
that, contrary to Palich et al. (2000), profitability decreases as related diversification 
increases up to a point and starts rising. Park and Jang also found that profitability 
increases initially with unrelated diversification up to a point before it starts decreasing 
with further increases in unrelated diversification.  
Concerning the risk effects of diversification, Park and Jang (2012) also found a 
curvilinear relationship: Risk increases with related diversification up to a point before 
decreasing and decreases as unrelated diversification increases but only up to a point 
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before decreasing with further increases in unrelated diversification (Park & Jang, 2012). 
According to Park and Jang, the managerial implication is that managers who wish to 
diversify should start with unrelated diversification as this initially increases profitability 
and reduces risk. However, to optimize the mix of related and unrelated diversification, 
Park and Jang suggested that managers should strike a balance of approximately equal 
ratio of the two.  
Andrés et al. (2014), Zahavi and Lavie (2013), La Rocca et al. (2018), Nigam and 
Gupta (2018), and Setianto (2020) also found a U-shaped relationship that is inconsistent 
with Palich et al. (2000). However, unlike Park and Jang (2012), Andrés et al., Nigam 
and Gupta, and Setianto did not distinguish between the effects of related and unrelated 
diversification. La Rocca et al. (2018) distinguish between the effects of related and 
unrelated diversification and found that whereas related diversification is negatively 
associated with firm value, unrelated diversification has a positive relationship with firm 
value. Smeritschnig et al. (2021) suggested that for related diversification, performance 
differences may arise from the type and degree of related (intra-industry) diversification. 
They, therefore, decomposed related diversification further into within-product 
proliferation and across-product proliferation and found that whereas the within-product 
proliferation–performance relationship is an inverted-U one, across-product proliferation 
and performance exhibited a U-shaped relationship. 
Nigam and Gupta (2020) used the Herfindahl index and entropy measures of 
diversification and found no significant impact of diversification—and its types, related 
and unrelated—on performance and risk in a sample of Indian firms, 2006-2016. 
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However, Nigam and Gupta (2020) went further and used the CBD measure developed 
by Nigam and Gupta (2018) to distinguish between two types of related diversification – 
PRD and NRD. They found that whereas NRD improved returns but had no significant 
impact on risk, PRD has no significant impact on both return and risk. Therefore, it 
appears that the way diversification is measured influences the results and accounts partly 
for the mixed results in the literature (Nigam & Gupta, 2018; 2020 
Lower performance in related diversification that may give rise to a U-shaped 
rather than an inverted-U shaped relationship is plausible for some reasons. One is the 
possible cannibalization of existing products by new ones produced using existing 
resources (Smeritschnig et al., 2021; Zahavi & Lavie, 2013). Cannibalization leaves the 
firm worse off (Smeritschnig et al., 2021; Zahavi & Lavie, 2013). The other reason is the 
increase in coordination cost. Coordination cost increases with the complexity introduced 
by the need to coordinate the interdependencies and use of shared resources between new 
and existing businesses in related diversification (Chen et al., 2019; Lee & Gaur, 2013; 
Zhou, 2011). This cost may increase faster than the expected synergy usually associated 
with related diversification and thus limit related diversification (Zhou, 2011; see also 
Chen et al., 2019; Lee & Gaur, 2013; Morris et al., 2017) 
Contrary to the U-shaped or inverted-U shaped relationship, Hashai (2015) 
hypothesized an S-shaped relationship between within-industry diversification and firm 
performance, explained not only by coordination cost as Zhou (2011) suggested, but by a 
combination of coordination cost and adjustment cost. Hashai reasoned that at low levels 
of intra-industry diversification, coordination cost is negligible, but adjustment costs 
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outweigh the little synergy that arises at this level—resulting in performance decline. 
Hashai further argued that at moderate levels of intra-industry diversification, the benefits 
of synergy increase and outweigh the sum of adjustment and coordination costs, resulting 
in a rise in performance. However, at high intra-industry diversification levels, a 
combination of an increase in adjustment and coordination costs outweighs the declining 
synergistic benefits at this stage. The result will be a decline in performance. Hashai 
tested these hypotheses on a sample of private and publicly traded firms in the high 
technology industries in Israel for the period 2000-2007 and obtained results that are 
supportive of the hypotheses, a result that is partly consistent with Zahavi and Lavie 
(2013), and inconsistent with Palich et al. (2000). 
Most of the authors that found a curvilinear within-industry D–P relationship 
focused on large firms in the developed countries (see Hashai, 2015; Park & Jang, 2012; 
Zahavi & Lavie, 2013). It is questionable whether this relationship could be generalized 
to the emerging markets that are characterized by institutional voids and small and 
medium enterprises (Pangboonyanon & Kalasin, 2018). Against this background, 
Pangboonyanon and Kalasin (2018) used data on 195 firms in five Southeast Asian 
countries for the period 2009–2014 to examined how within-industry diversification 
impacts the performance of SMEs in emerging markets. Rather than the curvilinear 
relationship, Pangboonyanon and Kalasin (2018) found that within-industry (related) 
diversification impacts firm performance positively in emerging markets and that the 
positive impact is stronger in less developed institutional contexts and more efficient 
firms.  
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Pangboonyanon and Kalasin’s (2018) explanation for this finding is that due to 
institutional voids and market imperfections, the benefits of within-industry 
diversification in SMEs in emerging markets result not from economies of scope in 
production but also in consumption. Pangboonyanon and Kalasin argued that these 
economies of scope in consumption surpass the adjustment and coordination cost 
involved in managing the interdependencies in resource sharing in within-industry 
diversification. Firms realize economies of scope in consumption when consumers prefer 
to buy multiple products from the same supplier, probably, due to the supplier’s 
reputation for quality products (Pangboonyanon & Kalasin, 2018). However, these results 
are inconsistent with Setianto (2020), who found a U-shaped diversification-firm value 
relationship in a study of 270 firm-year observations of Indonesian manufacturing firms 
over the period 2014-2014. The inconsistency suggests that further studies are still 
needed. 
Other researchers have found that the shape of the D–P relationship curve 
depends on other factors: (a) combination of firm size, product/service offerings, and 
industry domain (Dhandapani & Upadhyayula, 2015); (b) top management team (TMT)-
diversification fit (Hutzschenreuter & Horstkotte, 2013; Weiss et al., 2015; Zhou, 2018); 
and the industry (Purkayastha & Lahiri, 2016). Hutzschenreuter and Horstkotte (2013) 
and Weiss et al. (2015) argued that the performance of firms depends on the ability of the 
TMT to process information, the complexity of which depends on the number and 
relatedness of activities into which they entered. The TMT’s information processing 
ability, in turn, depends on its task-related (educational background and organizational 
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tenure) and bio-demographic attributes (Hutzschenreuter & Horstkotte, 2013; Kim & 
Rasheed, 2014). Therefore, it may be expected that TMT characteristics would moderate 
the shape of the D–P relationship.  
Hutzschenreuter and Horstkotte (2013) found an inverted-U relationship between 
added product scope (diversification) and performance: At levels of diversification with 
low scope and complexity (related diversification), performance increases up to a point 
and starts decreasing with further scope and complexity (unrelated diversification). This 
finding is consistent with Palich et al. (2000) but inconsistent with Park and Jang (2012) 
and Zahavi and Lavie (2013). However, Hutzschenreuter and Horstkotte found that TMT 
task-related attributes positively moderated the D–P relationship (see also Zhou, 2018). 
Both Hutzschenreuter and Horstkotte and Kim and Rasheed (2014) found that bio-
demographic attributes negatively moderated the relationship. 
One issue with the Hutzschenreuter and Horstkotte (2013) and Kim and Rasheed 
(2014) studies is that the authors assumed that complexity and information processing 
requirements increase with product scope, such that unrelated diversification would add 
more complexity than related diversification. However, Zhou (2011) suggested that 
related diversification is more complex given that it involves the sharing of existing 
resources and, therefore, requires more coordination. The difference in the 
conceptualization of complexity seems to stem from the approach in both studies. While 
Hutzschenreuter and Horstkotte, and Kim and Rasheed, approached complexity from the 
required managerial experience and information processing perspective, Zhou 
approached it from the coordination cost perspective. 
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From the preceding section, it appears that the curvilinear model of the D–P 
relationship has received some support. However, there is yet no consensus on the shape 
of the curve, and some attempts to find a curvilinear D–P relationship have not been 
successful (see Chao et al., 2012). On the basis of their study of diversified business 
groups in Taiwan, Chen and Chu (2012) concluded that a nonlinear D–P relationship 
does not exist. Apart from the inconsistent results, one of the issues with the studies 
supporting the curvilinear model of the D–P relationship is that they have not related their 
results to the organization’s institutional environment. Therefore, the curvilinear model 
does not explain why the performance effect of diversification has varied over time and 
across countries.  
Institution-Based Theory (IBT) and the Diversification-Performance Relationship 
The proponents of the diversification discount model, the premium diversification 
model, and the curvilinear diversification model have implicitly assumed that the home 
country environment is irrelevant (Benito-Osorio et al., 2012). On the basis of this 
assumption, these proponents had concentrated on the developed countries, notably the 
United States. Many also adopted primarily a cross-sectional approach or short sample 
periods, and by this approach implied that in the same countries and different country 
environments, the D–P relationship is similar and remains constant over time (Benito-
Osorio et al., 2012; Schommer et al., 2019). Insights from the IBT suggest otherwise. 
Essentially, the IBT is that countries’ institutional contexts inform strategic 
choices made by firms and the outcomes of such choices (Benito-Osorio et al., 2012; M. 
Zhang et al., 2015). Consistent with IBT, Qiu (2014) showed that cultural differences and 
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globalization context impact firm diversification decisions and their outcomes. Some 
researchers have argued and shown that nonmarket institutional factors such as political 
ties of managers matter for firm diversification strategies and performance in emerging 
markets (Boschma & Capone, 2015; Shi et al., 2017; Sun et al., 2015). Lohwasser et al. 
(2019) conducted a meta-analysis of 462 studies covering 1977-2012 in 40 countries and 
showed that diversification impacted firm performance more negatively in countries with 
better developed legal systems that offer better shareholder protection. Therefore, 
Lohwasser et al. concluded that institutions matter for the D–P relationship.  
Sun et al. (2017) found that CEO political ties have a significant positive 
relationship with product diversification in transition and emerging economies (see also 
Fan et al., 2020). However, as Mahmood et al. (2017) showed, the kind of political 
connections that benefit firms change as markets open up. In a recent study covering 15 
years, Gopal et al. (2021) found that while all firms reduced unrelated diversification 
following improvements in India’s market-supporting institutions, diversified business 
groups increased focus at the firm-level but continued to increase unrelated 
diversification at the group-level. In essence, the IBT could explain why a particular type 
of firm (diversified or focused) may be prevalent in certain countries or certain times in 
some countries. It could also explain the performance differences that have been recorded 
for different strategies in different countries and at different times (Benito-Osorio et al., 
2012). 
There is evidence of variation in diversification and focusing and their valuation 
effects over time. Diversified pyramidal business groups feature prominently in many 
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developing countries today (Gopal et al., 2021). However, Kandel et al. (2019) have 
shown that the diversified business group structure was also dominant at certain times in 
the history of many advanced countries (see also Nakamura, 2015). Many authors have 
shown that the trend towards diversification or focusing has changed over time (e.g., 
Basu, 2010; Bhatia & Thakur, 2016, 2017; Comment & Jarrell, 1995; Matvos et al., 
2018; Rumelt, 1982; Schmid & Waters, 2014; Schommer et al., 2019). The decision to 
operate as UDF or DF is not a one-time decision (Basu, 2010; Bhatia & Thakur, 2016, 
2017). Firms change their diversification/focus status over time in response to 
performance challenges, macro competitive environments, capital market conditions, and 
investor sentiments (Basu, 2010; Bhatia & Thakur, 2016, 2017; Bowen et al., 2015; 
Hovakimian, 2016; Lord & Saito, 2020; Matvos et al., 2018; Schommer et al., 2019; 
Smith & Coy, 2018).  
The diversification and refocusing strategies of firms have not only changed over 
time, they have also been valued differently over time (Flickinger & Zschoche, 2018; 
Schommer et al., 2019). There is evidence, for instance, that the valuation effect of 
diversification has varied over time (Ahn, 2009; Akbulut & Matsusaka, 2010; Mazur & 
Zhang, 2015; Pidun et al., 2019; Schommer et al., 2019; Servaes, 1996). The different 
types of diversification—related and unrelated—have also been valued differently over 
time. For instance, Ljubownikow & Ang (2020) found that higher competition is 
associated with more unrelated and less related diversification and that a more unrelated 
diversification strategy improves performance as competition rises. 
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There has also not been any consensus on refocusing and the value effects of 
divestiture (Bergh et al., 2020; Flickinger & Zschoche, 2018; Huang, 2014; King et al., 
2015; Matsusaka & Wang, 2015; Teschner & Paul, 2020). However, Comment and 
Jarrell (1995) found that the markets reacted positively to the refocusing in the 1980s (see 
also Zenner et al., 2015). Teschner and Paul (2020) found that divestiture is associated 
with a 1.33% announcement day average abnormal return in Germany, Austria, and 
Switzerland. Curi and Murgia (2018) found that divestiture (especially intra-industry) 
generally significantly reduces the diversification discount in financial conglomerates.  
However, the effect of refocusing may depend on some factors. For instance, 
Bergh et al. (2020) found that the market reaction to divestiture is contingent on the 
changes in blockholding and firm performance pre divestiture. Pham et al. (2021) found 
that the asset sell-off firms experienced higher long-run post divestiture operating 
performance and stock return than equity carve-out parents. The positive market reaction 
to divestiture announcement is lower for firms with high pre divesture R&D expenditure. 
Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010) explained these variations by changes in the institutional 
environment and efficiency of external capital markets over time (see also Flickinger & 
Zschoche, 2018; Schommer et al., 2019). 
Although there has not been any consensus on the performance effects of 
diversification, what is certain is that different periods in individual countries have 
experienced diversification or refocusing waves with different performance effects 
(Benito-Osorio et al., 2012; Flickinger & Zschoche, 2018). Firms react to these by 
changing their strategies to take advantage of the changing performance effects of 
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different strategies (Flickinger & Zschoche, 2018; Harper et al., 2017). The implication 
of this is that any effort at understanding the performance effects of diversification should 
incorporate the dynamic nature of firm diversification status (Basu, 2010). 
Following the finding that the performance effects of diversification vary over 
time, some authors have started examining how different economic conditions affect 
DFs’ behavior and, consequently, their performance in such conditions. For instance, 
Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2016) examined whether the value of diversification and 
its determinants changed during the financial crises of 2007-2009, given the financial 
constraints in the external capital market that it occasioned. Using a sample of 4,370 U.S. 
firms between 2005 and 2009, Kuppuswamy and Villalonga found a crisis-period 
diversification premium: The value of diversification increased significantly during the 
financial crisis period. On the basis of their finding that the crisis’s effect was more 
significant on the value of unrelated DFs than on related DFs, Kuppuswamy and 
Villalonga attributed the increase in the value of DFs to diversification.   
The crisis-period diversification premium hypothesis has received support in 
many other studies (e.g., Aivazian et al., 2019; Guerry & Wallmeier, 2017; Liu et al., 
2018; López-Zapata et al., 2019; Matvos & Seru, 2014; Rudolph & Schwelzler, 2013; 
Shen et al., 2018; Volkov & Smith, 2015). Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2016) gave two 
explanations for this result: the increased debt capacity of DFs based on the coinsurance 
theory (Lewellen, 1971; Santioni et al., 2020) and the increased efficiency of ICMs 
during this period (see Mazur & Zhang, 2015; Volkov & Smith, 2015). The increased 
debt capacity advantage is evident from Kuppuswamy and Villalonga’s finding of a 
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significantly higher industry-adjusted leverage of DFs than UDFs (see also Ushijima, 
2020). Kuppuswamy and Villalonga also found that the cash ratio was not the driver of 
the higher leverage.  
The coinsurance effect increases the firm’s borrowing capacity and reduces the 
cost of capital (Borah et al., 2018; Hann et al., 2013). Hann et al. (2013) found that, on 
average, DFs have a lower cost of capital than comparable focused firms (see also 
Aivazian et al., 2015; Borah et al., 2018; Demirci et al., 2020). Hann et al. attributed DFs’ 
lower cost of capital to the coinsurance effects of the DF’s uncorrelated cash flows, 
which reduce the firm’s risk. In a sample of 1,100 firms within their larger sample of 
16,000 firms across Western Europe, North America, and Asia Pacific regions between 
1998 and 2009, Beckmann et al. (2012) arrived at results that are consistent with Hann et 
al. and Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2016).  
The second reason for the crisis-period diversification premium that 
Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2016) put forward, is the increased efficiency of ICMs. 
Kuppuswamy and Villalonga’s idea is that given the external credit constraints, DFs 
tapped into their ICMs to fund positive net present value projects. Standalone firms have 
no ICMs and cannot fund some of their projects at such times in the absence of cash 
reserves. Increased competition for internal capital also increases headquarters’ 
incentives to choose the most deserving projects. This incentive improves the allocative 
efficiency of ICMs (Kuppuswamy & Villalonga, 2016; Sturm & Nüesch, 2019). The idea 
of the improved efficiency of ICM during the crisis period is consistent with many other 
studies (e.g., Hovakimian, 2011; Matvos & Seru, 2014; Santioni et al., 2020).  
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The fact that the availability of funds and access to credit were significant 
determinants of investments during this period highlights the importance of the debt 
coinsurance effect and the ICM. During the 2007-2009 financial crisis, many firms cut 
down on planned investment. Many of the firms that cut down on planned investment 
were those that had little cash reserves, low profits, limited access to external credit, and 
are generally financially constrained (Nguyen et al., 2015; Smith, 2014). Nguyen et al. 
(2015) also found that the 2007-2008 financial crisis negatively affected corporate debt 
issuance and capital expenditure, all of which significantly declined during the period. 
Aivavian et al. (2019) found that in the aftermath of the 2000-2001 economic downturn 
caused by the “dot.com bubble,” the capital investment of firms in their sample declined 
significantly. However, the decline was disproportionately larger for focused firms than 
diversified ones. 
On the basis of their finding, Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2016) argued that the 
diversification discount in normal times could be seen as a kind of insurance premium 
that firms are willing to pay to get some coverage during crisis periods (see also 
Beckmann et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2018). However, it is questionable whether the 
diversification premium in crisis times is sufficient enough to compensate for the 
discount suffered in regular times. Other issues still linger with the Kuppuswamy and 
Villalonga (2016) study. While the authors showed an increase in the value of DFs (a 
decline in the pre-crisis diversification discount), it is no evidence that diversification 
does not destroy value. As the authors reported, DFs still traded at a discount during the 
crisis period, though at lower discounts than previously (see also Liu et al., 2018). The 
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argument might be that DFs thrive better during such crisis periods and that the longer 
the crisis, the more valuable they would be. However, the crisis did not last long enough 
to assess this conjecture.  
The limited evidence provided by Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2016) is that the 
increase in value during this period had started reversing after the crisis (see also Matvos 
& Seru, 2014; Volkov & Smith, 2015). It is not certain what the trend would be over the 
long run. Kuppuswamy and Villalonga also examined only one crisis period. Therefore, 
their results could be an isolated case. Researchers have continued to address some of the 
questions related to the crisis period diversification premium hypothesis. For instance, 
Volkov and Smith (2015) argued that the reasons the value of diversification improved 
differed from crisis to crisis, depending on the origin and nature of the crisis. Liu et al. 
(2018) also pointed out that, although Kuppuswamy and Villalonga showed that DFs’ 
ICM efficiency and leverage increased during the crisis, they did not show that it was 
these factors that were driving the increase in the valuation of DFs during the period. Liu 
et al. showed that the increased investment and product market performance drive the 
crisis period diversification premium and not increases ICM efficiency and leverage. 
Liebenberg and Lin (2019) found that the performance effects of diversification during 
financial crises are contingent on ownership structure such as group affiliation. 
Moreover, given that Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2016) based their study on 
U.S. data, the extent to which their results apply to countries with different institutional 
and legal environments is questionable. Some authors obtained results that are 
inconsistent with Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (e.g., De la Fuente & Velasco, 2015; 
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Purkayastha, 2018). For instance, in the case of Spain, De la Fuente and Velasco (2015), 
found that financial crisis negatively moderates the valuation effects of diversification. In 
a study of Indian firms during the scarcity period of 1991 to 1997 and the munificent 
period of 2000 to 2006, Purkayastha (2018) also obtained results that are inconsistent 
with Kuppuswamy and Villalonga.  
Rudolph and Schwetzler (2013) examined how diversification impacted firms’ 
valuation in 21 countries during the 2008-2009 financial crisis and whether the 
institutional and legal environment explained any differences. They addressed the U.S. 
centric criticism of Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2016). Rudolph and Schwetzler 
selected firms from countries in the developed Asia-Pacific, the British Isles, North 
America, and Continental Europe regions. They identified the developed Asia-Pacific, 
the British Isles, and North America regions as having developed capital markets and 
high investor rights protection. In contrast, Continental Europe has less developed capital 
markets and the lowest investor rights protection. 
Rudolph and Schwetzler (2013) found a prerecession significant diversification 
discount for the Asia-Pacific, British Isles, and North America and nonsignificant 
diversification effect for Continental Europe. Consistent with Kuppuswamy and 
Villalonga (2016) and Volkov and Smith (2015), who used U.S. data, they found that in 
the regions with developed capital markets and high investor rights protection, the 
discount significantly declined during the crisis period, and in the case of the Asia-Pacific 
region tended towards a premium. However, in Continental Europe, with the least-
developed capital markets and the least-protected investor rights, the financial crisis had 
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no significant impact on diversification’s relative value. Rudolph and Schwetzler 
attributed this differential effect to differences in the institutional and legal context, a 
conclusion that is consistent with the IBT (Benito-Osorio et al., 2012).  
In a study of conglomerates’ performance in Brazil, Russia, India, and China 
(BRIC countries) pre- and post-2008–2009 financial crisis, Grigorieva and Gorbatov 
(2015) found that conglomeration creates value in periods of severe financial constraints. 
Given that the BRIC countries are emerging market countries characterized by less 
developed capital markets as Continental Europe, it appears that this finding is 
inconsistent with Rudolph and Schwetzler (2013) in the case of Continental Europe. 
Also, Rudolph and Schwetzler only addressed the 2008-2009 financial crisis, and 
therefore, does not indicate how the effect of different types of crises would vary across 
regions. This criticism would require further studies to clarify. 
From the preceding section, there is evidence of shifts in the diversification and 
refocusing trend and that the valuation effects of each strategy has varied over time. One 
factor that could account for the shifting trends in the diversification and refocusing 
strategies may probably be differences in the institutional environment. These differences 
could also account for why the different strategies have been valued differently over time 
and in different countries, as Rudolph and Schwetzler (2013) indicated. 
Some authors have pointed to the idea that institutional differences influence the 
performance effects of diversification. For instance, Lins and Servaes (1999) examined 
the value of corporate diversification in the UK, Germany, and Japan in the 1990s. Lins 
and Servaes found a diversification discount of about 10 percent and 15% for Japan and 
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the U.K. respectively, a result that is consistent with the U.S. evidence (Berger & Ofek, 
1995). However, contrary to the expectation based on the U.S. evidence, Lins and 
Servaes found no evidence that diversification destroyed value in Germany. The German 
firms that experienced diversification discounts were those with insider ownership below 
5%. Lins and Servaes, therefore, concluded that institutional differences between 
countries explained the differences in the performance effects of diversification.  
There is an increasing consensus that institutional differences affect the 
performance effects of diversification from country to country (Benito-Osorio et al., 
2012). IBT predicts that diversification and especially unrelated diversification is likely 
to create more value in institutionally weak countries such as emerging markets. The 
reason is that diversification facilitates the creation of internal markets that mitigate the 
cost of the imperfections in the external capital, labor, and product markets of such 
countries (Benito-Osorio et al., 2012; Berry-Stölzle et al., 2013; Khanna & Palepu, 1997; 
Lee et al., 2008; Pangboonyanon & Kalasin, 2018). 
Many authors have tested the predictions of the IBT in various ways. They have 
compared the performance of DFs with that of UDFs in particular countries (see Jara-
Bertin et al., 2015b; Mitra & Pattanayak, 2013; Pratyaksa et al., 2015). They have also 
compared the performance of DFs and UDFs across countries (see Berry-Stölzle et al., 
2013; Lin & Servaes, 2002; Pangboonyanon & Kalasin, 2018; Vestring et al., 2014; Yiğit 
& Behram, 2013). Other authors examined how the performance effects of diversification 
have varied over time in particular countries as the institutional context changed 
(Kuppuswamy et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2008; Ramaswamy et al., 2017). Although there is 
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no consensus on the direction of the D–P relationship in each context, there is substantial 
empirical evidence that institutional differences impact the performance effects of 
diversification. 
Staglianò et al. (2013) identified Italy as an institutionally weak country and used 
the IBT to explain their finding that unrelated diversification positively impacted firm 
performance in samples of listed and unlisted Italian firms over 1980-2007. Chen and Yu 
(2012) also found that unrelated diversification performed better than related 
diversification and focused strategy in Taiwan. Selçuk (2014, 2015) and Yücel and Önal 
(2016) arrived at similar conclusions as Chen and Yu in the case of Turkey. However, 
these authors did not indicate how the performance effects of diversification varied over 
time with changes in these countries’ institutional context. They also focused only on 
individual emerging markets and made no comparison with developed markets. 
To address the lack of country comparability criticism, Yiğit and Behram (2013) 
compared the performance of DFs in Turkey which they considered as institutionally 
weak with those in the Netherlands, a country they classified as institutionally developed. 
Yiğit and Behram found that unrelated diversification and single businesses performed 
better in Turkey, while the dominant business firm strategy performed better in the 
Netherlands. They interpreted this as supportive of the IBT, although institution-based 
theorist would have expected single businesses (focused firms) to do better in Netherland. 
The contradiction could stem from the fact that the countries have similar institutional 
settings. The authors did not indicate how Turkey is different from the Netherlands.  
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Against the country specificity criticism, Berry-Stölzle et al. (2013) studied the 
performance effects of diversification using a sample of 2,164 insurance companies 
across 76 countries—developed and developing—from 2004 to 2007. They found that in 
countries with developed capital markets, high property rights protection, and high 
competition levels, the performance of diversified insurance firms was lower than that 
focused firms, consistent with IBT. However, this study is one industry study, and its 
generalizability is, therefore, limited.  
Vestring et al. (2014) examined how conglomerates in six Southeast Asia fared 
relative to focused firms in this region and conglomerates in the developed countries over 
the period 2003 to 2012. Using total shareholder return (TSR) as the measure of value, 
Vestring et al. found that, on average, these conglomerates achieved a TSR that was 10% 
greater than that of focused firms in the region. They also found that the TSR was 18% 
greater than that achieved by conglomerates in the developed countries. However, given 
the cross-country nature of these studies and the short period covered in Berry-Stölzle et 
al. (2013), these authors did not capture how the D–P relationship has varied in particular 
countries given institutional changes over time. 
Although many of the studies conducted in the emerging markets tend to support 
the IBT prediction of a diversification premium for such markets (see Pangboonyanon & 
Kalasin, 2018), the results are also not consistent across studies. Some authors, 
Sambasivan and Asrarhaghighi (2016), found a nonsignificant relationship between 
diversification and performance in emerging markets. Others such as George and Kabir 
(2012) and Mitra and Pattanayak (2013) in the case of India and Chen and Chu (2012) 
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found a diversification discount in the case of Taiwan. Jara-Bertin et al. (2015b) and 
Pratyaksa et al. (2015) obtained similar results in Chile and the Philippines, respectively. 
Both George and Kabir (2012), Mitra and Pattanayak (2013), and Ravichandran 
and Baduri (2015) explained these discounts by the institutional improvements that have 
taken place following various reforms embarked upon by the governments. This result is 
consistent with the institution-based view. Lee et al. (2008) showed that as countries’ 
institutional framework improves, diversification will tend from a value-creating strategy 
to a value-destroying one. Noteworthy is that both George and Kabir, Mitra and 
Pattanayak, and Ravichandran and Bhaduri conducted their studies in India’s post-
economic liberalization era. In 1991, the Indian government introduced an economic 
liberalization program that significantly changed the corporate landscape and pattern of 
economic relationships in India (Mitra & Pattanayak, 2013). The limitation of these 
studies concerning this explanation is that the authors did not compare with the pre 
liberalization era.  
Scholars might argue that these studies are country-specific and do not distinguish 
the various institutional reforms that have taken place in these countries, changes that 
may have impacted the D–P relationship. However, the country-specific argument may 
not stand in the light of Lins and Servaes (2002), who examined the benefits of corporate 
diversification in seven emerging markets of Asia in 1995. Lins and Servaes found that, 
on average, DFs in emerging markets traded at a discount of approximately 7% and are 
less profitable than their single-segment counterparts. However, they found this discount 
only in firms that belong to industrial groups and firms with low ownership concentration 
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levels (between 10% and 30%). One issue with the Lin and Servaes’ work is that it is a 
cross-sectional study that does not account for the changes that may have occurred over 
time.  
Many of the studies that support the IBT have not shown how the performance 
effects of diversification have varied with changes in the institutional context of 
particular countries (see Lin & Servaes, 2002; George & Kabir, 2012; Mitra & 
Pattanayak, 2013; Ravichandran & Baduri, 2015). If the theory holds, the expectation 
would be that the performance consequences of diversification will vary with changes in 
the institutional framework within a particular country. It would also be expected that 
diversification will move from a value-creating strategy to a value-destroying one as 
market-supporting institutions develop (Basu, 2010; Benito-Osorio et al., 2012; Lee et al., 
2008) and as technological specialization increases (Anjos & Fracassi, 2018). Some 
authors have tested this proposition, but the results have been mixed. 
Anjos and Fracassi (2018) documented a decline in diversification activity in the 
United States since the 1970s and explained this by increasing technological 
specialization that makes diversification less valuable. Lee et al. (2008) examined how 
diversification’s performance effects changed as countries transition from one level of 
institutional development to another. Lee et al. based their study on data from South 
Korean firms for the period 1984 to 1996 and found that as South Korea’s institutional 
framework improved, the diversification premium found in the early years of their 
sample period changed to diversification discount in the later years, a result that is 
143 
 
consistent with the IBT. However, given that this study is focused only on South Korea, 
its generalizability to other countries is questionable. 
In a study of conglomerates in Southeast Asia, Vestring et al. (2014) also 
examined how the diversification premium changed as the economy developed. They 
classified the countries into three according to their development stages: pioneering 
economies, emerging economies, and mature economies. Pioneering economies 
represented the least developed of the three, and mature economies represented the most 
developed ones. Vestring et al. found that while the conglomerates showed higher TSR 
than focused firms, the TSR declined as they moved from pioneering to mature 
economies. For instance, conglomerates in the pioneering economies outperformed 
nonconglomerates by about 19%, whereas in the emerging economies, they outperformed 
by only 5%. However, Vestring et al. did not show the changes that have occurred in 
individual countries. 
Kuppuswamy et al. (2014) used data on 10,164 DFs and 21,737 focused firms 
across 38 countries over a 15-year period (1995-2009) to examine the effects of 
institutional factors on the value of firm diversification. Kuppuswamy et al.’s study has 
one notable strength over other studies on cross-country differences in the effect of 
institutional factors on the value of corporate diversification. They not only examined the 
performance differences across countries but also within-country variations over time. 
Kuppuswamy et al. found that compared with focused firms, the value of DFs is higher in 
countries with less efficient capital and labor markets. They also found that the product 
market efficiency does not affect the value of diversification. Consistent with Lee et al. 
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(2008) and Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2016), Kuppuswamy et al. found that as capital 
markets’ efficiency improved, the value of diversification tended to decrease. In a study 
of within-industry diversification in South Asia’s five emerging markets, Pangboonyanon 
and Kalasin (2018) found that the positive impact of diversification was more substantial 
in less developed institutional contexts. This positive impact is consistent with 
Kuppuswamy et al. (2014). 
However, notwithstanding the insights from Kuppuswamy et al. (2014), it fails to 
explain the contradiction that even as the institutions develop, already diversified 
business groups in emerging markets continue to diversify further while new ones 
continue to emerge (Gopal et al., 2021). Institution-based theory predicts that as the 
institutional framework develops, DFs would stop further diversification due to declining 
performance (Gopal et al., 2021; Hansoge et al., 2015; Karaevli, 2011; Larrain & Urzúa, 
2016; Lee et al., 2008). However, as Karaevli (2011) pointed out, what has happened is 
that as the institutional context improved, diversified business groups in emerging 
markets have exited some businesses. At the same time, these business groups have 
mainly remained diversified and continued to enter new businesses that are unrelated to 
their existing businesses (see also Hansoge et al., 2015; Larrain & Urzúa, 2016). They 
have also exhibited improved performance (Hansoge et al., 2015; Purkayastha, 2018; 
Ramaswamy et al., 2012).  
The conventional wisdom is that conglomerates in emerging markets exist 
because they fill institutional voids (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Khanna & Yafeh, 2015). 
However, the fact that conglomerates and group affiliated firms continue to expand and 
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thrive in many countries despite institutional reforms that have improved the functioning 
of markets challenges this conventional wisdom (Hansoge et al., 2015; Karaevli, 2011; 
Lee and Gaur, 2013; Manikandan & Ramachandran, 2015; Ramachandran et al., 2013; 
Ramaswamy et al., 2012). Ramaswamy et al. (2017) argued that this seeming 
contradiction stems from the fact that previous studies did not account for differences in 
diversification strategies—related or unrelated—adopted by the firms. Using data on 
diversified business groups in India from 1988 to 2012, Ramaswamy et al. found that as 
market supporting institutions develop, unrelated diversification tends to result in more 
unsatisfactory performance while related diversification strategy is associated with 
improved performance. This finding is more consistent with Lee et al. (2008) and 
Kuppuswamy et al. (2014) than Hansoge et al. (2015), Purkayastha (2018), and 
Ramaswamy et al. (2012).  
However, Ramaswamy et al. (2017) explanation may not be all to it. According to 
Manikandan and Ramachandran (2015), there are two ways to explain the contradiction. 
One explanation is that the reforms the government instituted may not have eliminated 
the institutional bottlenecks that made diversification and group affiliation valuable in the 
first place (see also Holmes et al., 2017; Larrain & Urzúa, 2016; Purkayastha & Lahiri, 
2016). The other explanation is that DFs thrive because of reasons other than the filling 
of institutional voids (see also Hansoge et al., 2015; Holmes et al., 2017; Ramaswamy et 
al., 2012). 
On the basis of their study of Indian firms, Manikandan and Ramachandran 
(2015) attributed the success of conglomerates in emerging markets compared to the 
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developed economies to two factors. One of the factors is the conglomerates’ business 
group structure (G-Form) that features greater decentralization of operational decision 
making than the multidivisional company (M-Form) structure in the West. The 
decentralization explanation is consistent with one of the reasons Thorndike (2014) gave 
for the exceptional success of Teledyne in the 1960s in the United States in comparison 
with its other conglomerate peers. Lee and Gaur (2013) explained the continued 
flourishing of diversified business groups in emerging markets compared with the United 
States by their finding that sociocultural mechanisms were more remarkable and worked 
better in divisions of Korean Chaebols than divisions of U.S. conglomerates. These 
sociocultural mechanisms are the essential components of organizational capabilities 
necessary for efficient management of DFs (Lee & Gaur, 2013). 
According to Karaevli (2011), two factors further help understand why contrary to 
the predictions of IBT, diversified business groups in emerging markets continue to 
diversify and show improved performance despite reforms that have improved the 
institutional context. The first one is that many of the authors have emphasized the 
lessening of transaction costs resulting from developments in the external markets 
without considering the opportunities created by these events. Such opportunities include 
the acquisition of lucrative state-owned enterprises being privatized as governments 
implement the privatization and deregulation policies in transition economies. Diversified 
business groups have better chances of exploiting these opportunities and gain the first-
mover advantage (Chittoor et al., 2015; Holmes et al., 2017; Karaevli, 2011; Manikandan 
& Ramachandran, 2015; Singh et al., 2018). This advantage is especially the case in the 
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early stages of the reforms because the privatization process is usually a gradual one, and 
the old template for doing things subsists and is advantageous to diversified business 
groups who could still use them (Singh, Pattnaik, et al., 2018). 
There is also the opportunity of finding buyers for the businesses that DFs are 
exiting from due to the developments in the financial markets and an increasing number 
of foreign investors (Gopal et al., 2021; Karaevli, 2011). According to Karaevli (2011), 
as long as these opportunities exist, the diversified business groups will not see the need 
to change their diversification policy (Gopal et al., 2021; Manikandan & Ramachandran, 
2015). The transaction cost view of the impact of institutional changes on firm 
diversification also ignores behavioral reasons for firm diversification, especially in 
emerging markets where many of the diversified groups are family-controlled. These 
behavioral reasons include the need to preserve wealth by diversifying risk while 
retaining control within the family, and firm diversification is one of the best ways of its 
accomplishment (Gopal et al., 2021; Karaevli, 2011; Masulis et al., 2020; Muñoz-Bullón 
et al., 2018). 
In summary, although there is yet no consensus, many of the recent studies are 
increasingly concluding that the D–P relationship is institutional context-dependent. This 
conclusion is consistent with Benito-Osorio et al. (2012) and the IBT. One the basis of 
the IBT, researchers would expect that diversification in countries with less developed 
institutions would experience more positive diversification effects that will decline as the 
institutional framework develops.   
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Insider Ownership and the Performance Effects of Firm Diversification  
In this section, I review some of the studies that used agency theory to explain the 
diversification decision and the diversification discount. Specifically, I examine some of 
the studies that attempted to account for DFs’ performance by insider ownership level. 
The difference in insider ownership may be the factor that distinguishes OPDFs from 
UPDFs. 
Based on the idea from portfolio theory that diversification through investing in 
negatively correlated securities reduces risk, many corporate managers have diversified 
into unrelated lines of business as a means of reducing corporate risk and improving firm 
performance (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Castañer & Kavadis, 2013; Park & Jang, 2012). 
However, some researchers have raised the point that in a well-functioning market, 
investors can efficiently achieve the required risk diversification on their own (Amihud & 
Lev, 1981). Consequently, no one should expect firm diversification to create value for 
shareholders. The reason is that firms can hardly create value for shareholders by doing 
what the shareholders can efficiently do on their own (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Castañer & 
Kavadis, 2013; Erdorf et al., 2013; Lacoste et al., 2010). Based on this view and given the 
many studies that show that DFs underperform their focused counterparts, many 
researchers have looked towards agency problems resulting from poor corporate 
governance as the possible explanation for continued diversification and the 
diversification discount. 
The recent high profile corporate failures and bankruptcies have mainly been 
attributed to corporate governance failures at controlling agency problems and have led to 
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renewed interest in corporate governance (Jiraporn et al., 2018). Consequently, 
researchers have looked at firms’ performance generally and DFs from the corporate 
governance perspective. There is some evidence that corporate governance variables 
partly explain the performance effects of diversification (Boumosleh et al., 2012; 
Hoechle et al., 2012; Gleason et al., 2012; Sautner & Villalonga, 2010). Insider 
ownership is one of such corporate governance variables that researchers have examined. 
Many authors have investigated the relationship between ownership structure— 
including insider ownership—and firm diversification (e.g., Anderson et al., 2000; 
Castañer & Kavadis, 2013; Chen & Yu, 2012; Denis et al., 1997; George & Kabir, 2012; 
Hautz et al., 2013; Lacoste et al., 2010; Sener & Akben-Selcuk, 2020; Tsai et al., 2011). 
Some researchers have also explained the continued diversification of firms and the 
underperformance of DFs by agency problems resulting from low insider ownership 
(Ammann et al., 2012; Hoechle et al., 2012). However, according to Tsai et al. (2011), 
only a few researchers have directly examined the relationship between insider ownership 
and the performance effects of diversification (e.g., Anderson et al., 2000; Denis et al., 
1997; Hoechle et al., 2012; Hyland & Diltz, 2002; Lin & Servaes, 1999; Singh et al., 
2004; Taĝ, 2017; Tsai et al., 2011). 
One of the few works in which the authors directly examined the relationship 
between insider ownership and the performance effects of diversification is Denis et al. 
(1997). They suggested that agency problems resulting from low managerial equity 
ownership are partly responsible for firms diversifying and maintaining value-destroying 
diversification when refocusing would have been a more value-creating strategy. 
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However, as Erdorf et al. (2013) pointed out, the results in Denis et al. (1997) do not 
provide convincing evidence that DFs’ underperformance is related to insider ownership. 
The reason is that Denis et al. found that higher managerial ownership level was only 
associated with lower levels of diversification and not with more valuable diversification.  
Lins and Servaes (1999) studied the value of corporate diversification in three 
developed markets of Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Although they did not 
find significant evidence that diversification on average destroyed shareholder wealth in 
Germany, they found that the firms that experienced diversification discount were those 
with low insider ownership levels (below 5 percent). Anderson et al. (2000) found that 
although there are differences in CEO equity ownership between focused and DFs, CEO 
equity ownership was not related to firm performance.  
Hyland and Diltz (2002) examined whether the diversification announcement 
abnormal return was related to managerial ownership. They found that firms with 
managerial ownership greater than 25% experienced a significantly positive 
announcement return, while firms with managerial ownership below 25% experienced 
returns that were not significantly different from zero. Gleason et al. (2012) also found a 
positive but nonsignificant relationship between director share ownership and the 
performance effects of diversifying and related M&A announcement of firms over the 
1996 to 2003 period. Boumosleh et al. (2012) found a positive correlation between 
director ownership and Tobin’s q of DFs post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States. 
Thorndike (2014) credited the high performance of Teledyne over the period Henry 
Singleton was the CEO partly to the fact that majority of the board members were 
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insiders who collectively owned almost 40% of the outstanding shares of the company. 
These findings are consistent with the view that the diversification discount could be due 
to agency problems from low insider ownership. 
Contrary to the expectation that insider ownership will be positively related to 
firm performance, Taĝ (2017) found a negative relationship between executive 
shareholding and EV in a sample of 119 firm-level observations in the United States for 
2002 and 2003. Singh et al. (2004) found evidence that are not consistent with the 
conclusion that the diversification discount results from low insider ownership-related 
agency problems. Using a sample of large U.S. firms for the period 1993 to 1998, Singh 
et al. examined whether there are more underperforming DFs among the group of firms 
with low-insider ownership than the group of high-insider ownership firms. Singh et al. 
found no significant difference in the number of underperforming and outperforming 
firms for both the groups of low and high insider ownership firms. They, therefore, 
concluded that value-destroying diversification is not attributable to low insider 
ownership. 
There is indirect evidence of a positive relationship between insider ownership 
and the performance effects of diversification. One of these indirect pieces of evidence is 
the relationship between ICM efficiency and insider ownership. Some researchers have 
found that the efficiency/inefficiency of ICMs affects DFs’ performance (Berger & Ofek, 
1995; Cline et al., 2014; Glaser et al., 2013; Ozbas & Scharfstein, 2010). Therefore, 
variables responsible for inefficient ICMs may be responsible for the diversification 
discount (Ozbas & Scharfstein, 2010; Sautner & Villalonga, 2010). Sautner and 
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Villalonga (2010) found that blockholding of insiders (managers and directors) has a 
significant positive relationship with the efficiency of ICM (see also Duchin & Sosyura, 
2013; Ozbas & Scharfstein, 2010). This relationship is supportive of the positive 
performance effects of greater insider ownership resulting from interest alignment.  
However, both Sautner and Villalonga (2010) and Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010) 
are not direct tests of the insider ownership–performance effects of diversification 
relationship. As some authors have shown, efficient ICMs do not automatically translate 
to improved valuation for the DF. The market may be valuing other things related to the 
DF, such as the firm’s organizational structure (Klein & Saidenberg, 2010; Ushijima, 
2016). 
As indicated earlier, the interest alignment and entrenchment hypotheses of 
insider ownership on performance (Connelly et al., 2010) give rise to the inverted-U 
shaped relationship (Kim & Lu, 2011). These hypotheses make it plausible to expect an 
inverted-U shaped relationship between insider ownership and DF performance. There is 
support for this model of insider ownership–performance effects of firm diversification 
relationship. For instance, Hoechle et al. (2012) found a curvilinear inverted-U shaped 
relationship between CEO ownership and firm performance. Hoechle et al. also found 
that officers’ and directors’ ownership (excluding the CEO) was not significant. 
However, this study is limited as a test of the relationship between insider ownership and 
the performance effects of diversification to the extent that the authors did not interact the 
diversification and insider ownership measures. 
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Given the inverted-U shaped relationship, the question becomes, which agency 
conflict dominates in explaining the diversification discount? Based on studies such as 
Denis et al. (1997), researcher would expect that low insider ownership is responsible for 
value-destroying diversification. However, contrary to this expectation, evidence points 
more towards the loss of value due to majority-minority shareholder conflict at high 
insider ownership levels. One source of this conflict is entrenchment (see Delbufalo et al., 
2016; Lien & Li, 2013; Tsai et al., 2011). Another is risk aversion, the need to reduce 
largely undiversified unemployment risk (Alessandri & Seth, 2014; Castañer & Kavadis, 
2013; Lacoste et al., 2010). Lacoste et al. (2010) hypothesized that risk aversion would 
lead insider owners to embark on risk-reducing strategies such as unrelated 
diversification, even if such strategies are value destroying (Lacoste et al., 2010).  
Alessandri and Seth (2014), Castañer and Kavadis (2013), and Lacoste et al. 
(2010) found evidence supportive of the hypothesis that risk aversion lead insider owners 
to embark on risk-reducing strategies such as diversification. However, these studies do 
not directly test the relationship between insider ownership and diversification’s 
performance effects. These authors also started on the premise that diversification and, 
especially, unrelated diversification is value destroying, ex ante. This assumption is 
wrong as it overlooks the fact that in some cases, DFs have created value more than 
focused firms (e.g., Beckmann et al., 2012).  
The premise that diversification is value destroying ex ante runs through many 
studies that have used agency problems to explain the diversification discount. Based on 
this premise, on finding that DFs, on average, have lower insider ownership than focused 
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firms, many of these authors concluded that the value destruction should be attributed to 
agency problems (e.g., Denis et al., 1997). This premise is wrong (García et al., 2013). 
Hovakimian (2016) has shown that some diversifiers have been successful regarding the 
EV measure while others have not and that it is the success or failure of diversification in 
each case that determines the restructuring on which the firm embarks. Whereas DFs with 
higher EV than focused firms tend to diversify further (which is a value-maximizing 
strategy), those with lower EVs tend to refocus (Hovakimian, 2016).  
Further, as Matsusaka (2001) has argued, firms do not know with certainty ex 
ante what the result of a new business will be or how it will match their organizational 
capabilities (see also Coad & Guenther, 2014; Deligianni et al., 2017; O’Brien et al., 
2014; Pisano, 2017). They, therefore, approach the search for matching businesses 
through experimentation, including such experimentations as diversification (Matsusaka, 
2001; see also Deligianni et al., 2017; García et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2013; Pisano, 2017; 
Tran et al., 2015). The ex post result obtained in this process will depend on such factors 
as the organizational capability and the firm’s ability to achieve a strategic fit between its 
abilities and its environmental opportunities. Firms can exploit these opportunities only 
through a search process that may involve diversification (García et al., 2013).  
The consequence of this premise is that these authors ignored the finding that DFs 
have, in many cases, created more value than focused firms (Chen & Yu, 2012; 
Hovakimian, 2016). Therefore, the authors also ignored the need to extend the analysis to 
examine separately DFs that have outperformed and those that have underperformed 
focused firms to discover the factors that differentiate high performing and low 
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performing DFs. Rather than diversification per se, these factors could explain the 
difference in performance between DFs and UDFs (Basu, 2010).  
What emerged from some studies is that shareholders with much of their wealth 
in a firm (such as controlling families) are not only interested in diversifying their risk to 
ensure corporate survival. They are also interested in having control over their investment 
and maintaining socioemotional wealth without jeopardizing corporate survival (e.g., 
Craninckx & Huyghebaert, 2015; Hernández-Trasobares & Galve-Górriz, 2017, 2020; 
Muñoz-Bullón et al., 2018; Pratyaksa et al., 2015; Shen, 2018). Karaevli (2011) argued 
that the primary goal of controlling shareholders at the mature stage of a business group 
is not only the preservation of wealth but also the retention of control within the family 
(see also Dou et al., 2020; Hernández-Trasobares & Galve-Górriz, 2020). One way of 
achieving this is through a firm diversification strategy, using pyramidal structures (Dou 
et al., 2020; Hernández-Trasobares & Galve-Górriz, 2020; Pratyaksa et al., 2015).  
Based on the dynamic socioemotional wealth (SEW) model, Shen (2018) 
proposed that diversification is a strategy to deal with business risk and suggested that 
family firms that face business risk are more likely to diversify than those that do not. 
Shen also proposed diversification might be a solution to the socioemotional wealth-
destroying conflicts and rivalry among family members, especially when the second 
generation becomes involved in the management. Diversification for controlling families, 
therefore, becomes a value-maximizing and not a value-destroying strategy the agency 
theory of diversification suggests (Craninckx & Huyghebaert, 2015).  
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Ataullah et al. (2014) questioned whether agency problems dominate corporate 
diversification decisions, thus causing diversification discount. Ataullah et al. argued that 
on the one hand, if agency considerations dominate insiders’ diversification decisions, 
such insiders would not be purchasing their firms’ shares in the open market since they 
will suffer the eventual loss from the diversification. The reverse would be the case if 
insiders diversify to increase the firm’s value. 
Therefore, the intensity of insider share purchases would signal to the market 
whether the insiders perceive that the diversification will be a value-increasing strategy or 
a value-destroying one (Ataullah et al., 2014). Because of problems of information 
asymmetry in DFs, outside investors would ordinarily tend to discount DFs (Borah et al., 
2018; Cai & Zeng, 2011; Feldman et al., 2014; Litov, Moreton, & Zenger, 2012) but 
would increase their valuation as the intensity of insider purchases increase. Therefore, 
Ataullah et al. (2014) hypothesized a significant positive relationship between the 
intensity of insider purchases and the level and valuation of diversification. Ataullah et al. 
found support for this hypothesis. Based on this finding, they concluded that it is 
asymmetric information rather than agency problems that cause the diversification 
discount. 
In a survey of managers in the United States relating to their views on how 
diversification affects firm performance, Bowen et al. (2015) found evidence that tends to 
support Ataullah et al. (2014) and inconsistent with the agency cost explanation of the 
diversification discount. They found that the majority (67.7%) of managers disagreed 
with the proposition that diversification (both product and international) is likely to 
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reduce firm financial performance. The majority (60%) of the managers surveyed agreed 
that diversification’s primary purpose was to exploit excess capacity in firm-specific 
resources such as proprietary knowledge. This purpose is likely to improve performance, 
contrary to the agency cost hypothesis (Dey & Banerjee, 2019; Fox & Hamilton, 1994).  
Smith and Coy’s (2018) evidence supporting the catering hypothesis of 
diversification also contradicts the agency cost hypothesis of firm diversification. The 
catering hypothesis is that managers tend to cater to the changing investor perception of 
diversification in diversifying or refocusing. Smith and Coy found a significant negative 
relationship between their measure of diversification discount (Diversified Q Differential) 
and the decision to diversify or remain diversified and a significant positive relationship 
between Diversified Q Differential and the decision to refocus. This finding implies that 
managers tend to diversify or remain diversified as the diversification discount decreases 
and refocus as the discount increases.  
Smith and Coy (2018) also found that, on average, DFs exhibit a fundamental 
diversification premium in the long run. Smith and Coy argued that the diversification 
discount that some researchers have documented is a systematic short-term firm-level 
mispricing phenomenon that efficient management is unlikely to respond to with a costly 
refocusing. According to Smith and Coy, this explains why, although diversification may 
be a value-maximizing strategy, researchers can still observe discounts, and firms would 
remain diversified even in the face of such discounts. 
In summary, there is yet no consensus on how insider ownership is related to the 
performance effects of diversification. There is, therefore, the need to reconsider the 
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agency cost explanation of diversification and diversification discount. This need is 
because while some DFs have traded at a discount, others have traded at a premium. 
Therefore, there is the need to separate the DFs according to their performance and 
examine how factors such as insider ownership level as a corporate governance 
mechanism affect the performance effects of diversification. There is the need for direct 
tests of the relationship between insider ownership and the performance effects of 
diversification rather than inferring this from the relationship between insider ownership 
and diversification based on the wrong assumption that diversification is always value 
destroying. 
Nigeria as an Emerging Market: The Institutional Context 
The IBT suggests that firms adapt their strategies to fit their peculiar environment, 
which impacts their performance (Berry-Stölzle et al., 2013). According to Khanna and 
Palepu (1997), widespread failures in the capital, labor, and product markets; in the 
regulatory systems; and mechanisms for enforcing contracts characterize emerging 
markets (see also Chowdhury et al., 2019; Elango & Dhandapani, 2020; Finchelstein, 
2017; Gao et al., 2017). These failures are not common in developed markets 
(Chowdhury et al., 2019; Elango & Dhandapani, 2020; Finchelstein, 2017; Gao et al., 
2017). These failures also characterize the Nigerian business environment (Ikyanyon et 
al., 2020; Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018; Tule et al., 2018; World Economic Forum [WEF], 
2018; World Bank, 2018; World Bank & International Finance Corporation [IFC], 2015).  
In Nigeria, market supporting infrastructure such as electricity is poorly 
developed, unreliable, and costly (Obokoh & Goldman, 2016; Oseni, 2017; Rentschler et 
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al., 2019; WEF, 2018; World Bank, 2018; World Bank & IFC, 2015). So also is the 
communication infrastructure (Olatokun & Ojo, 2016; WEF, 2018). Such infrastructure 
failure increases the difficulty of building a brand (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). In such an 
environment, DFs with reputable brands gain a competitive advantage as they can lower 
their unit cost by spreading these costs across many activities (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). 
They can also leverage their reputation to profitably enter into new lines of business that 
may even be unrelated to the firms’ current or core businesses (Gao et al., 2017; Khanna 
& Palepu, 1997). 
Compared with developed countries, Nigeria’s capital market is underdeveloped 
(WEF, 2018; World Bank & IFC, 2015). This underdevelopment limits the availability 
and affordability of financial services (WEF, 2018). The value of ICMs increases in such 
environments of external financial constraints (Berry-Stölzle et al., 2013; Bhatia & 
Thakur, 2018; Kuppuswamy et al., 2014). Some researchers have shown that DFs with 
efficient ICMs outperform single-industry firms (e.g., Kuppuswamy et al., 2014; 
Kuppuswamy & Villalonga, 2016).  
A shortage of qualified workforce and rigidities are features of Nigeria’s labor 
market and these increase the cost of employing skilled workers (Ikyanyon et al., 2020; 
WEF, 2018). Tate and Yang (2015) argued that in such an environment, diversification 
improves firm productivity and profitability by enabling firms to deploy their human 
capital more efficiently in an internal labor market (see also Berry-Stölzle et al., 2013; 
Lohwasser et al., 2019).  
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In Nigeria, there are various forms of government regulations that are costly and 
time-consuming to comply with (WEF, 2018; World Bank & IFC, 2015). There is high 
institutional uncertainty in emerging markets in the form of vagueness, arbitrary 
interpretation, and enforcement of such regulations (J. Zhang et al., 2015). Navigating 
these regulations necessitates cultivating and maintaining good political connections, 
which constitutes a valuable resource that can improve corporate strategy (Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997; Li et al., 2013; Su & Tsang, 2015; J. Zhang et al., 2015). Firms spend 
considerable amounts to cultivate and maintain good political connections because of 
their likely impact on performance (Deng et al., 2012; Khanna & Palepu, 1997, Li et al., 
2013; M. Zhang et al., 2015; Zhu & Chung, 2014).  
The way the authorities enforce the rules also breeds corruption which becomes a 
norm for doing business (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). Nigeria ranks poorly in most 
measures of corruption and institutional development. For instance, in 2018, Nigeria 
ranked 144 out of 180 countries in the Transparency International corruption perception 
index and 127 out of 140 in the Global Competitiveness Report index of quality of 
institutions (Transparency International, 2019; WEF, 2018). Ojeka et al. (2019) found 
that corruption and weak institutions negatively impact firm value and accounting 
performance while Elango and Lahiri (2014) showed that corruption also negatively 
impacts firm performance in Nigeria. However, the consensus seems to be that larger and 
more DFs are better able to carry the cost of corruption by spreading them across 
different operations (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Purkayastha, 2018). Consequently, many 
161 
 
scholars would expect that DFs will outperform focused ones in more corrupt and weak 
institution countries such as Nigeria.  
The Nigerian judicial system is highly dysfunctional and inefficient, and Nigeria 
ranks poorly on various indices of quality of judicial system (U.S. Department of State, 
2018; World Bank, 2018; WEF, 2018). Consequently, consumers and firms rarely use the 
court system to resolve disputes (U.S. Department of State, 2018). Firms limit contact 
with the inefficient judicial system by increasing intra-firm transactions and working 
based on established reputation rather than arm’s length contractual arrangements (Gao et 
al., 2017; Holmes et al., 2017; Kandel et al., 2019; Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Lohwasser et 
al., 2019; Purkayastha, 2018). The coinsurance effect of different businesses gives 
conglomerates the desired reputation to attract required resources (Gao et al., 2017; 
Khanna & Palepu, 1997). More intra-firm transactions are also more tax efficient 
(Wentland, 2020). 
The preceding section shows that institutional voids and failures characterize 
Nigeria. The institution-based view of the performance effects of firm diversification 
suggests that diversification would be a value-creating strategy in such environments 
(Kuppuswamy et al., 2014; Lien & Li, 2013; Lohwasser et al., 2019). Therefore, it is 
necessary to examine the empirical literature on the performance of DFs in Nigeria to 
ascertain the extent it is consistent with the IBT. 
The Diversification-Performance Literature in Nigeria 
Despite the preponderance and importance of DFs, only a few authors have used 
data on Nigeria firms to study the D–P relationship (see Adamu et al., 2011; Binuyo et 
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al., 2019; Oladimeji & Udosen, 2019; Olasupo, 2015; Oyedijo, 2012; Patrick, 2012; 
Ugwuanyi, 2012; Ugwuanyi et al., 2012a, 2012b). Of the few authors that have used 
cross-country data to study the performance effects of diversification, only Berry-Stölzle 
et al. (2013) that was limited to insurance companies included Nigerian firms. Apart from 
the methodological deficiencies of these studies, their results have also not been 
consistent. Moreover, none of these authors related the performance effects of 
diversification to insider ownership. 
As indicated earlier in this section, the studies on Nigerian firms have produced 
inconsistent results. For instance, Adamu et al. (2011) and Oyedijo (2012) found that 
UDFs s outperform DFs. On the contrary, Patrick (2012), Ugwuanyi (2012), and 
Ugwuanyi et al. (2012a, 2012b) found a significant positive D–P relationship. Adamu et 
al. were limited to only 12 firms in the construction industry, and many of these 
companies are not listed on the stock exchange. Therefore, the reliability of their data is 
questionable given that unlisted companies in Nigeria are not known to comply with 
requirements regarding the preparation and filing of annual reports (Adamu et al., 2011). 
By using average specialization ratio (ASR) to classify firms as UDF, moderately DFs, 
and highly DFs, Adamu et al. also implicitly assumed that once a firm is classified as 
UDF, for instance, it remains same throughout the study period. The fact that firms’ 
diversification status change over time makes this assumption faulty (Basu, 2010; Bowen 
et al., 2015; Hautz et al., 2014).  
Oyedijo (2012) relied on self-reporting questionnaires to classify firms as 
diversified or undiversified. Not only does this reduce the reliability of their data, it also 
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makes interfirm comparison difficult given that what firms call diversification may differ 
from firm to firm. Oyedijo also made the faulty assumption of a permanent 
diversification status that does not change over the sample period, contrary to the 
evidence in the literature (see Basu, 2010). Given that Oyedijo sampled managers from 
48 firms and used 231 valid responses, more than one respondent may have come from 
the same firms. Since the financial information used was from published financial 
statements of the 48 firms, Oyedijo must have repeated this financial information for 
respondents from the same firms. The author did not indicate was done to avoid such 
duplication of data or ensure data consistency. 
In the case of Patrick (2012), the author did not indicate the sample size used. 
Patrick classified firms as diversified if they produced “different goods” (p. 229) but did 
not indicate how the difference in goods was measured. By this approach, it is not 
possible to determine whether Patrick classified a firm producing two products with the 
same SIC codes as diversified or not.  
The deficiency of Ugwuanyi (2012) stems from two central angles. In the first 
place, Ugwuanyi’s measure of diversification counts the number of subsidiaries a bank 
had. This classification does not show the extent of diversity between these subsidiaries’ 
activities and those of the bank. Based on this measure, it would not matter if the 
subsidiaries’ activities are the same (Chan & Watson, 2011). The authors would classify 
a bank that operates in different industry segments without any subsidiary as a standalone 
bank. Therefore, this approach is faulty. Ugwuanyi’s measure of EV does not show any 
comparison between focused and diversified banks. These limitations are also associated 
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with Ugwuanyi et al. (2012a) and Ugwuanyi et al. (2012b) since it appears that the two 
studies are just a duplication from the same lead authors. 
Most recent authors on the D–P relationship in Nigeria suffer the same limitations 
as previous ones (see Binuyo et al., 2019; Mac-Ozigbo & Daniel, 2020; Nwakoby & 
Ihediwa, 2018; Oladimeji & Udosen, 2019; Olasupo, 2015). They either did not identify 
how their measures of diversification were defined and operationalized (see Oladimeji & 
Udosen, 2019; Mac-Ozigbo & Daniel, 2020; Nwakoby & Ihediwa, 2018) or relied on 
respondents’ view of whether the firm is diversified or not as in Binuyo et al. (2019) and 
Olasupo (2015). Relying on managers’ opinion of whether a firm is diversified or not 
makes interfirm comparison impossible. Due to the absence of SIC data and inadequate 
segment data disclosure, Gunu and Gunu (2020) measured diversification as the 
difference between total revenue and sales revenue. This measure is not popular in the 
diversification literature but also does not capture the diversity in firms’ activities.  
Another problem with most of these works is that except Gunu and Gunu (2020), 
the sample of firms in these recent studies is small, ranging from four in the case of 
Binuyo et al. (2019) to 20 in the case of Nwakoby and Ihediwa (2018). Binuyo et al. and 
Olasupo (2015) sampled the opinions of 400 managers in four companies and 426 
managers in 12 companies, respectively. As with Oyedijo (2012), it is obvious that there 
must have been duplication of firm data as more than one respondent must have come 
from the same firms. Mac-Ozigbo and Daniel (2020) sampled 400 private firms. 
However, the reliability of private firms’ data in Nigeria is questionable. Gunu and Gunu 
sampled 42 firms, but their work focused on the manufacturing sector. 
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Because of these shortcomings, there is still limited understanding of the D–P 
relationship in Nigeria. None of the authors have used the SIC codes to classify firms as 
diversified or focused. The reason may have been that SIC code data for Nigerian firms 
have not been readily available. I am the first to employ SIC codes in the study of the D–
P relationship in Nigeria. No author has yet examined the relationship between insider 
ownership and the performance effects of diversification in Nigeria. I am also the first to 
do this. None of the authors who have used data on Nigerian firms have captured the D–P 
relationship variations over time, given that all the authors employed cross-sectional 
analysis or pooled panel data analysis. These techniques do not capture the longitudinal 
nature of the data (Dhir & Dhir, 2015; Lin et al., 2014; Taĝ, 2017). I am the first to 
capture the longitudinal and multilevel nature of the information in the variables in the 
D–P literature in Nigeria.  
Summary and Conclusions 
A literature review on the D–P relationship shows that the diversification, 
performance, and insider ownership constructs are multidimensional. Researchers have 
measured them in different ways. The implication is that researchers must clarify the 
measurement adopted in any study. Availability of data has influenced the measurement 
of these constructs, considerably.  
There is no consensus on the performance effects of diversification. However, 
there seems to be an increasing consensus that the performance effect of diversification 
depends on the institutional context and that studies in environments that are 
institutionally different could help resolve the D–P relationship puzzle. Only a few 
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authors have directly tested the relationship between insider ownership and the 
performance effects of firm diversification without any consensus on the relationship’s 
direction. There is a need for more direct testing of this relationship. Given that some 
DFs have outperformed their focused counterparts while others have underperformed, 
there is the need to analyze DFs according to their performance to see how factors such 
as insider ownership make a difference in DFs’ performance.  
In its institutional context, Nigeria is different from the developed markets, where 
the D–P relationship research has concentrated. Therefore, there is a need to examine this 
relationship and the moderating effect of insider ownership using data on Nigerian firms. 
Despite the insights from the few authors that have used data on firms in Nigeria to 
examine the D–P relationship, some methodological deficiencies limit these studies. 
None of these authors has used SIC codes to measure diversification. I bridge these gaps 
in the literature by using SIC codes to classify firms as diversified or focused in Nigeria’s 
case. None has examined the relationship between insider ownership and the performance 
effects of diversification in Nigeria. I narrow this gap by examining this relationship. In 
chapter 3, I show the methodology I used to accomplish these. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine the relationship between 
firm diversification and firm performance and the relationship between insider ownership 
and the performance effects of diversification in Nigeria. In this chapter, I describe the 
overall approach to testing the hypotheses and answering the research questions. I 
identify and rationalize the research design I employed in this study. I describe the 
methodology, including the population, and also specify the sampling size and the 
sampling strategy I adopted. In this section, I also discuss the instrumentation, data 
collection process, and the data analysis plan for testing the hypotheses and addressing 
the research questions.  
Research Design and Rationale 
In this study, I addressed four questions focusing on the effects of diversification 
on performance and the relationship between insider ownership and diversification’s 
performance effects. These questions are:  
RQ1: How is the performance of DFs different from that of focused firms in 
Nigeria? 
RQ2: What is the relationship between the level of diversification and firm 
performance in Nigeria? 
RQ3: How is the insider ownership of DFs that outperform focused firms 
different from the insider ownership of DFs that underperform focused firms in Nigeria? 
RQ4: What is the relationship between insider ownership and the performance 
effects of level of diversification in Nigeria? 
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The independent variables in this study were diversification status, level of 
diversification, and insider ownership. Firm performance, measured by ROE and ATQ, 
was the dependent variable. The control variables included firm size, leverage, board 
independence, and blockholding/ownership concentration.  
The quantitative research approach is the most appropriate for examining the 
relationship between variables (Basias & Pollalis, 2018; Bloomfield & Fisher, 2019; 
Queiros et al., 2017; Rutberg & Bouikidis, 2018). Many researchers in similar studies 
have used the quantitative research approach (e.g., Aivazian et al., 2019; Bhatia & 
Thakur, 2018; Borah et al., 2018; Hoechle et al., 2012; Lee & Hooy, 2018a). Researchers 
have identified numerous research designs that include experimental designs and 
nonexperimental or correlational design (see Asenahabi et al., 2019; Bloomfield & 
Fisher, 2019; Rutberg & Bouikidis, 2018; Seeram, 2019). For this research, I employed 
the nonexperimental (correlational) design. Specifically, I employed the panel 
(longitudinal) design variant of correlational design (Asenahabi et al., 2019; Rutberg & 
Bouikidis, 2018; Wang et al., 2017).  
The rationale for this design was that the units of analysis in this study are firms. 
Firms are naturally formed groups that I needed to treat as they are (Bloomfield & Fisher, 
2019; Queiros et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2017). In such cases, randomization as a way of 
controlling for competing explanations of observed relationships was not possible 
(Bloomfield & Fisher, 2019; Queiros et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2017). This fact rules out 
experimental designs that require random assignment of the units of analysis into 
experimental and control groups (Bloomfield & Fisher, 2019; Wang et al., 2017). 
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Pretesting was also not possible as I had no control over the independent variables—
control regarding when and whom to introduce them to test before and after their 
introduction to the groups. The nonexperimental design is suitable where a researcher 
lacks control over the independent variables (Bloomfield & Fisher, 2019).  
Researchers have found that the primary variables analyzed in this research and 
their effects change over time. For instance, diversification status and diversification’s 
performance effects change over time (Basu, 2010; Benito-Osorio et al., 2012; 
Hovakimian, 2016; Schommer et al., 2019; Smith & Coy, 2018). Ownership and other 
corporate governance features of firms also change and evolve with firm growth and 
changes in investment opportunities (Brickley & Zimmerman, 2010). Using a panel 
design enabled me to capture these variations over the sample period (Lien & Li, 2013; 
Ployhart & Vandenberg, 2010; Wang et al., 2017; West, 2009). One constraint consistent 
with this design is that I did not have enough resources to search for companies’ annual 
reports where they were not publicly available.  
Methodology 
Under this heading, I discuss the population and the population size used in this 
study. I also review the sampling and data collection procedures I used. Finally, I indicate 
how I operationalized the various constructs.  
Population 
This study’s population was all companies (equities) listed on the NSE at any 
time between January 1, 2008, and December 31, 2018. The reason for using only listed 
companies is that they are required to publish their annual reports and audited financial 
170 
 
statements. The annual reports of companies listed on the NSE are more accessible and 
reliable as a source of data than unlisted companies. Moreover, the ATQ, which was one 
of the performance measures in this study, required data on company shares’ market 
price. These data are only available for companies listed on the stock exchange. 
The population size is the number of companies (equities) listed on the NSE at 
any time from December 31, 2008, to December 31, 2018. This information is available 
from the annual reports of the NSE. At the end of December 31, 2008, the number of 
equities listed on the NSE was 213. During the sample period, 12 new equities listed on 
the NSE. So, the population for the study was 225.  
Sampling and Sampling Procedures 
In this section, I discuss the sample size and the eligibility criteria. I also consider 
the sampling method and how I drew the sample. I aimed at a sample size that would help 
me achieve a statistical power of at least .80. Many researchers consider a statistical 
power of .80 adequate (Arend & Schäfer, 2019; Dattalo, 2009; Sherperis, 2014). The 
effect size I employed in determining the sample size necessary for statistical power of 
.80 was a function of the effect sizes that researchers have found in related studies.  
The coefficient of determination (R2) approximates the effect size (Arend & 
Schäfer, 2019; Burkholder, 2014; Sherperis, 2014). Field (2017) suggested that an 
average of effect sizes obtained in studies that addressed similar questions could 
approximate the effect size. Although some researchers have examined the relationship 
between diversification and firm performance in Nigeria, I am not aware of any 
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researcher who has examined the relationship between insider ownership and 
diversification’s performance effects.  
Few authors have looked at how insider ownership (as a corporate governance 
mechanism) is related to the performance effects of diversification. Those who have, 
Anderson et al. (2000), Hoechle et al. (2012), and Tsai et al. (2011), reported effect sizes 
of .13, .103, and .161, respectively. Mazur and Zhang (2015), Benito-Osorio et al. (2015), 
and Yücel and Önal (2016) reported R2 of .59, .64, and .39, respectively. The average of 
the effect sizes reported in these six studies means that I could work with an effect size of 
about .33, which for a regression study approximates to a large effect size of .35. which is 
considered appropriate (Burkholder, 2014; Sherperis, 2014).  
Field (2017) recommended G*Power software for determining the sample size 
necessary to achieve a required power (p. 70). I used this software to determine the 
minimum sample size. An a priori (Dattalo, 2009) power analysis for a multiple 
regression random model using G*Power 3.1.9.2 software and assuming a large effect 
size of .30, alpha of .05, and seven predictors, indicated that a sample size of 51 
companies would be required to achieve a power of .80. The seven predictors include the 
two independent variables, the four control variables, and the two independent variables’ 
interaction term. Given the expectation of a high attrition rate due to lack of data (Adamu 
et al., 2011), there was a need to provide a buffer. To provide a buffer by increasing the 
sample size, I used a medium effect size of .15, which gave a sample size of 101. Overall, 
I used 109 firms. 
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The problem with the power analysis for a multiple regression random model 
using G*Power 3.1.9.2 software related to this longitudinal study (with multilevel data 
set) is that it does not account for the repeated measures nature of the data and the 
resulting within-subject correlations. However, as Guo et al. (2013) have pointed out, 
validated sample size determination methods are available for only a few mixed model 
classes. Guo et al. (2013) also pointed out that these few methods are based on 
approximations and “simple assumptions about the study design” (p. 2). Based on the 
current knowledge on power analysis, Guo et al. recommended power analysis methods 
developed for multivariate models. This recommendation justifies the use of the power 
analysis for a multiple regression random model. 
Recently, Arend and Schäfer (2019) identified the R package-based SIMR using 
Monte Carlo simulation as the best approach for statistical power analysis for two-level 
multilevel models. Using this approach, Arend and Schäfer performed a minimum 
detectable effect size analysis and developed rules of the thumb for economically and 
quickly identifying sample sizes that achieve a statistical power of .80 in multilevel 
models. Based on the alpha of .05 and medium effect size, the researchers indicated that a 
Level 2 (firms) minimum sample size of 40 and a Level 1 (within-firm observations) 
sample size of 3 would achieve a power of .80 for a random intercept model. This rule 
suggests that a minimum of 3 firm-year observations for each firm and a minimum of 40 
firms would be sufficient to achieve a statistical power of .80.  
Arend and Schäfer (2019) and Lorah (2018) suggested that the interclass 
correlation (ICC) approximates effect size in multilevel models. I am aware of only Qiu 
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(2014) who has used the LMM in the D–P literature. Qiu calculated an ICC of .38. 
However, Qiu’s study is a cross-country study, and the ICC indicates that 38% of the 
variability in the performance (measured by market value) of DFs lies between 
countries—the Level 2 variable. In my case, the Level 2 variable is the firms, and 
therefore, Qiu’s ICC may not be a good proxy for interfirm variability. Arend and 
Schäfer recommended the use of a medium effect size where ICC information is not 
available. This recommendation justifies the use of medium effect size in using the Arend 
and Schäfer approach. 
Eligibility Criteria 
To be included in the sample, I required a firm to have data to measure the 
required variables. Following Hoechle et al. (2012) and others, I excluded financial 
services firms in the analysis. Financial services firms are usually listed under the 
financial services sector on the NSE and include banks; insurance carriers, brokers, and 
services; micro-finance banks, mortgage carriers, brokers, and services; and other 
financial institutions. In the International Standard Industrial Classification of all 
Economic Activities, Rev. 4, which I used to assign SIC codes to firms’ economic 
activities, these financial services firms would be firms whose activities fall under the 64, 
65, and 66 2-digit codes. Financial firms are excluded because their financial ratios are 
not usually comparable with those of nonfinancial firms. In the case of Nigeria, apart 
from the Company and Allied Matters Act that regulates all companies, financial 
institutions are further governed by the Banking and Other Financial Institutions Act 
1991, as amended.  
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I also excluded firms that did not have the data to operationalize the variables in 
the study. Given the study’s panel design and the need to capture how the relationships 
varied over time, I imposed the criteria that the firm must have a minimum of three 
consecutive years of data. Ployhart and Vanderberg (2010) argued that the change 
between two time points only is linear by default (p. 97). As a result, it is “impossible to 
determine the form of change over time” (p. 97). Ployhart and Vanderberg also argued 
that using less than three-time point observations may confound the actual change. The 
change observed from Time 1 to Time 2 may just be an isolated case due to measurement 
error (Ployhart & Vanderberg, 2010). 
I employed probability sampling in this study (Rahi, 2017). I had the list of all the 
firms on the NSE over 2008–2018. Therefore, I could define the population precisely, 
and this made it possible to use probability sampling. I used simple random sampling to 
select the required number of firms. By this process, I gave all nonfinancial firms listed 
on the NSE a chance to be included in the sample. I executed the simple random 
sampling by assigning computer-generated numbers to all firms in the population. I 
selected firms whose assigned numbers matched the numbers drawn from the lot of 
random numbers generated. I did this until I obtain the required sample size. When I 
dropped any of the selected firms for data unavailability, I used simple random sampling 
to choose other firms from the remaining lot to replace them. 
Procedures for Data Collection 
For this study, I extracted the required data from the selected companies’ annual 
reports and financial statements. I also collected data from NSE publications, such as the 
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NSE Factbook, daily price lists, and annual reports. These are publicly available from the 
NSE library, and I downloaded many from company websites. 
Reliability 
The companies I used in this study were all quoted on the NSE. The law requires 
these companies to publish annual reports and audited accounts. Presently, these annual 
reports are the most reliable data sources on companies in Nigeria, and many researchers 
have used them (e.g., Adamu et al., 2011; Gunu & Gunu, 2020; Oyedijo, 2012). 
A significant task in this research was that of assigning SIC codes to firms. At the 
time of data collection, there were no databases like Compustat that published SIC codes 
of companies in Nigeria yearly. Therefore, I perused the companies’ annual reports, 
especially the section on the nature of the business, to determine the products or services 
offered by each company for each of the years (either through any of its business units or 
its subsidiaries). I assigned SIC codes to each of the products/industries of every 
company selected based on the International Standard Industrial Classification of all 
Economic Activities, Rev. 4, published by the Economic and Social Department of the 
United Nations (2008). With this, I was able to classify firms as focused or diversified, 
and if diversified, the degree of diversification. Chen and Yu (2012) adopted a similar 
approach in their study of Taiwanese firms. To avoid bias, I also enlisted an industrial 
economist who independently did the assignment and classification. There was 
congruency between the two assignments. 
This approach produced segment classifications similar to the business units of 
the Business Information Tracking Series (BITS) that Villalonga (2004) used. The 
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approach mitigated managers’ self-reported segment data based on different activity 
aggregation levels that make interfirm segment comparison difficult (Villalonga, 2004). It 
also prevented segment under or overreporting and ensured that the segment data 
reflected only economically meaningful diversification or refocusing events rather than 
mere reporting changes (Hyland & Diltz, 2002; Villalonga, 2004).  
However, it was not possible to obtain usable segment sales, assets, or profit data. 
In many cases, the firms’ reported segments and segment data—where such data 
existed—were inconsistent with firm segments classification I used in this study. The 
inconsistencies made interfirm comparison less informative. Gunu and Gunu (2020) also 
identified insufficient segment disclosure in Nigeria that made it impossible for them to 
use any SIC-based diversification measures. Due to insufficient segment disclosure, I 
could not use the Berger and Ofek (1995) approach to compute EV.  
Using the EV measure of performance for robustness check, I could mitigate this 
problem in any of three ways. The first way is to compute the EV as the difference 
between the firm’s Q and the unweighted average of its segments’ imputed Qs as in 
Servaes (1996). The second is to follow an approach similar to Seo et al. (2010), and 
compute a DF’s EV as the difference between the firm’s Q and the average Q of single-
segment firms in the market. To calculate the EV of group firms, Seo et al. compared the 
performance of group firm with the median performance of all nongroup firms in their 
sample. The third approach is to use only firms where reported segments (segment sales) 
corresponded to the classification of the firms’ segment I used in this study. Although 
segment reporting is still in its rudimentary stages and many firms do not report any 
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meaningful segment information (Gunu & Gunu, 2020), the Berger and Ofek (1995) EV 
measure may be calculated for firms with sufficient segment information based on 
reported segments. Given the limitations with my data (as I explain later), the only 
feasible options were the Servaes (1996) and Seo et al. (2010) approach.  
Operationalization of Constructs 
In this section, I indicate how I operationalized and measured the constructs in 
this study and the strengths and limitations of the measurement. The independent 
variables were the diversification status, the level/degree of diversification, and insider 
ownership. The dependent variable was firm performance, and the control variables were 
firm size, leverage, blockholding/ownership concentration, and board independence. 
Diversification Status 
Diversification status is the category that a firm falls into when I classify them as 
focused firms/UDF or as DF. So defined, this variable, is an unweighted business count 
measure. A firm was classified as UDF if it operated in only one industry measured at the 
two-digit SIC code level and as DF if it operated in two or more industries. This way, I 
measured diversification status at the nominal level. Many researchers have 
operationalized diversification status similarly (e.g., Benz & Hoang, 2020; Berger & 
Ofek, 1995; Borah et al., 2018; Denis et al., 1997; Giachetti, 2012; Hoechle et al., 2012; 
Hund et al., 2013; Lee & Hooy, 2018a, 2018b; Rojahn & Zechser, 2019; Selçuk, 2015; 
Shen et al., 2018).  
The unweighted business count measure reflects the full extent of different 
activities or business lines that a firm is engaged in. It has the further advantage of being 
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more objective, given that it is usually based on internationally recognized standard 
measures of activity such as the SIC code system (Pitts & Hopkins, 1982). The data to 
measure the variable are also more readily available from published financial reports 
(Pitts & Hopkins, 1982). The availability of information is crucial, especially for 
developing countries like Nigeria where data availability is a serious issue. For instance, 
Giachetti’s (2012) justification for using the diversification status variable was the 
absence of detailed segment reporting to enable the operationalization of the weighted 
business count measures such as the Herfindahl index. 
However, one limitation of this measure is that it does not recognize the size 
differences of these activities and their contribution to the firm’s total output (Pitts & 
Hopkins, 1982). As some authors have pointed out, diversification should not be gauged 
only by the number of business segments a firm is engaged in but also by the size and 
contribution of each segment to the firm’s total output (Berry, 1971, Pitt & Hopkins, 
1982). Rumelt (1982) also suggested diversification should be gauged by the relatedness 
of these segments (see also Berry, 1971; Pitt & Hopkins, 1982).  
Despite this criticism, Ramaswamy et al. (2012) found a high correlation between 
the unweighted business count measure and the weighted business count measures 
(Herfindahl and entropy index) that capture each the contribution of each segment to the 
total firm output. Moreover, a business line may be presently insignificant for a firm but 
accounts for a significant proportion of the industry, such that the firm may come to 
depend on it in times of downturn in the other major segments. Also, significance is 
highly subjective given that it will boil down to what measure is used—sales, assets, 
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profit, or employment. A segment in which a firm has more of its assets may be 
contributing an insignificant proportion of its total sales currently. The issue becomes 
whether the firm should disregard it. 
As some authors have posited, the measure of diversification to be used in any 
study will depend on data availability (Chao et al., 2012; Gunu & Gunu, 2020; Pitts & 
Hopkins, 1982; Rumelt, 1982). Pitts and Hopkins (1982) recommended using numerical 
count when considering differences between groups of diversified and focused firms 
given that the measure has the advantages of accounting for all activities and data for it is 
more readily available. Chao et al. (2012), cited the lack of most of the information 
necessary to operationalize the other measures of diversification as the reason for their 
use of the BSD-MNSD approach, and Gunu and Gunu (2020) used what they called 
income and non-income diversification due to inadequate segment data disclosure in 
Nigeria. 
Degree/Level of Diversification  
The levelof diversification relates to the distribution of the firm’s output (say 
sales) across its different businesses (Wiersema & Beck, 2017). I operationalized this 
variable as the number of industries/egments in which a firm operated. Level of 
diversification is an interval variable. Many researchers have also operationalized it 
similarly (e.g., Andrés et al., 2016, 2017b; Custódio, 2014; George & Kabir, 2012; 
Giachetti, 2012; Lee & Hooy, 2018a; Mitra & Pattanayak, 2013; Nejadmalayeri, Iyer, & 
Singh, 2017; Shen et al., 2018). Following Nejadmalayeri et al. (2017), and Harper et al. 
(2017), among others, I defined industry at the two-digit SIC code level.  
180 
 
This measure has the advantage of being able to be operationalized with data that 
are more readily available data from company financial statements, especially in Nigeria 
and other developing countries, where segment reporting is still not well-developed. It 
also reflects the full range of the activities in which a firm is engaged. Its limitation is 
that, like other unweighted business count measures, it does not reflect the size 
differences of a firm’s activities and their contribution to the measure of total output. 
Some authors have suggested that the definition of a firm’s level of diversification should 
reflect each activity’s contribution to the firm’s total output (Pitt & Hopkins, 1982). 
However, Ramaswamy et al. (2012) found a high correlation between the unweighted and 
weighted business count measures. Due to less informative segment reporting in Nigeria, 
I could not operationalize the level of diversification by the Herfindahl index or entropy 
index—measures that reflect each activity’s relative contributions. 
Insider Ownership 
Insider ownership refers to the ownership of people who have access to firm-
specific information that is not usually available to other investors and who have 
influence over the firm’s decisions. I measured insider ownership as the proportion of a 
firm’s outstanding shares owned directly or indirectly by the firm’s directors (executive 
and nonexecutive) as disclosed in the annual reports. This way, I measured insider 
ownership at the ratio level. This definition is similar to that used in many studies (e.g., 
Anderson et al., 2000; Berķe-Berga et al., 2017; Chen & Yu, 2012; Denis et al., 1997; 
Hoechle et al., 2012). Companies in Nigeria are required to report the shareholding of 
their directors in their annual reports. These companies do not usually report officers’ 
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shareholding (other than the CEO and executive directors). Therefore, I was unable to use 
officers’ shareholding to operationalize insider ownership as Anderson et al. (2000), 
Chou (2015), Denis et al. (1997), Hoechle et al. (2012), and some others did. Cheng et al. 
(2012) employed the direct and indirect shareholding of directors in their study of Hong 
Kong firms because it was the only insider ownership information reported by companies 
in their annual reports. 
The argument against this measure is that not all the directors could be considered 
insiders, per se. Other than the executive directors, many of the directors lack adequate 
information about the company’s operations, and given their background and experience, 
some are not able to influence the firm’s decisions (Brickley & Zimmerman, 2010). 
Therefore, some of these directors may not be said to possess the information and the 
influence over the firm’s actions as insiders are assumed to have. Kim and Lu (2011) 
argued that CEO ownership should have the most impact if insider ownership is to be 
measured by influence over firm decisions. Boumosleh et al. (2012) used the CEO and 
the executive directors’ ownership as insider ownership measures. However, I could not 
employ the CEO and the executive directors’ shareholding to operationalize insider 
ownership because, during data collection, I did not make the distinction between 
executive directors’ and nonexecutive directors’ shareholding.  
Firm Performance 
Firm performance refers to how well a firm does over a period given its goals and 
objectives. I measured firm performance by ROE and ATQ. ROE is an accounting 
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measure of performance and ATQ is a hybrid of accounting and financial market 
measures. These measures mitigate the limitations of each other. 
I measured ROE as the net income after tax divided by shareholders’ funds. As 
measured, ROE is an interval variable. Chen and Chu (2012), Oyedijo (2012), Berry-
Stölzle et al. (2013), Olawale et al. (2017), and Zhou (2018), among others, measured 
ROE similarly. The strength of ROE is that, like most other accounting measures, the 
information for its computation is more readily available. It also provides information to 
management on past financial performance and rates of return to shareholders of the firm 
(Zhou, 2018), serving as a basis for future strategic decisions (Butler et al., 2012). 
However, it suffers from the limitations I identified in the literature review section. I 
mitigated these limitations by employing the ATQ measure.  
I measured ATQ as the market value of ordinary shares plus book value of total 
liabilities divided by book value of total assets. This makes ATQ an interval variable. 
Many researchers have used this measure (e.g., Custódio, 2014; Hyland & Diltz, 2002; 
Lien & Li, 2013; Singh et al., 2018; Villalonga, 2004). As a hybrid measure of firm 
performance, it leverages the strengths of the accounting and the market measures. It 
captures risk, which accounting measures do not, and operational performance issues lost 
in financial market measures (Richard et al., 2009) but is computationally less 
cumbersome than Tobin’s q.  
However, the ATQ is an approximation of the original Tobin’s q and suffers from 
some of the limitations of Tobin’s q as I identified in the literature review, such as the 
assumption of market efficiency in calculating the market value of equity. However, 
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despite the financial markets’ inefficiency, market prices still give the best 
approximations of the value of assets. The book value of debt may not reflect the market 
value of debt since most of the firms’ debts are not traded (Glaser & Mueller, 2010). 
Although it is possible to estimate the market value of debt using bond pricing equations, 
I could not do this for Nigerian firms due to the lack of detailed reporting of corporate 
debts in the annual reports. However, as some authors have pointed out, the difference 
between market value and the book value of debt could be ignored since the two values 
do not generally deviate significantly (Berk & Demarzo, 2019). Despite these limitations, 
Chung and Pruitt (1994) found that the ATQ explains 96.6% of the variability in Tobin’s 
q while making use of readily available accounting and financial market information. 
Control Variables  
I controlled for some of the variables that researchers have found to be related to 
firm performance. The reason is to rule out their confounding explanations of any 
relationships observed in this study. These variables included firm size, firm leverage, 
blockholding, and board independence. In the following section, I indicate the ways I 
measured these variables.  
Following Sturm and Nüesch (2019) and Brahmana et al. (2019), I measured firm 
size at the interval level as the natural logarithm of the book value of the firm’s total 
assets. This measure is considered better for some reasons. C. Dang et al. (2018) found 
that total asset is the most widely used measure of firm size in the corporate finance 
literature and that most researchers use the logarithm form of firm size measures to 
mitigate high skewness in the firm size data. The data to operationalize it were also 
184 
 
readily available. I extracted the data on total assets from company annual reports. 
Employment figures are not always available in the annual reports. C. Dang et al. (2018) 
found that total assets and total sales are highly correlated (see also Hashmi et al., 2020). 
This correlation suggests that researchers can safely use any of the measures as 
substitutes. 
One criticism of the book value of the total asset as a measure of firm size is that 
the principle of conservatism, which accountants adopt in computing book values, biases 
asset values downward (Wakil, 2020). As a result, the book values may not accurately 
reflect the market values and what the market thinks of the firm’s size (Wakil, 2020). 
Despite this drawback, Andrés et al. (2017b), Custódio (2014), Denis et al. (1997), 
Hoechle et al. (2012), Kuppuswamy et al. (2014), Olaniyi et al. (2017), Ramaswamy et 
al. (2017), Sturm and Nüesch (2019), and Sener and Selcuk (2020) among others, 
measured firm size similarly. 
Leverage refers to the use of debt in a firm’s capital structure. I measured firm 
leverage at the interval level as the ratio of the book value of total liabilities to the book 
value of total assets. I extracted the data for this from the balance sheet reported in the 
annual reports of the firms. This measure is preferable to other leverage measures 
because it captures all types of debt the firm might have. Other authors such as Andrés et 
al. (2017b), Chen and Yu (2012), Denis et al. (1997), and Hoechle et al. (2012) used this 
measure. 
Blockholding refers to the shareholding of people who own a significant 
percentage of the shares of a firm. I measured blockholding or ownership concentration 
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as the proportion of total shares held by shareholders who own 5% or more of the firm’s 
shares. As defined, blockholding is an interval variable. Other researchers have measured 
blockholding similarly (see Anderson et al., 2000; Edman, 2014; Nguyen et al., 2015; 
Odewale & Kamardin, 2015; Sautner & Villalonga, 2010). I sourced information used to 
operationalize blockholding from the annual reports of the companies. Companies in 
Nigeria report the names and shareholding of shareholders who own 5% or more of the 
firm’s shares. 
Board independence refers to the ability of the board members to exercise 
independent judgment. Following Muller-Kahle (2015), I measured board independence 
as the proportion of board members that are nonexecutive directors. As measured, board 
independence is an interval variable. Other researchers have used this measure (e.g., 
Khosa, 2017; Nguyen et al., 2015; Sener & Akben- Selçuk, 2020; Singh et al., 2018; 
Yasser & Al Mamun, 2017). As Brickley and Zimmerman (2010) pointed out, 
researchers have commonly viewed nonexecutive directors as outside directors and 
independent (Muller-Kahle, 2015). I sourced the information used to measure this 
variable from the annual reports of the firms.  
Data Analysis Plan 
I used the SPSS Version 25 to analyze the data. I screened the data for accuracy, 
outliers, and missing data by running frequencies on the data set using the explore and 
missing data analysis functions in SPSS. All outliers were verified, and those that were 
not accurate data were removed or corrected such that only actual data were used in the 
analysis. I used the missing values analysis module in SPSS to identify whether missing 
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data were at random or not. Missing values could be handled using pairwise deletion or 
imputation methods that are available in SPSS. However, the LMM, which I used for the 
analysis, accommodates missing data cases (Field, 2017; West, 2009). Therefore, I opted 
to analyze without imputation given that many experts have suggested that imputation 
does not add any value when LMM is used (Peters et al., 2012; Twisk et al., 2013). 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
RQ1: How is the performance of DFs different from that of focused firms in 
Nigeria?  
H01: There is no significant difference between the performance of DFs and 
focused firms in Nigeria. 
H11: There is a significant difference between the performance of DFs and 
focused firms in Nigeria.  
RQ2: What is the relationship between the level of diversification and firm 
performance in Nigeria? 
H02: There is no significant relationship between the level of diversification and 
firm performance in Nigeria. 
H12: There is a significant relationship between the level of diversification and 
firm performance in Nigeria. 
RQ3: How is the insider ownership level of DFs that outperform focused firms 
different from the insider ownership of DFs that underperform focused firms in Nigeria?  
H03: There is no significant difference in insider ownership level between DFs 
that outperform focused firms and DFs that underperform focused firms. 
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H13: There is a significant difference in insider ownership level between DFs that 
outperform focused firms and those that underperform focused firms.  
RQ4: What is the relationship between insider ownership and the performance 
effects of level of diversification in Nigeria? 
H04: There is no significant relationship between insider ownership and the 
performance effects of level of diversification. 
H14: There is a significant relationship between insider ownership and the 
performance effects of level of diversification. 
Statistical Test for Hypotheses 
I tested two groups of hypotheses. The first and the third were about comparing 
the difference in means. These could be tested using the independent-sample t-test. 
However, the independent sample t test captures only differences in group mean but does 
not capture within-subject and between-subject differences over time. Therefore, I 
assessed the significance of the difference between means through the estimated marginal 
means function in the mixed procedure in SPSS. The second and fourth deal with 
relationships between variables, and I tested them with the LMM variant of multiple 
regression in SPSS 
I included four variables that could confound the expected relationship between 
the independent variables and the outcome variable. These control variables were firm 
size, firm leverage, blockholding, and board independence. I included these firm 
characteristics and governance measures because some researchers have found they are 
correlated with firm performance (Chandra et al., 2019; Dao & Ta, 2020; Hashmi et al 
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2020; Iwasaki & Mizobata, 2020; Zattoni et al., 2017). As I show in Chapter 4, most of 
these control variables showed significant correlations with the outcome variables. These 
correlations justify their inclusion. 
For Hypothesis 1, I evaluated whether the mean ROE and mean ATQ of firms 
classified as undiversified are significantly different from the mean ROE and mean ATQ 
of firms classified as diversified. The independent variable here—diversification status—
as measured for this hypothesis is a nominal variable whereas the dependent variable, 
firm performance measured by ROE and ATQ, is interval variable. Because of the 
institution-based view of the performance effects of diversification, I expected the mean 
ROE and ATQ of DFs to be significantly higher than those of the UDFs. 
For this test and the other test in this study, I established a significance level (α) of 
5% (.05). This represents the probability of making a Type I error. I rejected the null 
hypothesis if the p-value was less than α, 0.05. Otherwise, I accepted the null hypothesis 
of no significance.  
For the second hypothesis, I used the LMM to evaluate the relationship between 
the independent and dependent variables. Qiu (2014) used the LMM, which I describe 
later in this section. The level of diversification measured by the number of different 
industries/segments, which a firm operates in was the independent variable, and firm 
performance was the dependent variable. In this hypothesis, I estimated two sets of 
models: one with ROE as the dependent variable and another with ATQ as the dependent 
variable. I adopted a hierarchical modeling approach wherein I introduced the predictors 
one after the other. 
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The hierarchical modeling approach enabled me to observe how the model 
improves with the introduction of each predictor and helped in determining the model 
that best fits the data. I entered the level of diversification first and the control variables 
subsequently. None of the control variables was considered more important than the 
other. Therefore, I entered them in any order. I established the significance of the 
relationships at the α level of 5% and rejected the null hypothesis if the p-value was less 
than .05. Otherwise, I accepted the null hypothesis. 
For Hypothesis 3, I could have used the independent-sample t test. However, this 
approach would not capture the within-subject and between-subject differences in the 
data. Therefore, I assessed the significance of the difference in mean insider ownership 
through the estimated marginal means function in the mixed procedure in SPSS. For this 
hypothesis, first, I classified DFs into two: OPDF and UPDF. I defined an OPDF as a DF 
whose performance (measured by ROE and ATQ) is greater than the average 
performance of focused firms, that is, DFs with positive EV. I defined a UPDF as a DF 
whose performance (measured by ROE and ATQ) is lower than the average performance 
of focused firms, that is, DFs with negative EVs. If agency cost theory of fir 
diversification holds, I would expect the average insider ownership of OPDF to be 
significantly greater than the mean insider ownership of UPDF. I assessed significance at 
the 5% level (that is, α = 0.05).  
I based the categorization of firms as OPDF and UPDF on the EV, which is a 
continuous variable. However, such a categorization leads to loss of information and 
statistical power (Cumberland et al., 2014; Kahan et al., 2016; Royston et al., 2006; 
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Sauzet et al., 2016). The loss of information is greater in the case of dichotomization 
(Naggara et al., 2011). Many authors agree that it is unnecessary to categorize continuous 
data for statistical analysis (Naggara et al., 2011; Royston et al., 2006). Royston et al. 
(2006) suggested that it is better to use regression on continuous data rather than 
categorizing them to use independent sample t test. Therefore, to avoid the loss of 
information due to this dichotomization and as a kind of robustness check, I also used the 
LMM to examine how insider ownership predicted excess ROE (ExROEav and 
ExROEserv) and excess ATQ (ExATQav and ExATQserv). 
In the Hypothesis 4, I introduced insider ownership and an interaction term of 
level of diversification and insider ownership (level of diversification* insider ownership) 
as predictors in the model estimating the relationship between the level of diversification 
and firm performance. I did this to examine whether insider ownership moderated the D–
P relationship. The dependent variable was firm performance measured by ROE and 
ATQ as earlier defined. I also introduced the control variables here. For robustness check, 
I also examined the relationship between insider ownership and DFs’ performance only. 
The independent variable was insider ownership. The dependent variable was firm 
performance measured by ROE and ATQ as earlier defined.  
For this hypothesis, I used the LMM first, to estimate the relationship between the 
interaction term of level of diversification and insider ownership on firm performance 
and secondly, the relationship between insider ownership and the performance of DFs. I 
also estimated two models, one for the ROE as the dependent variable and another for the 
ATQ as the dependent variable. The level of significance was also 5%. 
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The Linear Mixed Model  
In this study, I tested the hypotheses by fitting LMMs to panel data. I was 
interested in a model that would allow the effect of the independent and control variables 
on firm performance to vary within companies and between companies. The random 
intercept model was the best fitting based on the -2 log-likelihood (-2LL), and I 
formulated this model as follows 
𝑌𝑡𝑗 = 𝑏0𝑗 + 𝑏1𝑋𝑡𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡𝑗                                                                                                                (10) 
𝑏0𝑗 = 𝑏0 + 𝑢0𝑗                                                                                                                               (11) 
Where, Y is the dependent variable, 𝑏0 is the overall intercept, 𝑏1 is a vector of regression 
coefficients for the set of predictors X, t is case t (firm-year observation, Level 1); j is 
firm (Level 2); 𝜀𝑡𝑗 is within-firm (Level 1) error for case t (firm-year observations); 𝑢0𝑗 is 
a vector of firm-specific random effects (for intercept), the Level 2 error that allows the 
intercept to vary across firms and is assumed to follow a normal distribution with mean 
vector zero. εtj is a vector of the unexplained error term and is assumed to be independent 
and (𝜺𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝚺𝑡). First-order auto-regressive was assumed for 𝚺𝒕 given that in repeated 
measures, the correlation between scores is expected to lessen over time (Field, 2017). 
However, in each case, various models with different variance-covariance structures were 
tried to determine the best-fit models. 
The LMM, variously referred to as multilevel model, random coefficient model, 
and hierarchical linear model (Field, 2017; West, 2009), has some advantages. It can 
accommodate the violation of the assumption of independent errors—an assumption that 
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is difficult to hold in repeated measures design—by permitting the modelling of the 
dependence in nested data (Field, 2017; Harrison et al., 2018; West, 2009). I measured 
the variables for this study for the period 2008 to 2018. I could not assume, for instance, 
that the observation for one year is not correlated with those of previous and subsequent 
years.  
The model can also accommodate missing data cases, which is a severe issue in 
longitudinal data and cases where the measurements are not taken at the same time points 
(Harrison et al., 2018; West, 2009). This feature of the model was helpful in this study, 
given the nature of the data set. The financial year ends of all the firms are not the same. 
Many firms have financial years that ended in December but there were others with 
financial years that ended in other months. As such, the observations (based on annual 
reports) may not be said to have been taken at the same time points. 
Secondly, I did not expect a balanced data set because not all the companies listed 
on the stock exchange for all the years in the sample period. Some firms listed after 2008 
(the beginning of the sample period). Moreover, some of the companies did not have the 
data for all the years due to the unavailability of their annual reports. I had companies 
with 11 years of observations and others with less than 11 years of observation. In few 
cases, some of the companies did not have data in their annual reports to operationalize 
some of the variables for some of the years. Achieving a balanced data set in these 
situations would require deleting many companies with less than 11 years of observation 
for all the variables. Deletion reduced the sample size, statistical power, and produces 
worse bias (Wang et al., 2017) and threatened the validity of the study.  
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The LMM was valuable in these situations. According to West (2009), the “LMM 
accommodates these types of unbalanced study designs and data sets” (p. 212). Models 
such as standard regression, ANOVA, and analysis of covariance handle the problem of 
missing data by deleting the whole case. Deletion reduces the final sample size and thus 
the study’s validity (Field, 2017; West, 2009). The LMM also accommodates the 
violation of the assumption of homogeneity of variance (Field, 2017; Harrison et al., 
2018; West, 2009). Unlike repeated measures ANOVA, the LMM allows both time-
varying and time-invariant predictors and permits the consideration of alternative 
covariance structures (West, 2009). This feature of the LMM was relevant given that 
variables such as level of diversification did not change for some firms over the sample 
period. 
Other assumptions of the LMM are that of homoscedasticity and the absence of 
perfect multicollinearity in the case of multiple predictors (Field, 2017; Harrison et al., 
2018; Maas & Hox, 2004). Gelman and Hill (2007) noted that, normality or otherwise of 
residuals does not affect the parameter estimates in multilevel models, and advised 
against normality test in LMM (p. 46). Homoscedasticity did not constitute a problem 
because it is explicitly modeled in the LMM (Field, 2017; Harrison et al., 2018; Maas & 
Hox, 2004; West, 2009). Multicollinearity was assessed through correlation analysis, 
variance inflation factor of (VIF), and the tolerance statistics. As shown in Chapter 4, 
there is no multicollinearity problems to worry about. Overall, there seems to be a 
consensus that the LMM is robust to even severe violations of the assumptions and 
194 
 
therefore nothing to worry about (see for instance LeBeau et al., 2018; Schielzeth et al., 
2020). 
The LMM was estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation, an approach 
whereby statistical parameters are estimated by choosing the parameters that most likely 
have caused the data to occur (Newman, 2014; Wang et al., 2017). I chose this approach 
because I needed to compare different models. I used the chi-square ratio test to assess 
the LMM’s overall fit, and SPSS produces the deviance of this ratio as the -2LL in the 
information criteria table of the output (Field, 2017). The smaller the -2LL, the better the 
model, and a significant difference between the -2LL of models indicate improvement or 
not in the fit by introducing a new parameter (Field, 2017). 
Threats to Validity 
External Validity 
One threat to external validity relates to the fact that I used only a sample of the 
listed companies on the NSE. I used a sample of the firms because it also achieves the 
required statistical power while reducing the cost and time required. Moreover, it was 
impossible to get the necessary yearly data for all the firms. Therefore, there was the 
issue of whether this sample was representative of the larger population of firms in 
Nigeria to enable me to generalize the results to the larger population. 
I dealt with the threat of lack of representativeness of the sample by using the 
random sampling method of probability sampling, as indicated earlier. This approach 
gave all firms an equal chance of being included in the sample. As I show in Table 1 in 
Chapter 4, the sample included firms from all the sectors under which nonfinancial firms 
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listed on the NSE as of 2018. Except for the construction/real estate sector with 62.50% 
representation in the sample, all the other sectors had over 70% representation. This high 
representation increases my confidence in the generalizability of the results. I also had no 
control over the variables and did not attempt to manipulate them, and this means that I 
conducted the study in a real-life setting. This approach increases the external validity of 
the study.  
Internal Validity 
The design I used has two main weaknesses that threaten internal validity. The 
first was the absence of randomization, which makes competing explanations of 
relationships inadequately controlled. The absence of randomization makes causal 
inferences less convincing. The second threat is experimental mortality. Some of the 
firms did not have the required information for all the years in the study period. I, 
therefore, dropped them from the study, and this tended to reduce the sample size. 
Another weakness of the methodology stemmed from the type and source of data. As I 
indicated earlier, I based this study on secondary data that I had no control over. 
Therefore, the data were reliable to the extent that the publishing institutions were 
reliable. 
I addressed the design weakness of lack of randomization through the statistical 
models I employed for data analysis. These models controlled for some of the variables 
anticipated to offer competing explanations. Researchers who use nonexperimental 
designs tend to depend on statistical data analysis as a method of control (Bloomfield & 
Fisher, 2019; Wang et al., 2017). Although statistical association does not imply causality 
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(Bloomfield & Fisher, 2019; Field, 2017; Queiros et al., 2017), my intention was not to 
establish causality but a relationship. This increased my confidence about the 
relationships found in the study and my ability to generalize. 
To address the weakness of experimental mortality, I provided a buffer and 
randomly drew from the remaining firms to replace any dropped firm. This approach 
helped maintain the required sample size despite anticipated mortality and increased the 
sample’s representativeness, the study’s internal validity, and the generalizability of the 
findings. Moreover, the LMM, which I employed to estimate the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables, can fully accommodate missing data cases (Wang 
et al., 2017; West, 2009). Therefore, instead of dropping any firm because of 
unavailability of data for some years, I used all firm-year observations provided the firm 
had at least three years of consecutive data. This approach increased the overall sample 
size and statistical power. 
Regarding the reliability of secondary sources, I addressed this weakness by using 
only publicly listed companies in this study. These companies are legally required to 
publish their annual reports and financial statements. The directors take responsibility for 
preparing financial statements that give an accurate and fair view of the company’s 
affairs for the reporting period. They directors do this at the risk of jail terms under 
sections 334 and 335 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004. Further, regulatory 
authorities require that reputable auditing firms audit these financial statements. Given 
these requirements, I feel confident that the data collected from these secondary sources 
are reliable. 
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Construct Validity 
Some authors have shown most of the variables that I measured in this study as 
multidimensional constructs, each dimension meaning a different thing and measured 
differently (Butler et al., 2012; Hamann et al., 2013; Kim & Lu, 2011; Pitts & Hopkins, 
1982; Richard et al., 2009; Sambharya, 2000). I ensured construct validity by employing 
multiple measures of some of the constructs, to the extent that available data permitted 
and as some authors have suggested (Papadakis & Thanos, 2010; Sambharya, 2000). 
These multiple measures are supposed to reflect different aspects of the construct.  
Researchers have established the construct validity of some of these constructs. 
For instance, I used the unweighted business count measure for the diversification 
construct because I could extract data from companies’ annual reports. Ramaswamy et al. 
(2012) found a high correlation between the unweighted business count measure and the 
weighted business count measures—Herfindahl index and the entropy index—that are 
more data-intensive. Therefore, the interpretation is that these two measures reflect the 
same constructs, are equivalent, and can substitute each other.  
I could not employ the weighted business count measures (entropy index and 
Herfindahl index) because of limited segment data, as I indicated earlier. Ramaswamy et 
al. (2012) found a high correlation between the unweighted business count measure, the 
Herfindahl index, and the entropy index that capture each line of activity’s contribution to 
the total firm output. This correlation increases my confidence in the validity of the 
diversification construct I used in this study.  
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In the case of firm performance, I used both an accounting measure (ROE) and a 
hybrid measure (ATQ). Hamann et al. (2013) found the construct validity of these 
performance measures (see also Aliabadi et al., 2013; Butler et al., 2012; El‐Sayed Ebaid, 
2012). To make this study comparable to other studies that have used the EV measure, I 
employed a variant of this measure. For a particular year, I computed the firm’s EV as the 
difference between the ROE (or ATQ) of a firm and the average ROE (or ATQ) of all 
focused firms for that year. The reason for this was the shortage of focused firms in many 
of the industries.  
Ethical Procedures 
I extracted the data I used from publicly available sources. These sources included 
company annual reports and accounts and publications of the NSE. Company annual 
reports and accounts were available from the NSE Library and also from company 
websites. The NSE publishes daily price lists. Since my data collection did not involve 
humans, I had few ethical issues to address. However, as required by Walden University, 
before collecting data, I sought IRB approval that my procedure met all ethical 
requirements (IRB approval number: 11-01-16-0332133).  
Summary 
In this chapter, I presented and rationalized the research design that I adopted in 
this study. I also identified the population for this study and discussed how I determined 
the sample size. I discussed the sampling strategy that I adopted. I indicated how I 
collected the data for the study and how I operationalized the variables. Finally, I 
discussed the data analysis plan, the threats to the study’s validity, and how I addressed 
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them. In Chapter 4, I present the data, analyze them, and test the hypotheses to answer the 
research questions posed. 
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Chapter 4: Results  
The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine the relationship between 
firm diversification and firm performance and how insider ownership is related to the 
performance effects of diversification in Nigeria. To achieve this objective, I posed four 
research questions and addressed them by testing hypotheses. I outline the research 
questions and the hypotheses tested below. 
RQ1: How is the performance of DFs different from that of focused firms in 
Nigeria?  
H01: There is no significant difference between the performance of DFs and 
focused firms in Nigeria. 
H11: There is a significant difference between the performance of DFs and 
focused firms in Nigeria.  
RQ2: What is the relationship between the level of diversification and firm 
performance in Nigeria? 
H02: There is no significant relationship between the level of diversification and 
firm performance in Nigeria. 
H12: There is a significant relationship between the level of diversification and 
firm performance in Nigeria. 
RQ3: How is the insider ownership level of DFs that outperform focused firms 
different from the insider ownership of DFs that underperform focused firms in Nigeria?  
H03: There is no significant difference in insider ownership level between DFs 
that outperform focused firms and DFs that underperform focused firms. 
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H13: There is a significant difference in insider ownership level between DFs that 
outperform focused firms and those that underperform focused firms.  
RQ4: What is the relationship between insider ownership and the performance 
effects of level of diversification in Nigeria? 
H04: There is no significant relationship between insider ownership and the 
performance effects of level of diversification. 
H14: There is a significant relationship between insider ownership and the 
performance effects of level of diversification. 
In this chapter, I describe the procedures I used to collect data for the study. I follow this 
by presenting the study results. Finally, I summarize the chapter. 
Data Collection 
Following IRB approval in November 2016 (IRB approval number 11-01-16-
0332133), I started collecting data. This required visiting libraries such as those of the 
NSE and SEC of Nigeria for annual reports and other information on companies listed on 
the NSE. I also downloaded annual reports from company websites where they were 
available. Data collection for this study primarily involved extracting the information 
required to operationalize the variables in the study. There were no discrepancies in data 
collection from the plan presented in Chapter 3. Data collection took about 2 years. Based 
on the recommendation of the university research reviewer and due to the delay in 
graduation, there was a need to update the data period from 2008 to 2018 instead of 2013. 
The population for this study was nonfinancial services companies listed on the 
NSE at any time between January 31, 2008, and December 31, 2018, and for which I had 
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information to operationalize the variables for at least three consecutive years. I excluded 
firms in the financial services industry and real estate investment trusts for reasons stated 
earlier. As of December 31, 2008, the number of equities (financial and nonfinancial) 
listed on the NSE was 213. The number of listed equities dropped to 169 by the end of 
2018 (NSE, 2018). Twelve firms used in the study were listed after 2008. During the 
sample period, a total of 13 firms used in the study were delisted. Of these firms that 
delisted, 12 were in the 2008 sample. Overall, I used 109 firms in this study, but the 
sample size varied from year to year. I included 97, 102, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 107, 
102, 98, and 96 firms in the sample for the years 2008 to 2018, respectively.  
For instance, in 2018, there were 169 equities on the NSE. Fifty-seven of these 
were listed under the financial services sector, whereas 112 were under the nonfinancial 
services sectors. Three of these 112 nonfinancial services firms were real estate 
investment trusts; 13 were dropped for lack of data, leaving a total of 96 firms in the 2018 
sample. However, for robustness check, I reran all estimations using a sample comprising 
only of firms listed for the entire period. The sample comprised firms in the 10 sectors 
under which the NSE listed nonfinancial services companies in 2018. The NSE sectoral 
distribution of sample firms in 2018 is shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
 
Nigerian Stock Exchange Sectoral Distribution of Sample Firms as of 2018 
Sectors 
No. of 
nonfinancial 
firms listed 
No. of 
firms 
sampled 
Sample as % of 
firms listed in 
the sector 
Sample as % 
of total firms 
sampled 
Agriculture 5 5 100.00% 5.21% 
Conglomerates  6 6 100.00% 6.25% 
Construction/real 
estate 
8 5 62.50% 5.21% 
Consumer goods 21 18 85.71% 18.75% 
Healthcare  10 9 90.00% 9.38% 
ICT 7 5 71.43% 5.21% 
Industrials goods 14 13 92.86% 13.54% 
Natural resources 4 4 100.00% 4.17% 
Oil & gas 12 11 91.67% 11.46% 
Services  25 20 80.00% 20.83% 
Total  112 96  100% 
Note. The table is based on the NSE List of Equities as of December 31, 2018. 
This sample represents nonfinancial firms listed on the NSE because the selection 
was through random sampling, and I sampled 85.71% of such firms listed on the NSE at 
the end of 2018. As shown in Table 1, the least percentage of firms I sampled in each 
sector in 2018 was 62.5%. In Table 2, I present the equity market capitalization and the 
market capitalization of the firms in the sample for the period 2008–2018. As shown in 
Table 2, for most of the years, the sample firms represented more than half of the equity 
market capitalization of the NSE—66.67% in 2018. Given that I excluded the financial 
services industry (with a market capitalization of 3.88 trillion naira and representing 
about 33.08% of total equity market capitalization of the NSE in 2018) from the study, 
this sample appears representative of nonfinancial services firms listed on the NSE, at 
least, regarding market capitalization.  
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Table 2 
 
Equity Market Capitalization and Market Capitalization of Sample Firms 2008-2018 
Year 
Equity 
market cap. 
Market cap of 
sampled firms 
Market cap of sampled firms as a % of 
equity market cap. 
2008 7 2.47 35.29% 
2009 5 2.53 50.60% 
2010 7.92 4.63 58.46% 
2011 6.54 4.46 68.20% 
2012 8.98 5.64 62.81% 
2013 13.23 9.31 70.37% 
2014 11.49 8.46 73.63% 
2015 9.86 7.32 74.24% 
2016 9.26 6.72 72.57% 
2017 13.62 9.03 66.30% 
2018 11.73 7.82 66.67% 
Note. The table was compiled based on data from various editions of the NSE Annual 
reports, Factsheets, and Market Review & Outlook. All amounts are in trillions of 
Nigerian naira; exchange rates to the U.S. dollar were 130.75, 147.16, 148.31, 151.82, 
155.27, 159.79, 186.10, 199.35, 305, 359.99, and 364 for the years 2008 to 2018, 
respectively. Market cap a firms is the number of shares issued multiplied by market 
price as at the end of a firm’s financial year; equity market capitalization is from various 
issues of NSE annual reports and Market Recap and Outlook. 
Study Results 
In this section, I present some descriptive statistics relating to the sample. 
Following this, I evaluate the statistical assumptions of the LMM as it applies to this 
study. Finally, I report the statistical analysis performed and the findings. I organize these 
by research questions and hypotheses. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
DFs represented 63.44% of the total firm-year observations, whereas UDFs 
represented 36.56%. In Table 3, I present data on some firm characteristics, such as the 
book value of total assets, liabilities, and equity, turnover, profit before tax, the market 
value of equity, directors’ share ownership, number of directors, number of outside 
directors, and number of 2-digit SIC codes—which were the bases for computing the 
variables I used in this study. As shown in Table 3, using the bootstrap technique for 
independent sample t test of difference in mean, there is no significant difference in the 
mean of these firm characteristics between UDFs s DFs s except in the case of the 
number of 2-digit SIC codes that I used to measured the level of diversification. 
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Table 3 
Bootstrap for Independent Sample Test of Difference in Mean of Firm Characteristics 
Between Undiversified and Diversified Firms 
Characteristics 
UDF DF Difference in 
mean 
p 
N Total M N Total M 
2018         
TA 29 4,447.43 153.36 59 4,119.16 69.82 83.54 .291 
TL 29 2,117.55 73.02 59 2,710.15 45.93 27.08 .458 
EQ 29 2,338.05 80.62 59 1,409.00 23.88 56.74 .216 
Turnover 29 2,124.05 73.24 59 3,830.40 64.92 8.32 .831 
PAT 29 455.01 15.69 59 171.25 2.90 12.79 .462 
MVE 29 5,075.56 175.02 59 2,747.97 46.58 128.44 .415 
Dirown 27 36.37 1.35 57 20.20 0.35 0.99 .219 
No_Dir 29 244 8.41 59 489 8.29 0.13 .864 
No_OutDir 29 189 6.52 59 375 6.36 0.16 .783 
Nosic 29 29 1 59 218 3.69 –2.70 <.001 
2017         
TA 30 4,052.07 135.07 62 4,096.26 66.07 69.00 .348 
TL 30 2,244.37 74.81 62 2,850.11 45.97 28.84 .451 
EQ 30 1,817.31 60.58 62 1,246.15 20.10 40.48 .262 
Turnover 30 1,820.60 60.69 62 3,401.33 54.86 5.83 .856 
PAT 30 299.90 10.00 62 154.42 2.49 7.51 .398 
MVE 30 6,260.90 208.70 62 2,764.76 44.59 164.10 .377 
Dirown 28 28.59 1.02 59 20.37 .35 .68 .341 
No_Dir 30 259 8.63 61 507 8.31 .32 .627 
No_OutDir 30 195 6.50 61 383 6.28 .22 .537 
Nosic 30 30 1 62 226 3.65 –2.65 <.001 
2016         
TA 31 3,136.49 101.18 62 4,019.36 64.83 36.35 .575 
TL 31 1,599.64 51.60 62 2,871.82 46.32 5.28 .895 
EQ 31 1,544.29 49.82 62 1,147.54 18.51 31.31 .325 
Turnover 31 1,207.83 38.96 62 3,110.70 50.17 –11.21 .671 
PAT 31 130.17 4.20 62 78.24 1.26 2.94 .597 
MVE 31 3,646.72 117.64 62 3,075.78 49.61 68.03 .557 
Dirown 29 26.86 0.93 61 34.96 0.57 .35 .691 
No_Dir 31 266 8.58 61 505 8.28 .30 .640 
No_OutDir 31 201 6.48 61 378 6.20 .29 .602 
Nosic 31 31 1 62 226 3.65 –2.65 <.001 
2015         
TA 35 3,050.40 87.15 64 3,260.90 50.95 36.20 .392 
TL 35 1,543.41 44.10 64 2,404.16 37.57 6.53 .790 
EQ 35 1,514.01 43.26 64 857.23 13.39 29.86 .230 
Turnover 35 1,617.61 46.22 64 2,108.58 32.95 13.27 .500 
PAT 35 268.85 7.68 64 38.65 0.60 7.08 .361 
MVE 35 5,174.03 147.83 62 2,146.72 34.62 113.21 .346 
Dirown 31 12.34 0.40 62 32.44 0.52 –0.13 .737 
No_Dir 34 309 9.09 61 498 8.16 0.92 .094 
No_OutDir 34 235 6.91 61 371 6.08 0.83 .096 
Nosic 35 35 1 64 242 3.78 –2.78 <.001 
Table continues 
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Characteristics 
UDF DF Difference in 
mean 
p 
N Total M N Total M 
2014         
TA 35 2,750.62 78.59 66 3,132.52 47.46 31.13 .409 
TL 35 1,318.64 37.68 66 2,282.63 34.59 3.09 .899 
EQ 35 1,435.00 41.00 66 849.89 12.88 28.12 .220 
Turnover 34 1,485.46 43.69 66 2,275.58 34.48 9.21 .588 
PAT 35 299.06 8.54 66 12.18 0.18 8.36 .232 
MVE 35 5,995.50 171.30 66 2,461.21 37.29 134.01 .328 
Dirown 31 12.18 0.39 63 34.50 0.55 –0.15 .681 
No_Dir 34 306 9.00 63 524 8.32 0.68 .307 
No_OutDir 34 227 6.68 63 385 6.11 0.57 .233 
Nosic 35 35 1 66 246 3.73 –2.73 <.001 
2013         
TA  38 2,222.46 58.49 65 2,547.49 39.19 19.29 .478 
TL 38 1,046.02 27.53 65 1,658.24 25.51 2.01 .865 
EQ 37 1,176.43 31.80 65 840.86 12.94 18.86 .348 
Turnover 37 1,517.66 41.02 64 2,456.43 38.38 2.64 .875 
PAT 37 410.60 11.10 65 100.02 1.54 9.56 .231 
MVE 38 6,543.12 172.19 65 2,769.36 42.61 129.58 .341 
Dirown 33 13.40 0.41 61 34.36 0.56 –0.16 .680 
No_Dir 38 328 8.63 61 506 8.30 0.34 .541 
No_OutDir 38 242 6.37 61 364 5.97 0.40 .333 
Nosic 38 38 1 66 241 3.65 –2.65 <.001 
2012         
TA 38 1,647.69 43.36 63 2,204.11 34.99 8.37 .734 
TL 38 852.36 22.43 63 1,473.74 23.39 –0.96 .939 
EQ 38 795.37 20.93 63 714.49 11.34 9.59 .479 
Turnover 38 1,142.32 30.06 62 2,480.57 40.00 –9.94 .560 
PAT 38 220.00 5.79 63 80.47 1.28 4.51 .408 
MVE 38 4,132.59 108.75 62 1,505.81 24.29 84.47 .275 
Dirown 33 12.38 0.38 58 22.20 0.38 –0.01 .978 
No_Dir 37 319.00 8.62 58 470 8.10 0.52 .344 
No_OutDir 37 246 6.65 58 333 5.74 0.91 .448 
Nosic 39 39 1.00 63 235 3.73 –2.73 <.001 
2011         
TA 39 1,458.20 37.39 58 1,880.12 32.42 4.97 .809 
TL 39 784.79 20.12 58 1,267.14 21.85 –1.72 .860 
EQ 40 675.49 16.89 58 601.95 10.38 6.51 .472 
Turnover 37 1,015.67 27.45 53 2,213.78 41.77 –14.32 .406 
PAT 40 191.79 4.79 59 62.63 1.06 3.73 .392 
MVE 40 3,211.23 80.28 59 1,243.37 21.07 59.21 .320 
Dirown 33 13.14 0.40 51 20.64 0.40 –0.01 .974 
No_Dir 38 330 8.68 53 437 8.25 0.44 .396 
No_OutDir 38 249 6.55 53 306 5.77 0.78 .070 
Nosic 40 40 1.00 59 216 3.66 –2.66 <.001 
2010         
TA 34 1,095.29 32.21 50 1,531.35 30.63 1.59 .926 
TL 35 553.36 15.81 50 990.78 19.82 –4.01 .630 
EQ 36 542.43 15.07 51 540.70 10.60 4.47 .561 
Turnover 32 867.24 27.10 48 1,814.35 37.80 –10.70 .442 
PAT 37 174.46 4.72 51 92.95 1.82 2.89 .421 
MVE 38 3,351.80 88.21 54 1,276.56 23.64 64.57 .333 
Dirown 31 12.96 0.42 49 12.23 0.25 0.17 .297 
No_Dir 35 292 8.34 50 419 8.38 –0.04 .492 
No_OutDir 35 224 6.40 50 293 5.86 0.54 .282 
Nosic 40 40 1 56 208 3.71 –2.71 <.001 
Table continues 
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Characteristics 
UDF DF Difference in 
mean 
p 
N Total M N Total M 
         
2009         
TA 32 915.04 28.60 47 1,419.26 30.20 –1.60 .896 
TL 31 465.78 15.03 47 976.07 20.77 –5.74 .499 
EQ 33 449.50 13.62 51 450.69 8.84 4.78 .443 
Turnover 28 779.08 27.82 48 1,746.44 36.38 –8.59 .537 
PAT 34 121.74 3.58 51 55.45 1.09 2.49 .295 
MVE 34 1,127.24 33.15 56 897.10 16.02 17.13 .277 
Dirown 31 12.95 0.42 50 12.27 0.25 0.17 .359 
No_Dir 32 278 8.69 50 419 8.38 0.31 .557 
No_OutDir 32 212 6.63 50 293 5.86 0.77 .496 
Nosic 36 36 1 56 209 3.73 –2.73 .004 
2008         
TA 26 517.64 19.91 42 1,271.58 30.28 –10.37 .340 
TL 26 285.42 10.98 43 901.69 20.97 –9.99 .214 
EQ 26 232.22 8.93 48 393.87 8.21 0.73 .844 
Turnover 24 509.93 21.25 44 1,612.86 36.66 –15.41 .202 
PAT 26 71.90 2.77 48 64.00 1.33 1.43 .339 
MVE 30 959.60 31.99 55 1,508.58 27.43 4.56 .740 
Dirown 26 4.87 0.19 51 9.64 0.19 –0.002 .982 
No_Dir 28 241 8.61 51 418 8.20 0.41 .438 
No_OutDir 28 180 6.43 51 287 5.63 0.80 .153 
Nosic 31 31 1 55 206 3.75 –2.75 <.001 
Note. TA = book value of total assets; TL = total liabilities; EQ = equity; PAT = profit 
after tax; MVE = market value of equity; Dirown = number of shares owned by directors; 
No_Dir = number of directors; No_OutDir = number of outside/nonexecutive directors; 
Nosic = level of diversification; all values (except for No_Dir, No_OutDir, and Nosic) 
are in billions of Nigerian Naira; exchange rates to the U.S. dollar are 130.75, 147.16, 
148.31, 151.82, 155.27, 159.79, 186.10, 199.35, 305, 359.99, and 364 for the years 2008 
to 2018 respectively; all values are my computations based on information extracted from 
financial reports of the sampled firms. 
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In Table 4, I present descriptive statistics that characterize the sample over the 
entire period, and in Table 5, I show the significance of the differences in the mean of 
these variables between UDFs and DFs using the bootstrap technique for independent 
sample t-test. As shown in Table 5, on average, UDFs had higher ROE and ATQ than 
DFs over the period, although the difference was significant only in the case of ATQ. 
These values may support the view that DFs underperform UDFs (Berger & Ofek, 1995; 
Lang & Stulz, 1994). As shown in Table 5, also, UDFs had significantly greater 
blockholding and board independence than DFs over the period. The greater 
blockholding and board independence may indicate that UDFs have better corporate 
governance than DFs, based on agency theorists’ prescriptions relating to blockholding 
and board independence (Denis et al., 1997).  
As I showed in Table 5, on average, DFs were significantly larger than UDFs, 
consistent with C. Dang et al. (2018) and Lawrey and Maorris (2019). On average, DFs 
carried significantly more debt than UDFs over the study period. This tends to support 
the idea that DFs have the advantage of increased debt capacity due to the coinsurance 
effect of multiple lines of business (Aivazian et al., 2015; Lewellen, 1971). I subject 
some of these preliminary findings to multivariate statistical analysis in the next section. 
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Table 4 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Firm-Year Observations for the Sample Period 
 Undiversified firms Diversified firms 
Characteristics N M SD Min Max N M SD Min Max 
ROE 348 .07 2.06 –19.64 28.97 614 .02 .71 –10.00 1.41 
ATQ 367 1.77 1.43 .23 11.98 636 1.50 1.26 .29 11.76 
Fsize 367 22.74 2.12 18.27 28.16 637 23.24 1.64 19.62 27.70 
Nosic 385 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 668 3.70 2.30 2 13 
Insdown 368 .21 .27 .00 .97 664 .18 .24 .00 .97 
Lev 367 .57 .40 .03 3.95 637 .62 .27 .05 2.48 
Blkh 376 .59 .26 .00 .95 665 .52 .24 .00 .98 
Bind 365 .75 .13 .20 .92 622 .72 .13 .20 .93 
Note. ROE = return on equity; ATQ = approximate Tobin’s q; Fsize = firm size; Nosic = 
number of 2-digit SIC codes which measured level of diversification; Insdown = insider 
ownership; Lev = leverage; Blkh = blockholding; Bind = board independence.  
 
Table 5 
 
Bootstrap t Test of Difference in Mean of Firm Characteristics Between UDFs and DFs  
Variables Undiversified 
firms 
Diversified firms Difference in mean & p-
value 
 N M N M Difference in 
mean 
p 
ROE 348 .07 614 .02 .05 .700 
ATQ 367 1.77 636 1.50 .27 .004 
Fsize  367 22.74 637 23.24 –.50 <.001 
Nosic 385 1.00 668 3.70 –2.70 <.001 
Insdown 368 .21 664 .18 .03 .144 
Lev 367 .57 637 .62 –.05 .032 
Blkh 376 .59 665 .52 .06 <.001 
Bind 365 .75 622 .72 .04 <.001 
Note. ROE = return on equity; ATQ = approximate Tobin’s q; Fsize = firm size; Nosic = 
number of 2-digit SIC codes which measured level of diversification; Insdown = insider 
ownership; Lev = leverage; Blkh = blockholding; Bind = board independence. 
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Statistical Assumptions 
I tested the hypotheses using the LMM. This model is an extension of the basic 
linear model, and the relevant assumptions apply (Harrison et al., 2018; Maas & Hox, 
2004). These assumptions include the homoscedasticity, independence of error, and 
normality assumptions, and in the case of linear multiple regression, there is also the 
assumption that there is no perfect multicollinearity (Field, 2017; Harrison et al., 2018; 
Maas & Hox, 2004). 
The LMM has the advantage of accommodating the violation of the assumption of 
independent errors because the correlations between errors are modeled in the LMM 
(Field, 2017; Harrison et al., 2018; Maas & Hox, 2004; West, 2009). So, this is not an 
assumption to worry about when using the LMM. Homoscedasticity is also not a problem 
in the LMM because it is explicitly modeled in the LMM (Field, 2017; Harrison et al., 
2018; Maas & Hox, 2004; West, 2009). Based on the central limit theorem, there was no 
need to worry about the normality assumption given that the sample size is large enough 
(Lumley et al, 2002; Maas & Hox, 2004). Moreover, as Gelman and Hill (2007) noted, 
normality or otherwise of residuals does not affect the parameter estimates in multilevel 
models. Gelman and Hill advised against normality tests of regression residuals in 
multilevel models (p. 46). Beck and Katz (2007) also showed that for time-series cross-
sectional data, the random-effects model performs well even when the normality 
assumption is not met. 
To test for multicollinearity, I did a correlation analysis of the predictor and 
outcome variables and presented the results in Table 6. As I show in this Table, the 
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highest correlation coefficient is between insider ownership and firm size (–.30). A 
multiple regression analysis with the predictors and ATQ shows an average variance 
inflation factor of (VIF) of 1.133 with a highest of 1.255 for firm size and lowest of 1.022 
for leverage. The lowest tolerance value was .797 for firm size, and the highest was .978 
for leverage. In the ROE outcome variable, the average VIF was 1.160; the highest and 
lowest VIF were 1.282 and 1.109 for firm size and Board independence, respectively. 
The lowest and highest tolerance values were .780 for firm size and .901 for Board 
independence, respectively. The correlation, VIF, and tolerance statistics are within 
acceptable limits (Field, 2017) and indicate no multicollinearity problem of concern. 
The Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic, which I requested in the regression analysis, 
shows DW = 1.673 in the ROE as the dependent variable and DW = .580 in the case of 
ATQ. The DW indicates a violation of the assumption of independent errors in the ATQ 
dependent variable (Field, 2017). However, this is no cause for concern as the LMM that 
I used accommodates the violation of this assumption (Field, 2017; Harrison et al., 2018; 
West, 2009). Overall, many researchers have shown that the LMM is robust to even 
severe violations of model assumptions (e.g., LeBeau et al., 2018; Schielzeth et al., 
2020). This strengthened my confidence to proceed with the LMM. 
As I also show in Table 6, there is a significant correlation between the two 
independent variables (level of diversification and insider ownership) and ATQ. Insider 
ownership is also significantly correlated to ROE. Except for board independence, all the 
control variables showed a significant correlation with at least one outcome variable. 
These correlations justify the inclusion of these covariates in the models. 
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Table 6 
 
Correlation Analysis of Variables to Assess Multicollinearity 
No Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 ROE 1        
2 ATQ .17** 
(.000) 
1       
3 Nosic –.04 
(.266) 
–.11** 
(.001) 
1      
4 Insdown –.09** 
(.008) 
–.10** 
(.001) 
–.09** 
(.008) 
1     
5 Blkh .03 
(.359) 
.16** 
(.000) 
–.10** 
(.002) 
.14** 
(.000) 
1    
6 Bind .02 
(.501) 
–.03 
(.316) 
–.23** 
(.000) 
–.08* 
(.018) 
.09** 
(.009) 
1   
7 Lev –.14** 
(.000) 
.08* 
(.024) 
.19** 
(.000) 
–.13** 
(.000) 
.09** 
(.007) 
–.17** 
(.000) 
1  
8 Fsize .06 
(.085) 
.09** 
(.006) 
.26** 
(.000) 
–.30** 
(.000) 
.15** 
(.000) 
–.10** 
(.000) 
.26** 
(.000) 
1 
Note. ROE = return on equity; ATQ = approximate Tobin’s q; Nosic = number of 2-digit 
SIC codes which measured level of diversification; Insdown = insider ownership; Blkh = 
blockholding; Bind = board independence; Lev = leverage; Fsize = firm size; exact p-
values are in parenthesis. 
* p < .05; **p < .01. 
 
As I indicated in the methodology, the data set is a multilevel one, and I used the 
LMM to test the hypotheses. It was, therefore, necessary to assess its justification. The 
LMM allows researchers to account for intra-firm (within-firm) and interfirm (between-
firm) variances in firm performance. The model involved two levels—Level 1 and Level 
2—which correspond to within-firm and between-firm levels. Significant between-firm 
variability (above 5%) justifies the use of the LMM for conducting the multilevel 
analysis (Heck et al., 2010, p. 74). This variability is captured by the ICC, which provides 
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a sense of the degree to which differences in the outcome exists between firms (Level 2 
units). The ICC is given by (Heck et al., 2010, p. 74) as,  
𝐼𝐶𝐶 =
𝜎𝐵
2
𝜎𝐵
2+𝜎𝑊
2                                                                                                                                    (12) 
Where, 𝜎𝐵
2 = between-firm variance represented by the variance of the intercept, and 𝜎𝑊
2  
= within-firm variance represented by the Residual. 
The variances I used for calculating the ICC are those for the intercept-only 
model. I calculated the between-firm and within-firm variances in ATQ to be .40 and .29, 
respectively, giving an ICC of .58 for the ATQ. I calculated the between-firm and within-
firm variances in ROE to be .04 and .05, respectively and an ICC of .44. These ICCs 
indicate that 58% and 44% of the variability in ATQ and ROE respectively, lie between 
firms. These high ICCs (above 5%) justify a multilevel LMM analysis. 
Another issue I dealt with was missing data. Data for some firms were missing for 
two main reasons. Some of the firms were not listed for all the years in the study period, 
and the annual reports of some were not available for some of the years. In some cases, 
the published annual reports did not contain sufficient information to operationalize some 
variables. I used the missing values analysis dialog in SPSS to analyze the missing 
pattern. The minimum percentage missing that I specified for a variable to be displayed 
was .01. I summarize the variables and the percentage of missing values in Table 7. ROE 
had the highest percentage of missing values. The reason is that I removed ROE for 
observations with negative equity. For a loss-making firm, computing ROE with negative 
equity will produce a positive ROE, thus creating the wrong impression that the firm was 
making a profit.  
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Table 7 
 
Summary of Variables and Percentage of Missing Firm-Year Observations 
Variables 
Missing 
Valid N N Percent 
ROE 159 14.3% 956 
Fsize 134 12.0% 981 
Lev 134 12.0% 981 
Insdown 131 11.7% 984 
Bind 130 11.7% 985 
Blkh 114 10.2% 1001 
ATQ 110 9.9% 1005 
Note. ROE = return on equity; ATQ = approximate Tobin’s q; Insdown = insider 
ownership; Blkh = blockholding; Bind = board independence; Fsize = firm size; Lev = 
leverage. 
  
Little’s MCAR test did not show significance, indicating that data were missing at 
random (MAR). For each variable, I also compared ROE and ATQ of the firm-years with 
missing data to those without missing data. There were no significant differences, and 
this indicates that data missingness was not systematic but at least MAR. This 
missingness pattern is consistent with Wang et al. (2017) who pointed out that 
missingness in longitudinal data is typically MAR. MAR permits the application of 
LMM. The LMM accommodates missing data if data are missing completely at randomor 
at least MAR (Wang et al., 2017). If data are missing completely at random or MAR, 
multiple imputations could be used to achieve a balanced data set. Alternatively, I could 
ignore the missing value and use the available data to estimate the model.  
Researchers have argued whether multiple imputations—which is probably the 
most sophisticated method of handling missing data to achieve a balanced data set—is 
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necessary for the LMM analysis of longitudinal data (Peters et al., 2012; Twisk et al., 
2013). However, there seems to be a consensus that multiple imputations before 
conducting LMM analysis on longitudinal data do not add any value (Peters et al., 2012; 
Twisk et al., 2013). Twisk et al. (2013) found that the results were quite unstable when 
they conducted multiple imputations before LMM analysis of longitudinal data. For the 
above reason, I opted to analyze without multiple imputations. 
Another issue I addressed was that of centering the predictors. For two reasons, I 
chose to center the predictors. In the first place, one of the predictors (level of 
diversification) has no meaningful zero points in the sense that no firm can have zero 
segments. Secondly, there is an interaction term (level of diversification * insider 
ownership) in the fourth hypothesis. These are situations that necessitate centering of the 
predictors for any meaningful interpretation of the b parameters in the regression models. 
Moreover, centering also helps to deal with any multicollinearity problems that may exist 
and tend to make the models more stable (Field, 2017; Kelly et al., 2017). Although there 
is no statistically correct choice between grand mean and group mean centering, 
following Kelly et al. (2017), who favored grand mean centering, I fitted the LMM with 
grand mean centered predictors. Grand mean centering enabled me to capture the 
combined effects of within-firm and between-firmvariations in the covariates on firm 
performance. 
To select the best fit model for each of the tests based on their –2LL, I first fitted 
the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model that ignores the hierarchical and 
covariance structure of the data. I fitted the fixed effect, random intercept, and random 
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intercept and slope models with different repeated covariance structures. In the case of 
the covariance structures, I focused on the first-order autoregressive structure, AR(1) and 
its other version, the AR(1) heterogeneous [AR(1): Het] structure. The focus on the 
AR(1): Het structure was because my data set is a repeated measures data taken over 
time. According to Field (2017), these covariance structures are most appropriate for such 
repeated measures data set. I also tried the scaled identity and unstructured covariance 
structures. 
Research Questions and Results 
RQ1: How is the performance of DFs different from that of focused firms in 
Nigeria?  
H01: There is no significant difference between the performance of DFs and 
focused firms in Nigeria. 
H11: There is a significant difference between the performance of DFs and 
focused firms in Nigeria.  
For this hypothesis, I proposed using the independent-sample t test to evaluate 
whether the mean ROE and mean ATQ are significantly different between DFs and 
UDFs. Given that the observations are repeated measurements, the independent sample t-
test approach will only capture group mean differences that ignores the hierarchical 
structure of the data and the within-firm and between-firm differences that obscure the 
independent variable’s effect. Because of this, I used the the estimated marginal means 
procedure in the LMM to test whether the mean ROE and mean ATQ are significantly 
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different between DFs and UDFs. I also used the LMM to evaluate whether firm 
diversification status predict firm ROE and ATQ. 
The random intercept model with AR(1): Het repeated covariance type provided 
the best fit for this hypothesis. For the ROE dependent variable, the improvement in fit 
over the OLS model is significant, χ2𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 276.07 – (–151.25) = 427.32, p < .001. 
The improvement between the random intercept model and the fixed effects model is also 
significant, χ2𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = –87.91 – (–151.25) = 63.34, p < .001. In the case of ATQ, the 
improvement in fit between this model and the OLS model is significant, χ2𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 
2,266 – 1,089.88 = 1,176.12, p < .001. The improvement between the random intercept 
model and the fixed effects model is also significant, χ2𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 1,121.02 – 1,089.88 = 
31.14, p < .001.The results are shown in Tables  8 and 9, for ROE and ATQ respectively. 
Table 8 
 
Diversification Status (Diverstat) and Firm Performance Measured by ROE 
Variables M b SE df F p 95% CI 
Intercept  .07 .02 98.48 14.67 .00 .02, .12 
Diverstat =0 
Diverstat =1 
.09 
.07 
.02 
0a 
.03 
0 
267.55 .27 .60 –.05, .08 
 
–2LL  –151.25      
ARH1 rho  .37 .05  7.89 .00 .28, .46 
Var(Int)  .03 .01  5.39 .00 .02, .05 
Note. ROE is the dependent variable; I coded UDFs as 0, and DFs as 1; CI = confidence 
interval; ARH1 rho = correlation of adjacent errors; Var(Int) = variance of intercepts;  
–2LL = deviance of log-likelihood ratio; The values recorded for the ARH1 rho and 
Var(Int) under F represents their Wald Z statistics. 
aThis parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
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Table 9 
 
Diversification Status and Firm Performance Measured by ATQ 
Variables M b SE df F p 95% CI 
Intercept  1.16 .07 98.42 315.40 .00 1.02, 1.30 
Diverstat =0 
Diverstat =1 
1.20 
1.16 
.04 
0a 
.08 
0 
586.03 .30 .59 –.11, .20 
 
–2LL  1089.88      
ARH1 rho  .82 .03  26.34 .00 .75, .87 
Var(Int)  .33 .07  4.64 .00 .22, .51 
Note. ROE is the dependent variable; I coded UDFs as 0, and DFs as 1; CI = confidence 
interval; ARH1 rho = correlation of adjacent errors; Var(Int) = variance of intercepts; 
 –2LL = deviance of log-likelihood ratio; The values recorded for the ARH1 rho and 
Var(Int) under F represents their Wald Z statistics.  
aThis parameter is set to zero because it is redundant 
 
The analysis shows that using ROE as the measure of performance, firm 
diversification status did not significantly predict ROE, F(1, 267.55) = .27, p = .604. On 
average, UDFs (M = .09, SE = .03) had higher ROE than DFs (M = .07, SE = .02). 
However, the difference, b = 0.02, 95% CI [–.05, .08] was nonsignificant, t(267.55) = 
.52, p = .604. The result with ATQ also shows that firm diversification status did not 
significantly predict ATQ, F(1, 586.03) = .30, p = .587. On average, UDFs (M = 1.20, SE 
= .08) had higher ATQ than DFs (M = 1.16, SE = .07). The difference, b = 0.04, 95% CI 
[–.11, .20] was nonsignificant t(586.03) = .54, p = .587. The assumption of AR(1): Het is 
reasonable given that the correlation of adjacent errors (ARH1 rho) was positive and 
significant, b = .37, Wald χ2(1) = 7.89, p < .001 in the case of ROE and b = .82, Wald 
χ2(1) = 26.34, p < .001 in the case of ATQ (West, 2009). The intercepts also varied 
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across companies as indicated by the variance of random intercepts [Var(Int)] which was 
significant, b = .03, Wald χ2(1) = 5.39, p < .001 and b = .33, Wald χ2(1) = 4.64, p < .001 
for ROE and ATQ respectively. I, therefore, accepted the null Hypothesis 1 that there is a 
nonsignificant difference between the performance of DFs and UDFs in Nigeria.  
RQ2: What is the relationship between the level of diversification and firm 
performance in Nigeria? 
H02: There is no significant relationship between the level of diversification and 
firm performance in Nigeria. 
H12: There is a significant relationship between the level of diversification and 
firm performance in Nigeria. 
For this hypothesis, the independent variable was the level of diversification 
measured by the number of industries in which a firm operates, with industry measured at 
the 2-digit SIC code level. The dependent variable is firm performance measured by ROE 
and ATQ. The control variables are leverage, firm size, blockholding, and board 
independence (Bind). To test this hypothesis, I did the analysis separately for each of the 
performance measures (ROE and ATQ) as the dependent variable.  
For the ROE dependent variables, the random intercept model with the AR(1): 
Het repeated covariance type provided the best fit. For instance, with all the sample 
firms, the improvement in fit between the pooled OLS model and the random intercept 
model with all control variables was significant, χ2𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 180.94 – –300.07 = 481.01, 
p < .001. With the fixed effects model, the improvement in fit was also significant, 
χ2𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = –233.39 – –300.07 = 66.68, p < .001. With DFs only, the random intercept 
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model showed a significant improvement in fit over the pooled OLS model, χ2𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 
347.19 – 34.57 = 312.62, p < .001, and over the fixed effects model, χ2𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 116.30 – 
34.57 = 81.73, p < .001. I present the analysis based on observations on all firms in Table 
10 and then the analysis based on DFs only in Table 11. Model 1 represents the 
relationship between the level of diversification (without any control variable) and the 
dependent variable. The control variables were entered in a stepwise manner but not 
hierarchically. Model 5 includes the independent variable and all the control variables. 
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Table 10 
 
LMM Results of the Relationship Between Level of Diversification and ROE Using 
 Observations for All Firms 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Parameter b CI b CI b CI b CI b CI 
Intercept .07** 
(.02) 
.04, 
.11 
.05* 
(.02) 
.002,  
.09 
.05* 
(.02) 
.01, 
.09 
.05* 
(.02) 
.01,  
.09 
.05* 
(.02) 
.01,  
.09 
Nosic –.02 
(.03) 
–.07, 
.03 
–.001 
(.03) 
–.05, 
.05 
–.01 
(.03) 
–.06, 
.04 
–.01 
(.03) 
–.06,  
.04 
–.01 
(.03) 
–.06, 
.05 
Lev   –.44** 
(.06) 
–.55, 
–.32 
–.44** 
(.06) 
–.56, 
–.32 
–.45** 
(.06) 
–.57, 
–.34 
–.44** 
(.06) 
–.56, 
–.33 
Fsize     .03* 
(.01) 
.01, 
.06 
.03** 
(.01) 
.01,  
.05 
.03* 
(.01) 
.01, 
.05 
Blkh       –.04 
(.06) 
–.15, 
.07 
.09 
(.06) 
–.03, 
.22 
Bind         –.11 
(.10) 
–.30, 
.08 
ARH1 rho .37** .36** .37** .37** .41** 
Var(Int) .03** .04** .04** .04** .04** 
–2LL –151.40 –218.60 –223.74 –227.32 –300.07 
Δ in –2LL 22.62** 67.20** 5.14* 3.58 72.32** 
N 108 108 108 108 107 
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Nosic = level of diversification; Lev = leverage; 
Blkh = blockholding; Bodind = board independence; Firmsize = firm size; CI = 95% 
confidence interval; ARH1 rho = correlation of adjacent errors; Var(Int) = variance of 
intercepts; –2LL = deviance of log likelihood ratio; Δ = change 
*p < .05; **p < .01. 
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Table 11 
 
LMM Results of the Relationship Between Level of Diversification and ROE Using Observations for Diversified Firms Only 
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 b CI b CI b CI b CI b CI b CI 
Intercept .09** 
(.02) 
.05, .14 .07* 
(.03) 
.02, .13 .08** 
(.03) 
.02, .13  .08** 
(.03) 
.03, 
.13 
.08** 
(.03) 
.02, .15 .08** 
(.03) 
.02, .15 
Nosic –.02 
(.04) 
–.11, .07 –.04 
(.05) 
–.13, .06 –.05 
(.05) 
–.15, .04 –.03 (.05) –.13, 
.06 
–.03 
(.05) 
–.13, .06 –.03 
(.05) 
–.12, .07 
Lev   –.36** 
(.07) 
–.50, 
–.22 
–.37** 
(.07) 
–.51, 
–.22 
–.34** 
(.07) 
–.48, 
–.19 
–.31** 
(.08) 
–.46, –.17 –.31** 
(.07) 
–.45, 
–.17 
Fsize      .02 
(.01) 
–.01,.05 .02 (.02) –.01, 
 .05 
.01 
(.02) 
–.02,  .04   
Blkh       .13 (.10) –.07, .33 .12 
(.10) 
–.09, .32 .13 
(.10) 
–.07, .34 
Bind       .   .02 
(.12) 
–.23, .26 .01 
(.12) 
–.24, .24 
ARH1 rho .32** .29** .30** .31** .31** .31** 
Var(Int) .03** .05** .04** .04** .04** .04** 
–2LL 200.15 98.30 96.60 80.46 34.57 35.33 
Δ in –2LL 0.14 101.85** 1.7 16.14** 45.89** –0.76 
N 72 72 72 71 71 71 
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Nosic = level of diversification; Lev = leverage; Blhk = blockholding; Bind = board 
independence; Fsize = firm size; CI = 95% confidence interval; ARH1 rho = correlation of adjacent errors; Var(Int) = variance of 
intercepts; –2LL = deviance of log likelihood ratio; Model 6 excludes Fsize which did not improve the model significantly. 
*p < .05; **p < .01. 
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As I indicated in Model 1 of Table 10, there was a negative but nonsignificant 
relationship between the level of diversification and ROE, b = –.02, F(1, 174.42) = .424, 
p = .516. This relationship was consistent across all the models. For instance, in model 5 
of Table 10, in which I included all the control variables, the level of diversification was 
not significantly related to ROE, b = –.01, F(1, 199.81) = .03, p = .862. The correlation of 
adjacent errors (ARH1 rho) was positive and significant, b = .41, Wald χ2(1) = 8.62, p 
< .001. The positive and significant coefficient of ARH1 rho suggested that the 
assumption of AR(1): Het covariance structure was reasonable (West, 2009). The 
intercepts also varied across companies given that the Var(Int) was significant, b = .04, 
Wald χ2(1) = 5.34, p < .001.  
To further verify the relationship between the level of diversification and ROE, I 
reran the analysis using only DFs because interfirm differences in the level of 
diversification are only among DFs. As shown in Table 11, there was a nonsignificant 
negative relationship between Level of diversification and ROE in all the models. For 
instance, in Table 11, Model 1 where no control variable was included, there was a 
nonsignificant relationship between Level of diversification and ROE, b = –.02, F(1, 
94.68) = .15, p = .704. Accounting for all the control variables as in Table 11, Model 5, 
the relationship remained nonsignificant, b = –.03, F(1, 99.45) = .48, p = .489. The Level 
of diversification-ROE relationship remained nonsignificant in Model 6 where I removed 
firm size that did not improve the model significantly, b = –.03, F(1, 99.17) = .27, p 
= .603. As shown in Table 11, ARH1 rho and Var(Int) are positive and significant in all 
the models, indicating that the assumption of an AR(1): Het repeated covariance structure 
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is reasonable. Intercepts also varied across companies. Based on the analysis in this 
section, I accepted the null Hypothesis 2 that there is no significant relationship between 
the level of diversification and firm performance measured by ROE in Nigeria. Leverage 
was the only control variable that showed significance in all the models in Table 11. It 
was negatively related to ROE. 
In the case of the ATQ as the dependent variable, the random intercept model 
with the AR(1): Het repeated covariance type provided the best fit both when I did the 
analysis with all-firm observations and when I executed it with DF observations only. 
With all-firm observations, this model showed a significant improvement in fit over the 
pooled OLS model, χ2𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 2016.18 – 903.27 = 1112.91, p < .001 and over the fixed 
effects model, χ2𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 933.06 – 903.27 = 29.79, p < .001, with all the control 
variables included. With DF observations only, the improvement in fit over the pooled 
OLS model was significant, χ2𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 1563.35 – 563.92 = 999.43, p < .001. The 
improvement in fit over the fixed effects model was also significant, χ2𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 620.80 – 
563.92 = 56.88, p < .001. I present the analysis based on observations on all firms in 
Table 12 and then the analysis based on DFs only in Table 13. 
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Table 12 
 
LMM Results of the Relationship Between Level of Diversification and ATQ Using Observations for All Firms 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Parameter b CI b CI b CI b CI b CI 
Intercept 1.18** 
(.07) 
1.05, 
1.31 
1.14** 
(.06) 
1.02, 
1.26 
1.15** 
(.06) 
1.03, 
1.27 
1.13** 
(.06) 
1.01, 
1.25 
1.13** 
(.06) 
1.01, 
1.24 
Nosic –.12 
(.07) 
–.26, .02 –.10 
(.06) 
–.22, .02 –.08 
(.06) 
–.21, .05 –.07 
(.06) 
–.20, 
(.05) 
–.07 
(.06) 
–.20, .06 
Lev   .75** 
(.06) 
.63, .88 .74** 
(.06) 
.61, .86 .74** 
(.06) 
.62, .86 .74** 
(.06) 
.62, .87 
Fsize     –.07** 
(.02) 
–.12, 
–.02 
–.08** 
(.03) 
–.13, 
–.03 
–.07** 
(.22) 
–.12, 
–.02 
Blkh       .23* 
(.10) 
.03, .42 .34** 
(.13) 
.09, .59 
Bind         –.34 
(.20) 
–.73, .05 
ARH1 rho .82** .83** .83** .84** 83** 
VAR (Int) .34** .27** 30** .31** .28** 
–2LL 1,087.32 955.29 948.40 913.36 903.27 
Δ in –2LL 117.05** 132.03** 6.89** 35.04** 10.09** 
N 109 109 109 109 108 
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Nosic = level of diversification; Lev = leverage; Blkh = blockholding;  
Bodind = board independence; Firmsize = Firm size; CI = 95% confidence interval; ARH1 rho = correlation of  
adjacent errors; Var(Int) = variance of intercepts; –2LL = deviance of log likelihood ratio.  
*p < .05; **p < .01. 
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Table 13 
LMM Results of the Relationship Between Level of Diversification and ATQ Using 
Observations for Diversified Firms Only 
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 b CI b CI b CI b CI b CI 
Intercept 1.26** 
(.10) 
1.07,  
1.45 
1.21** 
(.09) 
1.02, 
1.40 
1.23** 
(.10) 
1.03, 
1.43 
1.19** 
(.10) 
1.00, 
1.38 
1.32** 
(.11) 
1.11, 
1.53 
Nosic –.26* 
(.12) 
–.51, 
–.02 
–.11 
(.11) 
–.33, 
.11 
–.07 
(.11) 
–.29, 
.15 
–.08 
(.12) 
–.31, 
.16 
–.02 
(.12) 
–.26, 
.22 
Lev   .93** 
(.08) 
.78, 
1.08 
.90** 
(.08) 
.75, 
1.05 
.92** 
(.09) 
.75, 
.1.09 
.91** 
(.09) 
.73, 
1.08 
Fsize      –.12** 
(.04) 
–.20, 
–.04 
–.10* 
(.04) 
–.18, 
 –.01 
–.10* 
(.04) 
–.19, 
–.02 
Blkh       .47* 
(.19) 
.09, 
.85 
.55** 
(.20) 
.15, 
.94 
Bind          –.68** 
(.24) 
–1.15, 
–.20 
ARH1 rho .74** .78** .77** .79** .77** 
Var(Int) .60** .60** .68** .60** .62** 
–2LL 696.67 584.66 577.48 567.83 563.92 
Δ in –2LL 4.48* 112.01** 7.18** 9.65** 3.91* 
N 73 73 73 72 72 
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Nosic = level of diversification; Lev = leverage; 
Blhk = blockholding; Bind = board independence; Fsize = firm size; CI = 95% 
confidence interval; ARH1 rho = correlation of adjacent errors; Var(Int) = variance of 
intercepts; –2LL = deviance of log likelihood ratio.  
*p < .05; **p < .01. 
 
As I showed in Model 1 of Table 12, without accounting for the control variables, 
the relationship between the level of diversification and ATQ was negative but 
nonsignificant, b = –.12, F(1, 332.24) = 2.96, p = .086. The nonsignificant negative 
relationship persisted in all the models. For instance, after accounting for all the control 
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variables in model 5, the level of diversification remained nonsignificantly related to 
ATQ, b = –.07, F(1, 283.59) = 1.18, p = .279. The covariance structure was reasonable 
given that the ARH1 rho was positive and significant in all the models. For instance, 
Model 5 ARH1 rho showed b = .83, Wald χ2(1) = 25.19, p < .001. The intercepts also 
varied across companies since the Var(Int) was significant in all the models. For instance, 
in Model 5, Var(Int) showed, b = .28, Wald χ2(1) = 4.41, p < .001.  
To further verify the relationship between the level of diversification and firm 
performance for the reasons indicated earlier, I reran the analysis using DFs only. I 
presented the results in Table 13. As I showed in Model 1 of Table 13 where I did not 
include any control variable, the relationship between Level of diversification and ATQ 
was negative and significant, F(1, 318.99) = 4.58, p = .033. However, in all the other 
Models where I introduced the control variables, the coefficient of Level of 
diversification remained negative but nonsignificant. For instance, in Model 5, where I 
introduced all the control variables, the coefficient of Level of diversification was 
negative and nonsignificant, F(1, 273.18) = .025, p = .875. The ARH1 rho was positive 
and significant in all the models and indicates that the AR(1): Het repeated covariance 
type was a reasonable assumption for this analysis. The Var(Int) was also positive and 
significant in all the models and indicated that the intercepts varied across companies. 
Based on the analysis in this section, I accepted the null hypothesis that there is no 
significant relationship between the level of diversification and firm performance 
measured by ATQ in Nigeria. 
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In Tables 12 and 13, all the control variables improved the Models and were 
significantly related to ATQ at the 5% level except board independence that was 
significant at only the 10% level when I used observations from all firms (Table 12). The 
coefficients of leverage and blockholding were positive, while that of firm size and board 
independence were negative.  
To make the results comparable with studies that used EV as the measure of 
performance, I used some variants of EV measures. I could not use Berger and Ofek 
(1995) approach to calculate EV because I did not have segment sales, assets, or revenue 
data necessary to compute weights for segment contribution for most of the companies 
and most of the years. Moreover, in many cases, firm-reported segments and segment 
data (where such data existed) were not consistent with the firms’ segments’ 
classification based on their SIC codes. It was, therefore, not possible for me to make any 
meaningful calculations using this approach. 
I computed two variants of EV and used them as the measures of performance. In 
the first place, following Seo et al. (2010), I computed excess ROE (ExROEav) of a DF 
for each year as the difference between the ROE for that year and the average ROE of all 
UDFs for that year. I also calculate excess ATQ (ExATQav) for any year as the 
difference between the DF’s ATQ and the average ATQ of all UDFs s for that year. This 
measure is close to Smith and Coy’s (2018) Diversified Q Differential EV measure. The 
analysis showed that the relationship between the level of diversification and EV of DFs 
was nonsignificant for both ExROEav, b = –.03, F(1, 102.48) = .36, p = .552 and 
ExATQav, b = –.25, F(1, 245.88) = 3.68, p = .056. Accounting for the control variables, 
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the relationship remained nonsignificant for both the ExROEav, b = –.05, F(1, 110.74) = 
1.16, p = .283 and the ExATQav, b = –.07, F(1, 224.53) = .27, p = .602.  
The problem with the Seo et al. (2010) approach is that it does not reflect industry 
differences that may affect the performance of DFs, as some authors have noted 
(Purkayastha & Lahiri, 2016). To mitigate this problem, I followed Servaes (1996) and 
computed another variant of excess ROE (ExROEserv) and excess ATQ (ExATQserv) of 
a DF as the difference between the firm’s ROE (ATQ) and the unweighted average of the 
imputed ROE (ATQ) of its segments. Imputed ROE (ATQ) for a segment is the 
unweighted (equally weighted) average ROE (ATQ) of focused firms in that 
segment/industry. For example, if a DF operates in three 2-digit SIC code industries (say 
10, 23, and 31), each of these segments/industries was assigned the average ROE (ATQ) 
of all focused firms that operate exclusively in the industry. The firm’s imputed ROE 
(ATQ) will now be the equally weighted average of the assigned ROEs (ATQs) for the 
three industries.  
The problem I ran into with the Servaes (1996) approach was that for many 
segments, there were no focused firms in the same industry that I could use to compute 
imputed ROE (ATQ). To deal with this problem, I aggregated the observed firm 
segments/industries into groups. Every 2-digit SIC code industry that had five or more 
focused firms was assigned a distinct group. Those with less than five focused firms were 
grouped together with others in the same 1-digit SIC code industry. This aggregation 
resulted in 18 groups. Some authors had also employed similar aggregations when they 
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encountered the absence of sufficient focused firms in any given industry (see Berger & 
Ofek, 1995; Ljubownikow & Ang, 2020; Sturm & Nüesch, 2019). 
The analysis based on the Servaes (1996) approach showed that the relationship 
between level of diversification and ExROEserv was nonsignificant, b = –.06, F(1, 97.04) 
= 1.42, p = .237. Accounting for the control variables, the relationship remained 
nonsignificant, b = –.09, F(1, 113.09) = 2.85, p = .094. In the case of ExATQserv, the 
relationship was negative and significant, b = –.34, F(1, 314.23) = 6.81, p = .009. 
However, by including the control variables in the model, the relationship turned 
nonsignificant, b = –.19, F(1, 247.52) = 1.99, p = .160.  
From the analysis based on EVs, I still could not reject the hypothesis that there is 
no significant relationship between the level of diversification and firm performance in 
Nigeria. The drawback of the Servaes (1996) approach is that it gives too much weight to 
a firm’s less significant segments (Servaes, 1996). However, in the absence of reliable 
segment revenue, profit, or asset data, it is difficult to determine each segment’s 
significance. This rationalizes the use of the equal weighting approach.  
RQ3: How is the insider ownership level of DFs that outperform focused firms 
different from the insider ownership of DFs that underperform focused firms in Nigeria?  
H03: There is no significant difference in insider ownership level between DFs 
that outperform focused firms and DFs that underperform focused firms. 
H13: There is a significant difference in insider ownership level between DFs that 
outperform focused firms and those that underperform focused firms.  
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For this hypothesis, I classified DFs into two groups according to their EV status: 
OPDF and UPDF. The EV status is based on their excess ROE (ExROEav and 
ExROEserv) and excess ATQ (ExATQav and ExATQserv). OPDF (UPDF) are firms 
with positive (negative) excess ROE or excess ATQ, as the case may be. I then used the 
LMM to test the significance of the difference in insider ownership between these two 
groups. On the basis of –2LL, the random intercept model with AR(1): Het repeated 
covariance type was the best fit model for both the excess ROE- and excess ATQ-based 
classifications.  
Using the ExROEav-based classification, on average, OPDF had a lower insider 
ownership (M = .18, SE = .03) than UPDF (M = .20, SE = .03). The difference, b = –.02, 
95% CI [–.02, .04] is nonsignificant, t(359.19) = –1.92, p = .056. In the case of the 
ExROEserv-based classification, on average, OPDF (M = .19, SE = .03) had a lower 
insider ownership than UPDF (M = .20, SE = .03), and the difference, b = –.01, 95% CI 
[–.02, .00] was nonsignificant, t(345.14) = –1.85, p = .065. Using the ExATQav-based 
classification, on average, OPDF (M = .20, SE = .03) had a higher insider ownership than 
UPDF (M = .19, SE = .03) but the difference was nonsignificant, b = .01, 95% CI 
[–.01, .03], t(383.02) = 1.12, p = .262. With the classification based on EVATQserv, on 
average, OPDF (M = .20, SE = .03) had a higher insider ownership than UPDF (M = .19, 
SE = .03) but the difference, b = .01, 95% CI [–.01, .02] was nonsignificant, t(363.20) = 
1.06, p = .292. These suggested that there is no significant difference in the level of 
insider ownership between OPDF and UPDF, classified on the basis of the excess ROE 
and excess ATQ measures. However, the difference is significant at the 10% level in the 
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case of the measures excess ROE. These findings are inconsistent with the interest 
alignment hypothesis of increasing insider ownership, which suggests that OPDFs should 
have significantly higher insider ownership than UPDFs. 
However, given that excess ROE and excess ATQ are continuous variables, the 
categorization of firms into two based on them—dichotomization—has some limitations. 
It results in loss of information and reduces statistical power because it obscures intra 
category variations in values (Cumberland et al., 2014; Kahan et al., 2016; Naggara et al., 
2011; Royston et al., 2006; Sauzet et al., 2016). Many authors agree that it is unnecessary 
to categorize continuous data for statistical analysis (Naggara et al., 2011; Royston et al., 
2006). Royston et al. (2006) suggested that it is better to use regression on continuous 
data rather than categorizing them to use independent sample t test or similar tests. 
Consequently, I used the LMM to examine how insider ownership is related to 
excess ROE (ExROEav and ExROEserv) and excess ATQ (ExATQav and ExATQserv). 
For this analysis, the random intercept model with the AR(1): Het repeated covariance 
type was the best fit model in all the cases. I present the results with the ExROEav and 
ExROEserv measures in Panels A and B respectively of Table 14 and present the 
ExATQav and ExATQserv measures in Panels A and B, respectively of Table 15. Model 
1 of each Panel shows the relationship between insider ownership and EV measures 
without the control variables. In Model 2 of each Panel, I introduced the control 
variables.  
As shown in Table 14, Panel A, Model 1, insider ownership was a significant 
negative predictor of ExROEav, b = –.16, F(1, 173.92) = 4.19, p = .042. However, when 
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I incorporated the control variables in Table 14, Model 2, insider ownership lost its 
significance, b = –.10, F(1, 176.22) = 1.35, p = .247. Insider ownership exhibited a 
significant negative relationship with ExROEserv as I show in Table 14, Panel B, Model 
1, b = –.19, F(1, 151.01) = 4.61, p = .033, and when I introduced the control variables in 
Model 2, the coefficient of insider ownership remained negative but nonsignificant, b = 
–.14, F(1, 179.17) = 2.20, p = .140. 
Table 14 
 
LMM Result of the Relationship Between Insider Ownership and the ExROE of DFs 
Parameter Panel A: ExROEav Panel B: ExROEserv 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 b CI b CI b CI b CI 
Intercept  –.01 
(.02) 
–.06,  
.04 
–.04 
(.03) 
–.10, 
.03 
–.03 
(.03) 
–.03, 
.08 
.02 (.04) –.05, 
.09 
Insdown –.16* 
(.08) 
–.32, 
–.01 
–.10 
(.08) 
–.26, 
.07 
–.19* 
(.09) 
–.37, 
–.02 
–.14 
(.10) 
–.33, 
.05 
Lev   –.24** 
(.07) 
–.38, 
–.10 
  –.33** 
(.08) 
–.50, 
–.17 
Fsize    .04* 
(.01) 
.01,  
.06 
  .03* 
(.02) 
.001, 
.06 
Blkh   .13 (.10) –.06, 
.33 
  .16 (.11) –.06, 
.39 
Bind    .06 (.12) –.18, 
.31 
  –.07 
(.14) 
–.35, 
.22 
ARH1 rho .26** .24** .16** .12* 
Var(Int) .03** .03** .03** .04** 
–2LL 139.18 48.78 294.33 197.31 
Δ in –2LL 55.98** 90.40** 75.68** 97.02 
N 71 71 71 71 
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Insdown = insider ownership; Lev = leverage; 
Blhk = blockholding; Bind = board independence; Fsize = firm size; CI = 95% 
confidence interval; ARH1 rho = correlation of adjacent errors; Var(Int) = variance of 
intercepts; –2LL = deviance of log likelihood ratio.  
*p < .05; **p < .01. 
235 
 
 
Table 15 
 
LMM Result of the Relationship between Insider Ownership and the ExATQ of DFs 
Parameter Panel A: ExATQav Panel B: ExATQserv 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 b CI b CI b CI b CI 
Intercept .14 
(.09) 
–.03, 
.32 
.26* 
(.10) 
.06, .4
6 
–.04 
(.10) 
–.23, 
.15 
.02 
(.11) 
–.19, 
.23 
Insdown .07 
(.18) 
–.28, 
.42 
–.10 
(.16) 
–.42, .
22 
.16 
(.18) 
–.19, 
.50 
–.02 
(.17) 
–.36, 
.31 
Lev   1.02** 
(.16) 
.83, 
1.21 
  .89** 
(.10) 
.69, 
1.09 
Fsize    –.06 
(.04) 
–.14, .
02 
  –.03 
(.04) 
–.12, 
.05 
Blkh   .63** 
(.22) 
.19, 
1.07 
  .59* 
(.23) 
.14, 
1.04 
Bind    –.80** 
(.27) 
–1.33, 
–.28 
  –.49 
(.27) 
–1.02, 
.05 
ARH1 rho .73** .74** .68** .72** 
Var(Int) .48** .52** .59** .58** 
–2LL 767.59 657.845 708.93 631.90 
Δ in –2LL 48.82** 109.75** 43.04** 77.03** 
N 72 72 72 72 
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Insdown = insider ownership; Lev = leverage; 
Blhk = blockholding; Bind = board independence; Fsize = firm size; CI = 95% 
confidence interval; ARH1 rho = correlation of adjacent errors; Var(Int) = variance of 
intercepts; –2LL = deviance of log likelihood ratio 
*p < .05; **p < .01. 
 
The results in Table 15, Panel A, Model 1 show that insider ownership has a 
nonsignificant relationship with ExATQav, b = .07, F(1, 324.13) = .146, p = .703. When 
I introduced the control variables in Model 2 of the Panel, the relationship continued to 
be nonsignificant, b = –.10, F(1, 224.71) = .39, p = .535. The results in Table 15, Panel B, 
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Model 1 show that insider ownership has a nonsignificant relationship with ExATQserv, 
b = .16, F(1, 327.24) = .78, p = .378. When I included the control variables in Table 15, 
Panel B, Model 2, the relationship remained nonsignificant, b = –.02, F(1, 267.16) = .02, 
p = .887.  
In all the models I estimated in Tables 14 and 15, the coefficient of ARH1 rho is 
positive and highly significant. This indicates that the assumption of AR(1): Het was 
reasonable. The Var(Int) is also positive and highly significant, indicating that the 
intercept varied across companies. The analyses presented in Tables 14 and 15 show no 
significant relationship between insider ownership and the measures of EV used in this 
study. I, therefore, accepted the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference in 
insider ownership between DFs that outperform focused firms and those that 
underperform focused firms in Nigeria. 
Singh et al. (2004) examined whether the numbers of diversification gainers and 
losers in the groups of low and high insider ownership firms are significantly different. I 
followed Singh et al. and did a similar analysis. I classified DFs into low-insider 
ownership firms (that is, firms with insider ownership below the average) and High- 
insider ownership firms (that is, firms with insider ownership above the average). In 
Table 16, I showed the number an insider ownership d proportion of firm-year 
observations that belong to each combination of insider ownership and EV categories 
(status). In Tables 17, 18, 19, and 20, I presented the generalized linear mixed model 
(GLMM) results of the relationship between I insider ownership status and EV status 
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based on the ExROEav, ExROEserv, ExATQav, and ExATQserv measures of EV, 
respectively. 
Table 16 
Diversified Firms According to Their Insider Ownership and Excess Value Categories 
Pooled Data ExROEav ExROEserv ExATQav ExATQserv 
Low_Insdown-OPDF 202 233 140 216 
High_Insdown-OPDF 77 103 40 56 
Low_Insdown-UPDF 162 132 241 165 
High_Insdown-UPDF 146 119 181 165 
Total Low-Insdown firm 364 365 381 381 
Total High-Insdown firm 223 222 221 221 
Proportion of Low-Insdown and 
OPDF 
0.55 0.64 0.37 0.57 
Proportion of High-Insdown and 
OPDF 
0.35 0.46 0.18 0.25 
Proportion of Low-Insdown and 
UPDF 
0.45 0.36 0.63 0.43 
Proportion of High-Insdown and 
UPDF 
0.65 0.54 0.82 0.75 
Note. Insdow = insider ownership; OPDF = outperforming diversified firms; UPDF = 
underperforming diversified firms; The table was compiled based on insider ownership 
data extracted from the annual reports of companies and on the 2-digit SIC codes 
assigned to the firms 
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Table 17 
 
GLMM Result of the Relationship Between Insider Ownership Status and the ExROEav 
Parameter b SE t p 95% Confidence 
Interval 
OR 
     LL UL  
Intercept  –.66 .26 –2.54 .015 –1.19 –.14 .52 
Low-Insdown=0 .72 .36 1.99 .049 .004 1.43 2.05 
High-
Insdown=1 
0a       
–2LL 2,720.75       
Var(Int) 2.41 .60 Z = 4.03 .000 1.48 3.92  
N 587       
Note. Insdown = insider ownership; Var(Int) = variance of intercepts. 
aThis coefficient is set to 0 because it is redundant. 
 
Table 18 
 
GLMM Result of the Relationship Between Insider Ownership Status and the ExROEserv  
Parameter b SE t p 95% Confidence 
Interval 
OR 
     LL UL  
Intercept  .032 .26 .12 .902 –.48 .54 1.03 
Low-Insdown=0 .46 .35 1.31 .191 –.23 1.16 1.59 
High-
Insdown=1 
0a       
–2LL 2,673.28       
Var(Int) 1.92 .50 Z = 3.83 .000 1.15 3.20  
N 587       
Note. Insdown = insider ownership; Var(Int) = variance of intercepts. 
aThis coefficient is set to 0 because it is redundant 
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Table 19 
 
GLMM Result of the Relationship Between Insider Ownership Status and the ExATQav 
Parameter b SE t p 95% Confidence 
Interval 
OR 
     LL UL  
Intercept  –1.55 .33 –4.71 .000 –2.22 –.89 .21 
Low-Insdown=0 .49 .41 1.19 .238 –.33 1.30 1.63 
High-
Insdown=1 
0a       
–2LL 2976.31       
Var(Int) 3.77 .91 Z = 4.15 .000 2.35 6.04  
Note. Insdown = insider ownership; Var(Int) = variance of intercepts. 
aThis coefficient is set to 0 because it is redundant 
Table 20 
 
GLMM Result of the Relationship Between Insider Ownership Status and the ExATQserv  
Parameter b  t p 95% Confidence 
Interval 
OR 
     LL UL  
Intercept  –1.14 .36 –3.17 .002 –1.86 –.43 .32 
Low-
Insdown=0 
.57 .44 1.29 .199 –.30 1.45 1.77 
High-
Insdown=1 
0a       
–2LL 2,891.00       
Var(Int) 3.50 .85 Z = 
4.13 
.000 2.18 5.63  
N 602       
Note. Insdown = insider ownership; Var(Int) = variance of intercepts. 
aThis coefficient is set to 0 because it is redundant 
The data in Table 16 shows that in all the EV measures, the proportion of 
observations in the Low-insider ownership category that are OPDF (have positive EVs) is 
more than those that are in the High-insider ownership category. In contrast, the 
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proportion of observations in the Low-insider ownership category that are UPDF (have 
negative EVs) are less than those in the High-insider ownership category. Whether these 
differences are significant is the question.  
Because my data are pooled repeated measures data set that violate the 
assumption of independence, I could not use the Chi-square test to check for the 
significance of the differences as Singh et al. (2004) did. Alternatively, I could use the 
Chi-Square test on a yearly basis. The problem here was that this procedure does not give 
summary statistics for the whole period that could enable me to draw a uniform 
conclusion. This is because in some years, some of the differences were significant, and 
in others, they were not. Moreover, the assumption of expected frequencies was violated 
in some of the years.  
Because of these challenges, I used the GLMM procedure in SPSS to check 
whether insider ownership status predicted EV status. In other words, is EV status 
independent of insider ownership status? The GLMM is appropriate in this case where 
the outcome variable is categorical, and the assumption of independence is violated as in 
repeated measures observations.  
As shown in Tables 17, 18, 19, and 20, in all the EV measures, the odds 
(represented by the odds ratio) are higher that a Low-insider ownership observation will 
have a positive EV than a High-insider ownership observation. For instance, if an 
observation belongs to the Low-insider ownership category, the odds of their having a 
positive EV is 2.05, 1.59, 1.63, and 1.77 times higher than if they belonged to the High- 
insider ownership category for the ExROEav, ExROEserv, ExATQav, and ExATQserv 
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measures, respectively. Insider ownership status did not significantly predict EV status 
except in the ExROEav measure, b = .72, F(1, 156) = 3.95, p = .049 as shown in Table 
17. However, when I included the control variables, insider ownership status lost its 
significance in the ExROEav measure, b = .45, F(1, 197) = 1.12, p = .291. On the basis of 
these analyses, I was unable to conclude that the proportion of OPDF and UPDF in the 
groups of low- and high- insider ownership firms are significantly different. Singh et al. 
(2004) also arrived at a similar conclusion—reults that do not support the agency cost 
hypothesis. 
RQ4: What is the relationship between insider ownership and the performance 
effects of level of diversification in Nigeria? 
H04: There is no significant relationship between insider ownership and the 
performance effects of level of diversification. 
H14: There is a significant relationship between insider ownership and the 
performance effects of level of diversification. 
To test this hypothesis, I did the analysis separately for each of the performance 
measures (ROE and ATQ) as the dependent variable. The random intercept model with 
AR(1): Het repeated covariance type was the best fitting model for the ROE outcome 
variables. For instance, when I estimated the models using observations from all firms 
and including all the predictors, the random intercept model showed a significant 
improvement in fit from the pooled OLS model, χ2𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 164.04 – (–304.08) = 
468.12, p < .001. The improvement between the fixed effects model and the random 
intercept model was also significant, χ2𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = –240.21 – (–304.08) = 63.87, p < .001.  
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Also, when I estimated the models with ROE as the dependent variable, included 
all the predictors, and using observations from DFs only, the random intercept model 
showed a significant improvement in fit from the pooled OLS and fixed-effects models. 
The improvement from the pooled OLS model was χ2𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 312.21 – 32.64 = 279.57, 
p < .001 and χ2𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 97.80 – 32.64 = 65.16, p < .001 for the fixed effects model. I 
presented the analysis based on observations on all firms in Table 21 and then the 
analysis based on DFs only in Table 22.  
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Table 21 
 
LMM Result of the Relationship Between Insider Ownership and the ROE Effects of Diversification: All Firms 
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
b CI b CI b CI b CI b CI b CI b CI 
Intercept .07**  
(.02) 
.04,  
.11 
.08**  
(.02) 
.04,  
.12 
.08**  
(.02) 
.04,  
.12 
.05*  
(.02) 
.01,  
.09 
.05*  
(.02) 
.01,  
.09 
.05*  
(.02) 
.01,  
.09 
.05*  
(.02) 
.01,  
.09 
Nosic –.02  
(.03) 
–.07,  
.03 
–.01  
(.02) 
–.06,  
.04 
–.02  
(.02) 
–.06,  
.03 
–.003  
(.03) 
–.05,  
.05 
–.01  
(.03) 
–.06,  
.04 
–.02  
(.03) 
–.07,  
.04 
–.01  
(.03) 
–.06,  
.04 
Insdown   –.06  
(.05) 
–.16,  
.04 
–.07  
(.05) 
–.17,  
.04 
–.09  
(.05) 
–.19,  
.01 
–.08  
(.05) 
–.18,  
.02 
–.08  
(.05) 
–.18,  
.03 
–.14*  
(.06) 
–.26,  
–.03 
Nosic × Insdown     –.08  
(.07) 
–.23,  
.07 
–.05  
(.08) 
–.19,  
.10 
–.05  
(.07) 
–.20,  
.09 
–.05  
(.07) 
–.20,  
.10 
–.10  
(.08) 
–.26,  
.06 
Lev       –.44**  
(.06) 
–.55,  
–.32 
–.44**  
(.06) 
–.56,  
–.32 
–.45**  
(.06) 
–.57,  
–.34 
–.45**  
(.06) 
–.56,  
–.34 
Fsize         .03*  
(.01) 
.01,  
.05 
.03**  
(.01) 
.01,  
.05 
.02*  
(.01) 
.00,  
.04 
Blkh           –.03  
(.06) 
–.15,  
.08 
.13  
(.07) 
–.01,  
.26 
Bind             –.15  
(.10) 
–.34,  
.04 
ARH1 rho .37** .38** .38** .36** .38** .38** .41** 
Var(Int) .03** .03** .03** .04** .03** .04** .04** 
–2LL –151.40 –162.88 –164.06 –217.52 –222.83 –228.07 –304.08 
Δ–2LL 22.62** 11.48** 1.18 53.45** 5.32* 5.23* 76.01** 
N 108 107 107 107 107 107 106 
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Nosic = level of diversification; Lev = leverage; Blkh = blockholding; Bind = board 
independence; Firmsize = Firm size; Insdown = Insider ownership; CI = 95% confidence interval; ARH1 rho = correlation of 
adjacent errors; Var(Int) = variance of intercepts; –2LL = deviance of log likelihood ratio. 
*p < .05; **p < .01. 
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Table 22 
 
LMM Result of the Relationship Between Insider Ownership and the ROE Effects of Level of Diversification: DFs Only 
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
b CI b CI b CI b CI b CI b CI b CI b CI 
Intercept .09**  
(.02) 
.05,  
.14 
.10**  
(.02) 
.05,  
.15 
.10** 
(.02) 
.05,  
.15 
.07**  
(.03) 
.02,  
.13 
.08** 
(.03) 
.02,  
.13 
.08**  
(.03) 
.03,  
.13 
.09*  
(.03) 
.02,  
.15 
.08* 
(.03) 
.02,  
.15 
Nosic –.02  
(.04) 
–.11,  
.07 
–.02  
(.04) 
–.11,  
.07 
–.02  
(.04) 
–.11,  
.07 
–.05  
(.05) 
–.15,  
.04 
–.06  
(.05) 
–.16,  
.04 
–.05  
(.05) 
–.15,  
.04 
–.05  
(.05) 
–.15,  
.04 
–.05  
(.05) 
–.15, 
.04 
Insdown   –.19*  
(.08) 
–.34,  
.04 
–.19*  
(.08) 
–.34,  
–.04 
–.16*  
(.08) 
–.32,  
.002 
–.16  
(.08) 
–.31,  
.001 
–.19*  
(.08) 
–.36,  
–.03 
_.19* 
(.08) 
–.36,  
–.02 
–1.6*  
(.08) 
–.32,  
–.004 
Nosic × Insdown     .01  
(.17) 
–.33,  
.36 
–.29  
(.17) 
–.62,  
.04 
–.27  
(.17) 
–.60,  
.06 
–.28  
(.17) 
–.63,  
.05 
–.27  
(.17) 
–.60,  
.06 
–.29  
(.17) 
–.62,  
.04 
Lev       –.36**  
(.07) 
–.50,  
–.22 
–.36**  
(.07) 
–.51,  
–.22 
–.36**  
(.07 
–.51,  
–.22 
–.34**  
(.07) 
–.49,  
–.19 
–.34**  
(.07) 
–.49,  
–.20 
Fsize         .01  
(.02) 
.02,  
.04 
.01  
(.02) 
–.02,  
.04 
.01  
(.02) 
–.02,  
.04 
  
Blkh           .21*  
(.11) 
.001,  
.42 
.20  
(.11) 
–.01,  
.41 
  
Bind             –.04  
(.12) 
–.28,  
.21 
–.03  
(.12) 
–.28,  
.21 
ARH1 rho .32** .34** .34** .30** .30** .30** .30** .30** 
Var(Int) .03** .03** .03** .04** .04** .04** .04** .04** 
–2LL 200.15 140.08 140.08 43.78 43.08 42.49 32.64 33.42 
Δ–2LL 0.14 60.07** 0 96.30** .70 0.59 9.85** –0.78 
N 72 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Nosic = level of diversification; Lev = leverage; Blkh = blockholding; Bind 
 = board independence; Fsize = firm size; Insdown = insider ownership; CI = 95% confidence interval; ARH1 rho =  
correlation of adjacent errors; Var(Int) = variance of intercepts; –2LL = deviance of log likelihood ratio. 
*p < .05; **p < .01. 
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The analysis in Table 11 (based on observations on all firms) showed a 
nonsignificant relationship between the Level of diversification and ROE. As I showed in 
Model 3 of Table 21, after introducing insider ownership and the interaction term of level 
of diversification and insider ownership as predictors, the relationship remained 
nonsignificant, b = –.02, F(1, 170.84) = .39, p = .532. The interaction term of level of 
diversification and insider ownership was nonsignificant, b = –.08, F(1, 448.67) = 1.19, p 
= .276. The coefficients of the level of diversification and the interaction term of level of 
diversification and insider ownership were also nonsignificant in all the models 
incorporating the control variables. The ARH1 rho was positive and significant in all the 
models, suggesting that the assumption of AR(1): Het covariance structure was 
reasonable. As the positive and significant coefficient of Var(Int) shows, the intercepts 
also varied across companies in all the models.  
When I reran the analysis using observations for DFs only, the relationships 
remained qualitatively similar to those obtained with all firm observations. As shown in 
Model 2 of Table 22, when I introduced insider ownership as a predictor, level of 
diversification remained nonsignificantly related to ROE, b = –.02, F(1, 87.68) = .24, p = 
.627 while insider ownership showed a significant negative relationship with ROE, b = –
.19, F(1, 154.51) = 6.08, p = .015. The interaction term of level of diversification and 
insider ownership in Model 3 of Table 22 was nonsignificant, b = .01, F(1, 155.91) = .01, 
p = .938 and did not improve the model significantly while level of diversification 
remained nonsignificant. With the introduction of the control variables in Models 4 to 7 
of Table 22, the coefficient of the interaction term and level of diversification remained 
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nonsignificant. When I removed firm size and blockholding that did not improve the 
model significantly, the interaction term remained nonsignificant as shown in Model 8 of 
Table 22, b = –.29, F(1, 190.32) = 3.02, p = .084 while level of diversification remained 
negative and nonsignificant, b = –.05, F(1, 115.35) = 1.25, p = .267.  
The covariance structure assumption was reasonable in all the models as indicated 
by the positive and significant ARH1 rho. The intercepts varied across firms, as shown by 
the positive and significant coefficient of the Var(Int) in all the models. Based on the 
analysis in Tables 21 and 22, I accepted the null hypothesis that there is no significant 
relationship between insider ownership and the performance effects of level of 
diversification in Nigeria based on the ROE. In other words, insider ownership did not 
moderate the level of D–P relationship in Nigeria. 
As shown in Table 21 where I presented the results with all firm observations, 
leverage showed a significant negative relationship with ROE. Firm size was positively 
and significantly related to ROE. When I used only observations from DFs, as presented 
in Table 22, insider ownership and leverage consistently showed a significant negative 
relationship with ROE in all the models, except Model 5 for insider ownership and Model 
6 for Lev. 
For the ATQ outcome variable, the random intercept model with AR(1): Het 
repeated covariance type was the best fitting model. When I used observations from all 
firms, the improvement in fit between the pooled OLS model and the random intercept 
model with AR(1): Het model (with all predictors included) was significant, χ2𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 
1982.68 – 903.05 = 1079.63, p < .001. The improvement between the fixed effects model 
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and the random intercept model is also significant, χ2𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 932.88 – 903.05 = 29.05, 
p < .001. When I estimated the model using observations from DFs only, the random 
intercept model showed a significant improvement in fit. The improvement from the 
pooled OLS model was χ2𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 1504.28 – 543.65 = 960.63, p < .001 and χ2𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 
608.24 – 543.65 = 64.59, p < .001 for the fixed effects model. I show the results in Table 
23 for the analysis based on all firms (both diversified and undiversified) and in Table 24 
for the analysis based on DFs only. 
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Table 23 
 
LMM Result of the Relationship Between Insider Ownership and the ATQ Effects of Diversification: All Firms 
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 b CI b CI b CI b CI b CI b CI b CI 
Intercept  1.18** 
(.07) 
1.05, 
1.31 
1.17** 
(.07) 
1.04, 
1.30 
1.17 
(.07) 
1.04, 
1.30 
1.13** 
(.06) 
1.01, 
1.24 
1.14** 
(.06) 
1.02, 
1.26 
1.14** 
(.06) 
1.01, 
1.26 
1.13** 
(.06) 
1.01, 
1.26 
Nosic –.12 
(.07) 
–.26, 
.02 
–.12 
(.07) 
–.26, 
.02 
 
–.12 
(.07) 
–.26, 
.02 
–.10 
(.06) 
–.22, 
.02 
–.08 
(.06) 
–.21, 
.05 
–.07 
(.06) 
–.20, 
.05 
–.07 
(.07) 
–.20, 
.06 
Insdown   –.09 
(.10) 
–.28, 
.10 
–.08 
(.10) 
–.28, 
.11 
–.02 
(.09) 
–.19, 
.16 
–.02 
(.09) 
–.19, 
.16 
–.13 
(.10) 
–.32, 
.07 
–.16 
(.11) 
–.38, 
.06 
Nosic × 
Insdown 
    .07 (.15) –.21, 
.36 
–.01 
(.13) 
–.26, 
.25 
–.05 
(.13) 
–.30, 
.21 
–.01 
(.13) 
–.27, 
.25 
.09 (.15) –.21, 
.39 
Lev       .76** 
(.06) 
.64, 
.88 
.74** 
(.06) 
.62, 
.86 
.74** 
(.06) 
.62, 
.86 
.74** 
(.06) 
.61, 
.86 
Fsize         –.07** 
(.03) 
–.12, 
–.02 
–.08** 
(.03) 
–.13, 
–.03 
–.07** 
(.03) 
–.13, 
–.02 
Blkh           .29* 
(.11) 
.06, 
.51 
.42** 
(.14) 
.14, 
.70 
Bind             –.35 
(.20) 
–.75, 
.04 
ARH1 rho .82** .83** .83** .85** .85** 84** .82** 
Var(Int) .34** .33** .33** .27 .30** .30** .29** 
–2LL 1,087.32 1,065.73 1,065.49 933.78 925.88 914.41 903.05 
Δ–2LL 117.05** 21.59** .24 131.71** 7.90** 11.47 11.36** 
N 109 108 108 108 108 108 107 
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Nosic = level of diversification; Lev = leverage; Blkh = blockholding; Bind = board independence; 
Fsize = firm size; Insdown = insider ownership; CI = 95% confidence interval; ARH1 rho = correlation of adjacent errors; Var(Int) = variance 
of intercepts; –2LL = deviance of log likelihood ratio. 
*p < .05; **p < .01. 
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Table 24 
 
LMM Result of the Relationship Between Insider Ownership and the ATQ Effects of Diversification: DFs Only 
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 b CI b CI b CI b CI b CI b CI b CI 
Intercept  1.26** 
(.10) 
1.07, 
1.45 
1.21** 
(.09) 
1.04, 
1.39 
1.21** 
(.09) 
1.04, 
1.39 
1.17** 
(.09) 
.99, 
1.36 
1.19** 
(.10) 
.99, 
1.39 
1.19** 
(.10) 
1.00, 
1.38 
1.31** 
(.11) 
1.10, 
1.52 
Nosic –.26* 
(.12) 
–.51, 
-.02 
–.12 
(.13) 
–.36, 
.13 
–.12 
(.13) 
–.37, 
.14 
–.09 
(.12) 
–.33, 
.14 
–.06 
(.12) 
–.29, 
.18 
–.09 
(.12) 
–.33, .15 –.04 
(.13) 
–.28, .21 
Insdown   .07 (.17) –.26, 
.40 
.07 (.17) –.26, 
.40 
.07 (.14) –.21, 
.35 
.05 (.14) –.22, 
.33 
–.07 
(.15) 
–.37, .22 –.08 
(.15 
–.38, .22 
Nosic*Insdo
wn 
    –.02 
(.36) 
–.74, 
.70 
–.01 
(.30) 
–.60, 
.57 
–.07 
(.30) 
–.65, 
.51 
–.33 
(.31) 
–.95, .29 –.27 
(.31) 
–.89, .35 
Lev       .99** 
(.08) 
.82, 
1.16 
.96** 
(.08) 
.80, 
1.13 
.98** 
(.09) 
.81, 1.15 .97** 
(.09) 
.80, 1.14 
Fsize         –.09* 
(.04) 
–.17, 
–.01 
–.10* 
(.04) 
–.18, 
 –.02 
–.11* 
(.04) 
–.19,  
–.02 
Blkh            .57** 
(.21) 
.16, .99 .65** 
(.22 
.22, 1.08 
Bind             –.62* 
(.24) 
–1.09,  
–.14 
ARH1 rho .74** .74** .74**  .79** .80** .79** 
Var(Int) .60** .50** .50**  .65** .63** .63** 
–2LL 696.67 651.26 651.25 557.02 553.00 546.47 543.65 
Δ–2LL 4.48* 45.41** .01 94.23** 4.02* 6.53* 2.82 
N 73 72 72 72 72 72 72 
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Nosic = level of diversification; Lev = leverage; Blkh = blockholding; Bind = board 
independence; Fsize = firm size; Insdown = insider ownership; CI = 95% confidence interval; ARH1 rho = correlation of adjacent 
errors; Var(Int) = variance of intercepts; –2LL = deviance of log likelihood ratio. 
*p < .05; **p < .01. 
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As shown in Model 1 of Tables 12 and 23, where I used observation on all firms 
in the sample, the level of diversification showed a nonsignificant negative relationship 
with ATQ. When I introduced insider ownership and the interaction term of level of 
diversification and insider ownership in Model 3 of Table 23, the coefficient of the 
interaction term was nonsignificant, b = .07, F(1, 559.96) = .24, p = .623. The coefficient 
of level of diversification remained negative and nonsignificant, b = –.12, F(1, 325.20) = 
2.96, p = .086. The nonsignificance of the interaction term and the level of diversification 
persisted with the introduction of the control variables in Models 4 to 7. Leverage and 
blockholding showed a significant positive relationship with ATQ, while firmsize 
exhibited a significant negative relationship. The assumption of ARH1 Heterogeneous 
covariance structure is reasonable given the positive and significant coefficient of ARH1 
rho in all the models in Table 23. The intercepts varied across companies, as shown by 
the positive and significant coefficients of the variance of the intercepts in the Table. 
I reestimated the models using only observation from DFs. In Model 1 of Tables 
13 and 24, where I used observations from DFs only, the level of diversification showed 
a significant negative relationship with ATQ, b = –.26, F(1, 318.99) = 4.58, p = .033. 
With the introduction of insider ownership in Model 2 of Table 24, level of 
diversification became nonsignificant. When I introduced the interaction term of level of 
diversification and insider ownership in Model 3 of Table 24, the interaction term was 
negative and nonsignificant, b = –.02, F(1, 274.67) = .004, p = .952. When I introduced 
the control variables in the subsequent Models of Table 24, level of diversification, 
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insider ownership, and the interaction term of level of diversification and insider 
ownership (Nosic * insider ownership) remained nonsignificant in all the models.  
AR(1): Het covariance structure was a reasonable assumption given that ARH1 
rho had a positive and significant coefficient in all the models. Consistent with the 
random intercept assumption, the intercepts varied across companies, as shown by the 
positive and significant coefficient of Var(Int) in all the models. Based on the preceding 
analysis, I accept the null Hypothesis 4 that there is no significant relationship between 
insider ownership and the performance effects of diversification in Nigeria with ATQ as 
the measure of performance. insider ownership did not significantly moderate the 
relationship between the level of diversification and ATQ. Leverage and blockholding 
showed significant positive relationships with ATQ, while firm size and board 
independence had significant negative relationships with ATQ when I used only DFs in 
the analysis  
Additional Statistical Tests 
One concern with the analysis so far is that not all the firms were listed for the 
entire period. Therefore, this fact may have biased the results. To address this concern, I 
reestimated the models using observations from firms listed for the entire period. On all 
the hypotheses tested, I arrived at the same conclusions as when I used all the companies’ 
observations in the sample. 
On Hypothesis 1, I found as before, that diversification status did not significantly 
predict ROE, b = .009, F(1, 275.00) = .07, p = .797. UDFs had higher ROE (M = .094, SE 
= .03) than DFs (M = .085, SE = .03) but the difference, b = .009, 95% CI [–.06, .08], was 
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nonsignificant, t(275.00) = .26, p = .797. Also, diversification status did not predict ATQ 
significantly, b = .07, F(1, 514.42) = .75, p = .386. The difference between the mean 
ATQ of UDFs (M = 1.20, SE = .09) and DFs (M = 1.13, SE = .08) was 
nonsignificant, .07, 95% CI [–.09, .24], t(514.42) = .87, p = .386.  
On Hypothesis 2, I found that when both DFs and UDFs were used in the 
analysis, there was no significant relationship between level of diversification and ROE, 
b = –.02, F(1, 169.35) = .31, p = .577, 95% CI [–.07, .04]. The situation remained the 
same with the introduction of each of the control variables, and in the full variable model 
(with all control variables), b = –.01, F(1, 197.61) = .14, p = .711, 95% CI [–.07, .04]. 
When I estimated the models with only observations from DFs, I also found a 
nonsignificant negative relationship in the model without the control variables, b = –.03, 
F(1, 97.51) = .34, p = .561, 95% CI [–.12, .06]. With the introduction of each of the 
control variables, the relationship remained nonsignificant. For example, in the model 
that included all the control variables, the relationship was also nonsignificant, b = –.05, 
F(1, 105.22) = .86, p = .357, 95% CI [–.14, .05]. 
In the case of ATQ, there was also a nonsignicant negative relationship in all the 
models when I used all firms in the sample. Without the control variables, the level of 
diversification showed a marginally significant negative relationship with ATQ, b = –.14, 
F(1, 278.99) = 3.88, p = .050, 95% CI [–.29, -.00], and in the model with all control 
variables, b = –.10, F(1, 259.84) = 1.85, p = .175, 95% CI [–.23, .04]. When I reestimated 
the relationship with observations from DFs only, the coefficient of level of 
diversification was significantly negative in the model without the control variables, b = 
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–.26, F(1, 270.55) = 4.21, p = .041, 95% CI [–.50, –.01]. However, with the introduction 
of each of the control variables in the subsequent models, the coefficients of level of 
diversification were nonsignificant. In the model that included all control variables, the 
relationship was nonsignificant, b = –.02, F(1, 261.69) = .0.14, p = .907, 95% CI 
[–.27, .24].  
On Hypothesis 3, I found that insider ownership was not a significant predictor of 
any of the measures of EV. For ExROEav without the control variables, b = –.12, F(1, 
182.70) = 2.25, p = .136, 95% CI [–.28, .04]. With the control variables included, insider 
ownership remained a nonsignificant predictor of ExROEav, b = –.07, F(1, 173.32) = .74, 
p = .390, 95% CI [–.24, .09]. In the case of ExATQav, the relationship with insider 
ownership (without the control variables) was nonsignificant, b = .06, F(1, 295.37) = .11, 
p = .736, 95% CI [–.30, .43]. Accounting for the control variables, the insider ownership 
continued to be a nonsignificant predictor of ExATQav, b = –.09, F(1, 194.68) = .25, p 
= .618, 95% CI [–.42, .25]. When I used the ExROEserv measure, I found also that 
insider ownership did not significantly predict EV, b = –.14, F(1, 151.36) = 2.57, p 
= .111, 95% CI [–.32, .03]. When I included the control variables, the relationship 
remained nonsignificant, b = –.09, F(1, 175.77) = .90, p = .344, 95% CI [–.28, .10]. With 
the ExATQserv measure, insider ownership remained a nonsignificant predictor of EV 
without the control variables, b = .14, F(1, 310.07) = .59, p = .444, 95% CI [–.22, .50] 
and with the control variables, b = .02, F(1, 254.60) = .11, p = .914, 95% CI [–.33, .37]. 
With regard to Hypothesis 4, insider ownership was not a significant moderator of 
the level of diversification-ATQ relationship. When I used all firms in the sample, the 
254 
 
coefficient of the interaction term of level of diversification and insider ownership was 
nonsignificant, b = .04, F(1, 511.93) = .09, p = .766, 95% CI [–.25, .34]. Accounting for 
the control variables, the interaction term remained nonsignificant, b = .06, F(1, 404.58) 
= .13, p = .723, 95% CI [–.26, .38]. Reestimating the models with DFs only, the 
interaction term remained nonsignificant, b = –.11, F(1, 242.69) = .08, p = .783, 95% CI 
[–.86, .65]. The interaction term was nonsignificant with the introduction of each of the 
control variables, and for the full variable model it also showed nonsignificance, b = –.39, 
(1, 187.37) = 1.41, p = .236, 95% CI [–1.04, .26].  
In the case of ROE, insider ownership had no significant moderating effect on the 
level of diversification-ROE relationship when I used all firms in the sample since the 
coefficient of the level of diversification * insider ownership interaction term was 
nonsignificant, b = –.05, F(1, 427.21) = .43, p = .513, 95% CI [–.20, .10]. The coefficient 
of the interaction term remained nonsignificant with the introduction of each of the 
control variables. For instance, accounting for all the control variables, b = –.08, F(1, 
335.00) = .89, p = .345, 95% CI [–.25, .09]. When I used DFs only to run the analysis, the 
interaction term was also nonsignificant, b = –.06, F(1, 170.47) = .14, p = .713, 95% CI 
[–.41, .28]. Overall, the conclusions based on observations from firms listed for the entire 
period did not diverge from those based on the data set that included firms that were not 
listed for all the years.  
Summary 
I used the LMM to test the hypotheses developed to address four research 
questions. Two questions related to whether firms differed in their performance on the 
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basis of their diversification status and level of diversification. The other two questions 
related to whether insider ownership distinguished between OPDFs and UPDFs and how 
insider ownership is related to the performance effects of the level of diversification.  
On the basis of the analyses, there is sufficient evidence that there is no 
significant difference in performance between DFs and UDFs. There is also evidence that 
there is no significant relationship between the level of diversification and firm 
performance. The analyses also showed that insider ownership did not significantly 
predict outperforming and underperforming DFs. I also found that there is no significant 
relationship between insider ownership and the performance effects of the level of 
diversification.  
Some of the control variables were significantly related to the measures of 
performance, and some were not. Leverage consistently showed a significant negative 
relationship with ROE and a positive one with ATQ. Blockholding also consistently 
showed a significant positive relationship with ATQ. Firm size consistently exhibited a 
significant negative relationship with ATQ. Board independence was significant only in 
its relationship with ATQ when I analyzed with DFs only. insider ownership did not 
show significance in all the models where I introduced it except when I used DFs only to 
examine the relationship between level of diversification and ROE. 
In Chapter 5, I discuss these findings in the light of existing literature and the two 
theories that formed the foundation of the study. These theories are the agency theory and 
the IBT. I also draw some conclusions and make some recommendations on the basis of 
the findings in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The purpose of this quantitative panel design study was to examine the 
relationships between firm diversification and firm performance and how insider 
ownership is related to the performance effects of diversification in Nigeria. The study 
was conducted with a guiding framework of IBT and agency theory. IBT suggests that 
diversification will help to improve firm performance in emerging markets where market-
supporting institutions are underdeveloped. The reason is that diversification leads to the 
creation of internal markets that enable firms to overcome institutional voids in the 
economy. Agency theory of firm diversification suggests that diversification is a 
corporate strategy motivated by agency problems resulting from low insider ownership. 
Accordingly, diversification is likely to be associated with poor performance in firms 
with low insider ownership. 
I conducted this study to bridge gaps in the D–P literature, especially in the case 
of Nigeria, which is the most populous country and one of the biggest economies in 
Africa. None of the authors who used data on Nigerian firms had employed SIC codes to 
measure diversification. Only a few authors have directly tested the relationship between 
insider ownership and the performance effects of diversification, and there has been no 
consensus on the direction of the relationship. Moreover, none of the authors that have 
used data on Nigerian firms has examined the relationship between I insider ownership 
and the performance effects of diversification. None of the authors who used data on 
Nigerian firms captured the variations in the D–P relationship over time because they 
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either employed cross-sectional analysis or pooled panel data analysis—techniques that 
do not capture these changes (Dhir & Dhir, 2015; Lin et al., 2014).  
I used data on firm products to assign SIC codes to sampled firms and used the 
SIC codes to classify firms as either diversified or undiversified for each of the years in 
the sample period. The number of 2-digit SIC codes assigned to a firm measured the 
firm’s level of diversification. I employed the LMM to examine the relationship between 
diversification and firm performance and how insider ownership moderated the 
relationship between the level of diversification and performance. The LMM captured the 
effects of the within-firm and between-firm variations in the variables over the sample 
period. Overall, I tested four hypotheses and summarized the results in Table 25. 
Table 25 
 
Summary of Results of Tests of Hypotheses 
Details of hypotheses Dependent 
variable 
Decision 
H01 There is no significant difference between the 
performance of DFs and focused firms in Nigeria. 
ROE Accepted 
ATQ Accepted 
H02 There is no significant relationship between the level 
of diversification and firm performance in Nigeria. 
ROE Accepted 
ATQ Accepted 
H03 There is no significant difference between the level 
of insider ownership of DFs that outperform focused 
firms and DFs that underperform focused firms. 
ROE Accepted 
ATQ Accepted 
H04 There is no significant relationship between insider 
ownership and the performance effects of level of 
diversification. 
ROE Accepted 
ATQ Accepted 
 
The diversification status identifies that a firm is diversified or not but does not 
indicate the degree/level of diversification (Oweis, 2012). Consequently, in the second 
hypothesis, I aimed at discovering whether the level of diversification is related to firm 
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performance. The test of H02 showed that the level of diversification measured by the 
number of 2-digit SIC code industries in which a firm operated was not significantly 
related to firm performance. This finding was consistent across both measures of 
performance. 
Against the background that some DFs have underperformed DFs, and others 
have outperformed, in H03, I aimed at identifying whether insider ownership could 
differentiate between underperforming DFs and outperforming ones. The analysis 
showed no significant difference in insider ownership between DFs that OPDF and those 
that UPDF in Nigeria. I also found that the proportion of OPDF and UPDF in the groups 
of low and high insider ownership firms is not significantly different. The test of H04 
showed no significant relationship between insider ownership and the performance 
effects of level of diversification in both performance measures. In other words, insider 
ownership did not moderate the level of D–P relationship.  
Interpretation of Findings 
The results of this study are consistent with some findings in previous literature 
and inconsistent with others. In the case of studies based on data on Nigerian firms, the 
D–P relationship results were mixed. Adamu et al. (2011) and Oyedijo (2012) found that 
UDFs outperformed diversified ones. Nonetheless, Patrick (2012), Ugwuanyi (2012), and 
Ugwuanyi et al. (2012a, 2012b) found significant positive relationships between firm 
diversification and firm performance (see also Gunu & Gunu, 2020; Mac-Ozigbo & 
Daniel, 2020; Oladimeji & Udosen, 2019). I found no significant relationship between 
diversification and firm performance, which is inconsistent with these streams of the D–P 
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relationship literature in Nigeria. One explanation for the inconsistency is that none of the 
previous authors used SIC codes to classify firms as diversified or undiversified. Also, 
none used analytical techniques that captured the effects of within-firm and between-firm 
variations in the predictors over time.  
For the broader D–P literature, my findings are inconsistent with the 
diversification discount literature (Berger & Ofek, 1995; Borah et al., 2018; Denis et al., 
1997; Jouida et al., 2017; Lang & Stulz, 1995; Lee & Hooy, 2018b; Liu et al., 2018; 
Mazur & Zhang, 2015). My results are also inconsistent with the diversification premium 
literature (Aivazian et al., 2019; Bhatia & Thakur, 2018; Cole & Karl, 2016; Lawrey & 
Morris, 2019; Villalonga, 2004). With regards to the relationship between firm 
diversification and firm performance, the results are more consistent with the no 
relationship literature (Garcia-Feijoo & Smith, 2017; Hoberg & Philips, 2014, Mackey et 
al., 2017; Mansi & Reeb, 2002; Schommer et al., 2019).  
The no relationship stream of the literature argues that diversification is not 
necessarily a value-creating or a value-destroying corporate strategy (Hoberg & Philips, 
2014; Mackey et al., 2017; Schommer et al., 2019; Tsai et al., 2011). Therefore, factors 
other than diversification could be responsible for performance differences between firms 
in Nigeria. Hoberg and Philips (2014) identified one of those factors as product 
uniqueness; Delbufalo et al. (2016) indicated family involvement, while Mackey et al. 
(2017) suggested the firm’s resources and operating context. I examined the effects of 
insider ownership as one factor that could explain performance differences between 
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firms, whether diversified or undiversified, and between DFs that outperform and those 
that underperform focused firms.  
Using the EV measures (ExROEav, ExATQav, ExROEserv, and EVATQserv), I 
found that the relationship between insider ownership and EV of DFs was nonsignificant 
in all the measures of EV. This finding suggests that UPDF do not differ from OPDF on 
the basis of insider ownership, as agency theory suggests. The finding is consistent with 
Singh et al. (2004), who found no significant difference in the number of UPDF and 
OPDF for both the groups of low and high-insider ownership firms. My finding of 
nonsignificant relationship between insider ownership and the EVs of DFs is also 
consistent with Anderson et al. (2000) and Gleason et al. (2012) but inconsistent with Taĝ 
(2017), who found a negative relationship between executive shareholding and EV. 
I also found that insider ownership did not significantly moderate the relationship 
between the level of diversification and firm performance. The finding that insider 
ownership did not significantly moderate the relationship between the level of 
diversification and firm performance is inconsistent with Lins and Servaes (1999), 
Hyland and Diltz (2002), and Boumosleh et al. (2012). These authors found a positive 
relationship between insider ownership and the performance effects of diversification. 
The finding that insider ownership did not significantly moderate the relationship 
between the level of diversification and firm performance is inconsistent with agency 
theory and the expected benefits of increasing insider ownership (Boateng et al., 2017; 
Denis et al., 1997; Gugong et al., 2014; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Rashid, 2020).  
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The positive relationship I found between leverage and ATQ is consistent with 
Chandra et al. (2019) and the literature that considers leverage a good corporate 
governance mechanism (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Leverage helps to reduce the agency 
cost of free cash flow. It introduces the discipline of the market that increases efficiency 
in picking projects—factors that the markets tend to value positively (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). However, it is inconsistent with O’Brien et al. (2014). O’Brien et al. 
found that leverage has a significant negative relationship with DFs’ value. This 
relationship supports the view based on transaction cost economics that leverage limits 
managerial discretion to leverage on strategic resources to experiment and adapt in such 
forms as diversification into new products and markets that are potentially value-creating. 
My finding that leverage consistently showed a significant negative relationship with 
ROE is supportive of the transaction cost economics view and consistent with the 
findings of some authors who used profitability as the measure performance (e.g., 
Yazdanfar & Öhman, 2015). 
The results of this study that show a significant positive relationship between 
blockholding and ATQ in all the models are consistent with some previous studies (e.g., 
Mitra & Pattanayak, 2013; Singh et al., 2020; van Essen et al., 2020) but inconsistent 
with Thraya (2015). For the D–P relationship literature, the finding is consistent with 
Lins and Servaes (1999), Pratyaksa et al. (2015), and Sautner and Villalonga (2010). 
These results support the idea that blockholders provide effective monitoring that curtails 
managerial self-seeking behavior and leads to higher market valuation (Yasser & Al 
Mamun, 2017). Blockholders can monitor managers because they have the incentives and 
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power to do so (Basu, 2014; Edmans & Holderness, 2017). However, the study did not 
distinguish blockholders by their identity and motivations, the number of blockholders, 
and the mechanism employed to influence management. Some authors have found that 
these factors moderate the effects of blockholding on firm performance (Edmans et al., 
2013; Hautz et al., 2013; Li & Li, 2015). 
I found that firm size consistently exhibited a significant negative relationship 
with ATQ. This finding is consistent with the view that complexity and coordination cost 
tends to increase with firm size, making larger firms less transparent and increasing the 
ease of managers’ opportunistic and value-destroying behavior (Olaniyi et al., 2017). 
However, this finding is inconsistent with Khatun and Siddiqui (2016).  
I found a nonsignificant relationship between board independence and firm 
performance when all firms were in the analysis. This result is consistent with Akpan and 
Amran (2014) in the general board independence–performance relationship literature in 
Nigeria. However, the significant negative relationship I found between board 
independence and ATQ when I did the analyses with DFs only, is inconsistent with 
Boumosleh et al. (2012) and Gleason et al. (2012).  Boumosleh et al. (2012) and Gleason 
et al. (2012) found a significant positive relationship between board independence and 
the performance effects of diversification. The way I operationalize board independence 
may explain the differences in the results. I found that insider ownership is not 
significantly related to ATQ but negatively related to ROE when I used only DFs for the 
analyses.  
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I interpret these findings in the context of the theoretical framework of the study. 
The IBT and agency theory formed the theoretical foundation of this study. Essentially, 
IBT states that the institutional context in which firms operate shapes their strategic 
choices and the outcomes of such choices (Elango & Lahiri, 2014; Garrido et al., 2014; 
Rottig, 2016; Zhang et al., 2015). Therefore, IBT suggests that a strategy should not be 
expected to perform similarly in all contexts and periods.  
The IBT predicts that DFs will perform outperform UDFs in emerging markets 
where market-supporting institutions are less developed (Benito-Osorio et al., 2012; 
Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Kuppuswamy et al., 2014; Lohwasser et al., 2019). The reason 
for this prediction is that, among other advantages, diversification facilitates the creation 
of internal markets that mitigate the cost of the imperfections in the external markets of 
emerging markets (Benito-Osorio et al., 2012; Berry-Stölzle et al., 2013; Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997; Kuppuswamy et al., 2014). The theory also predicts that as the country’s 
institutional framework develops, diversification will move from a value-creating 
strategy to a value-destroying one (Kuppuswamy et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2008). 
On the basis of IBT, the expectation was that in Nigeria—an emerging market 
with weak institutions—DFs would perform better than UDFs, and the level of 
diversification will be show a significant positive relationship with firm performance. 
The results in this study are inconsistent with the predictions of IBT. There was no 
significant difference between the performance of DFs and UDFs. There was also no 
significant relationship between the level of diversification and firm performance. 
Although the difference in performance was not significant, DFs had lower mean ROE 
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and ATQ than UDFs. In all the models I specified for the relationship between the level 
of diversification and firm performance, the coefficient for diversification was negative. 
The inconsistency between the prediction of IBT and the findings in this study 
can explain in various ways. First, it is possible that the theory is misspecified and does 
not hold in all contexts (Yusuf et al., 2018). Secondly, the reforms that have been going 
on in Nigeria since the return to democratic rule in 1999 may have brought significant 
improvements in the institutional context. These reforms may have reduced the 
“institutional voids” (Khanna & Palepu, 1997, p. 41) that make diversification relevant in 
the first place—consistent with Kuppuswamy et al. (2014), Lee et al. (2008), and 
Ramaswamy et al. (2017). The effect of these reforms would require further studies to 
clarify. Since I had no variable that measured institutional development in this study, I 
cannot assert that improvements in the institutional context explain the contradiction. 
Agency theory—the other theoretical foundation of this study—can also explain 
the inconsistency in the results of this study and the predictions of IBT. The motive that 
dominates a particular diversification decision influences the performance outcomes 
(Basu, 2010; Dey & Banerjee, 2019). If agency considerations dominate, diversification 
will more likely produce negative results (Dey & Banerjee, 2019). Diversification in 
Nigeria could be an agency-motivated strategy that would not be expected to create 
value. 
Agency theory predicts that the separation of ownership from control in 
organizations could lead to a conflict of interest between shareholders and managers. 
When this is the case, managers are more likely to pursue their interests even if it 
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destroys shareholder value. One way of preventing such managerial self-seeking 
behaviors is to place appropriate corporate governance structures in the firm (Bendickson 
et al., 2016; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Panda & Leepsa, 2017; Schillemans & Bjurstrøm, 
2020; Yusuf et al., 2018). Therefore, agency theorists prescribe two types of corporate 
governance mechanisms. One of these is interest alignment measures, such as insider 
ownership. Based on this theory, Denis et al. (1997) posited that if value-reducing 
diversification is due to agency problems, on average then, diversification should be 
associated negatively with firm performance in low-insider ownership firms and 
positively in higher-insider ownership firms.  
I found that insider ownership did not significantly predict the EV of DFs. In 
other words, in Nigeria, insider ownership does not distinguish DFs that outperform 
focused firms from those that underperform. I also found that the proportion of OPDF 
and UPDF in the groups of low- and high-insider ownership firms is not significantly 
different. Although the differences are not significant, in all the EV measures that I 
employed in this study, the odds (represented by the odds ratio) are higher that a Low-
insider ownership observation will have a positive EV than a High- nsider ownership 
observation. These findings are inconsistent with the traditional agency theory prediction 
that shareholder-manager conflicts from low insider ownership are likely to result in poor 
firm performance. I also found a negative relationship between insider ownership and 
firm performance, a result that was significant only in the case of ROE when only DFs 
were used in the analysis. This negative relationship is inconsistent with the traditional 
agency theory.  
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Therefore, I conclude that the shareholder-manager agency conflict resulting from 
low insider ownership—that higher insider ownership is expected to mitigate—is not per 
se responsible for the diversification discount that some researchers have documented. 
Singh et al. (2004) arrived at a similar conclusion. Consequently, the factors that explain 
the underperformance of some DF remain unclear and requires further studies. One 
explanation for the nonsignificant relationship between insider ownership and the 
performance effects of level of diversification is that the interest alignment mechanism of 
corporate control is less effective than control/monitoring mechanisms in Nigeria. There 
is increasing evidence that monitoring mechanisms such as blockholding and leverage are 
more effective than interest alignment mechanisms such as increased insider ownership 
(see Alessandri & Seth, 2014; Gleason et al., 2012; Kim & Lu, 2011; Lacoste et al., 
2010). 
The other set of corporate governance mechanisms prescribed by agency theorists 
is monitoring mechanisms such as increased leverage, blockholding, and board 
independence which I employed as control variables in this study. Consistent with agency 
theory, I found a significant positive relationship between leverage and ATQ and 
between blockholding and ATQ. These findings tend to support the view that monitoring 
mechanisms are more effective than interest alignment mechanisms (Alessandri & Seth, 
2014; Gleason et al., 2012; Kim & Lu, 2011; Lacoste et al., 2010). However, the negative 
relationship between leverage and ROE calls this view to question. The reason leverage 
has a divergent relationship with the two measures of performance is unclear. One 
explanation for it is that the two measures capture different dimensions of the 
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performance construct and that each would appeal to different stakeholder groups. This 
requires further investigation.  
 Board independence was negatively but nonsignificantly related to performance 
in most models except with ATQ when DFs only were used in the analysis. This 
nonsignificant relationship suggests that in Nigeria, board independence does not play the 
valuable corporate governance role predicted by agency theory. However, this finding 
may be an artifact of the way I operationalized the variable in this study. Whether being a 
nonexecutive ensures a director’s independence is questionable (Brickley & Zimmerman, 
2010).  
Limitations of the Study 
This study is limited in some ways. I relied on secondary data. The biases and 
reliability of this type of data are a constraint. I addressed this weakness by using only 
companies listed on the Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE). The law requires these 
companies to publish their audited annual reports and financial statements that give an 
accurate and fair view of the company’s affairs for the reporting period. The directors 
take responsibility for this, at the risk of jail terms under sections 334 and 335 of the 
Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004.  
However, some companies did not comply with this requirement in some years. 
For these noncomplying companies, data were not available to operationalize some of the 
variables for some of the years. In some cases, published reports did not provide the 
required information. These increased the number of missing data in my data set. I 
addressed this limitation by making serious efforts to acquire the companies’ annual 
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reports wherever available and using the LMM for data analysis. This analytical 
technique accommodates cases of missing data better than ANOVA and standard 
regression techniques. For robustness check, I also used firms listed for all the years and 
had data to operationalize the variables. The conclusions based on these additional tests 
are qualitatively similar to those from all firms in the sample. 
Segment reporting is still in its initial stages in Nigeria. Before adopting 
international financial reporting standards (IFRS) in 2012, emphasis on segment 
reporting was on geography (Madawaki, 2012). Even with the adoption of IFRS, the level 
of activity aggregation depends on the chief operating decision-makers’ discretion 
(Ibrahim, 2014). In many cases, the aggregation did not reflect differences in company 
activities. This discretion made interfirm comparison less informative. 
Consequently, it was impossible to operationalize some of the diversification and 
performance measures that I could have used for construct validity. This limitation 
threatens validity, given that many of the constructs are multidimensional. For instance, 
the primary measure of diversification in this study did not reflect the relative 
contribution of each segment of the firm to the total output. The measure of a DF’s EV 
did not reflect each firm’s segment/industry’s weighted contribution. As some authors 
have pointed out, diversification’s performance effects may depend on industry 
characteristics (Purkayastha & Lahiri, 2016). 
However, it is impossible to cover all the dimensions of all the constructs in this 
study. I tried to mitigate this weakness by narrowing down the research to specific 
domains of the constructs and employed multiple measures as much as possible. Some 
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authors have proposed this approach to dealing with multidimensional constructs (e.g., 
Hoskisson et al., 1993; Sambharya, 2000). Some experts have agreed to the construct 
validity of some of the measures I employed (e.g., Hoskisson et al., 1993). 
The study focused on nonfinancial firms listed on the NSE. I excluded financial 
firms and private companies. The findings in this study are generalizable to these 
financial and private firms only to the extent that the sample used in this study represents 
these firms. Also, because I did not use randomization, I may not have adequately 
controlled for competing explanations of the observed relationships. The absence of 
randomization makes causal inferences less convincing and limits the ability to 
generalize the results. I addressed this limitation through statistical techniques such as the 
LMM used for data analysis. This model controlled for some of the confounding 
variables. I hope that the control variables reasonably captured the essential factors that 
impact performance. The introduction of these control variables increases my confidence 
about the relationships found in the study and the ability to generalize. 
Some questions arose from the analysis of the data. Some of these issues were not 
addressed due to a lack of data to do so. Addressing those questions will extend 
knowledge in this area. I recommend some of these issues and questions for further 
research. 
Recommendations 
I can hardly claim that this study has been exhaustive of all the issues that could 
improve knowledge about the relationship between diversification and firm performance 
and how insider ownership impacts this relationship. As indicated in the preceding 
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section, this study is limited in some ways. Mitigating these limitations in future studies 
will extend knowledge in this area. In the light of the findings and limitations of this 
study, I offer some recommendations for further research in this area. 
I recommend that future researchers in this area in Nigeria should incorporate 
other measures of diversification such as the Herfindahl index and entropy measure. The 
use of these measures will increase robustness and make for a better comparison of the 
results of this study with those of authors that have used these other measures. The 
primary measure of diversification in this study did not reflect the relative contribution of 
each segment of the firm to the total output. Berry (1971) suggested that the measurement 
of diversification should reflect each segment’s relative contribution. I could not use 
these measures because of the deficiencies that still exist in segment reporting in Nigeria. 
I relied exclusively on publicly available information, especially from financial 
statements. Given the current state of segment reporting in financial statements in 
Nigeria, future researchers should combine published financial statements and 
management accounts privately held by companies. Making this manageable will require 
case studies of few companies to collect more detailed information to operationalize 
relevant variables where these are not publicly available. 
The combination of both publicly available and privately held information will 
help to reduce cases of missing data. It will also facilitate the operationalization and use 
of other measures of relevant constructs. For instance, my first measure of the EV of DFs 
was the difference between a firm’s ROE (ATQ) and the average ROE (ATQ) of UDFs. 
The second measure was the difference between the firm’s ROE (ATQ) and the 
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unweighted average of its segments’ imputed ROEs (ATQs). Whereas the first measure 
does not reflect industry effects on performance, the second does not reflect the weighted 
contribution of each segment/industry. It also entailed the grouping together of some 
industries.  
I could not use Berger and Ofek’s (1995) measure of EV, which deals with these 
limitations because, for many industries, there were no focused firms that I could use for 
comparison and avoid grouping. Secondly, I did not have detailed and informative 
segment sales, profit, and assets data to compute segment contribution for most 
companies and most of the years. The inclusion of private companies in future studies 
could increase the number of UDFs in each industry and enable the use of the Berger and 
Ofek measure. However, it may limit the use of market-based measures of performance. 
The use of privately held information will also provide more segment revenue, profit, and 
assets data. 
I operationalized insider ownership by the proportion of total company shares 
held by its directors. I did not distinguish between the ownership of executive directors 
and nonexecutive directors or that of the CEO. Kim and Lu (2011) have argued that the 
executive directors and especially the CEOs are the most impactful insiders in the 
company and that their holding should count the most. Therefore, my conclusions on the 
impact of insider ownership may have been a reflection of the measure of insider 
ownership that I used. Future researchers should consider distinguishing between 
executive directors and nonexecutive directors’ shareholding.  
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There is evidence that blockholder identity, number, the contest for control, and 
strategy impact blockholder effectiveness (Benamraoui et al., 2019; Fattoum-Guedri et 
al., 2018; Hadlock & Schwartz-Ziv, 2019; Lee et al., 2020; van Essen et al., 2020). I did 
not make these distinctions in my measure of blockholding due to a lack of data. Future 
researchers should try to capture these dimensions of blockholding.  
As I indicated in the section on interpretation of findings, my results are 
inconsistent with the predictions of IBT regarding the performance effects of 
diversification in emerging markets. One plausible explanation for this contradiction may 
be that the institutional reforms that the government has implemented since the return to 
democratic rule in 1999 may have changed the institutional context of Nigeria. However, 
I did not include any variable that captured institutional changes over time. Future 
researchers in this area should include some measures of institutional development in 
their model. The inclusion of a measure of institutional development would enable one to 
verify how the performance effects of diversification have varied with changes in the 
institutional context. 
As I indicated earlier, segment reporting is still in its initial stages in Nigeria. 
Segment reporting in Nigeria was mandated, effective 2008. However, there seems to be 
no guideline that will ensure interfirm comparability of reported segments. Even with the 
adoption of IFRS, segment reporting has focused on geography, and activity aggregation 
has depended on the chief operating decision maker’s discretion (Ibrahim, 2014). As a 
result, in many cases, the aggregation does not reflect differences in company activities. 
The absence of standardized segment reporting rules makes the comparison of interfirm 
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segment data less informative (Hund et al., 2019). There is, therefore, the need for 
regulatory authorities to aggregate activities along lines similar to SIC codes and enforce 
segment reporting consistent with those codes. 
Implications  
Businesses act as development agents by creating jobs and innovative products 
and services that society depends on (Blowfield & Dolan, 2014; Likoko & Kin, 2017). 
They also respond to various societal needs through forms of CSR (Blowfield & Dolan, 
2014; Likoko & Kin, 2017). In these ways, businesses contribute to positive social 
change, and therefore, their survival and growth are essential if they are to continue 
contributing to society in this direction (Carroll, 2016). Corporate survival and growth 
require sustainable improvement in performance and continuous adaptation to face the 
challenges posed by the dynamic environment (Burgelman, 2014; Chen, 2017; Josefy et 
al., 2017; Kaulio et al., 2017). 
This study has implications for positive social change because of its relevance for 
firm survival and economic development. The results of this study indicate that contrary 
to the prediction of IBT, diversification is not associated with better firm performance in 
Nigeria. Contrary to agency theory, insider ownership is not associated with performance 
improvement and does not significantly predict DFs that will outperform or underperform 
focused firms. Insider ownership does not also moderate the relationship between the 
level of diversification and performance. Therefore, companies may improve 
performance by not focusing on whether or not to diversify because it does not make any 
significant difference in performance. Businesses can improve performance by focusing 
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on some of the control governance mechanisms such as blockholding that I found to be 
associated with firm market value measured by ATQ. With improved performance, 
businesses can attract more resources and investors that will guarantee their survival and 
ability to contribute to society.  
The study also contributes to positive social change by providing information that 
will improve the investing public’s investment decisions. I found that insider ownership 
does not positively moderate the D–P relationship and does not predict OPDFs and 
UPDFs but is, at best, associated negatively with the ROE of DFs. This points to the view 
that interest alignment corporate governance mechanisms such as stock options may not 
be adequate in Nigeria. Armed with this information, investors in the stock market may 
shift focus away from insider dominated firms. They may increase their returns and 
economic well-being by investing in firms with significant blockholding given the 
finding that this monitoring governance mechanisms is positively associated with ATQ. 
Investors may also improve their returns by selling off their holdings in such firms 
without blockholders. Investors’ exit may pressure such firms’ stock prices and force the 
managers to take corrective actions that could improve performance. 
The study also has methodological and theoretical implications. As I pointed out 
earlier, my findings are inconsistent with the two strands of the D–P literature in 
Nigeria—the diversification discount and premium strands. One explanation for the 
inconsistency may be that none of the previous authors had used SIC codes to measure 
diversification, as I did. It may, therefore, be necessary to revisit the previous studies 
using SIC codes to operationalize diversification.  
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As I also indicated, there have been few direct tests of the relationship between 
insider ownership and the performance effects of diversification. Most of the few direct 
tests did not consider that some DFs outperform focused firms while others 
underperform. To the best of my knowledge, only Singh et al. (2004) have distinguished 
between DFs that are gainers and losers to see if there is a significant difference in the 
proportion of gainers and losers among high-insider ownership and low-insider 
ownership DFs. However, among the other differences that I identified earlier, their study 
was based in the United States, which has an institutional context different from Nigeria, 
the focus of this study. This approach, which I used in this study, is necessary to make 
meaningful assertions about the relationship between insider ownership and the 
performance effects of diversification (Singh et al., 2004). The reason is that instead of 
the wrong premise that diversification is ex ante value-destroying, I considered the fact 
that some DFs outperform focused firms while some underperform. There is need to 
revisit this conclusion in other settings, using this approach. 
The findings in this study have theoretical implications also. My findings are 
inconsistent with IBT and agency theory regarding their predictions about the 
performance effects of diversification and the role of insider ownership in this 
relationship in Nigeria. One explanation for the inconsistency may be that the theories are 
context-specific and have no universal application. The findings in this study suggest 
revisiting these theories in different institutional contexts. 
There are also implications for policy and practice. As I pointed out in the 
literature review, researchers have increasingly recognized ownership as a form of 
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corporate governance (Connelly et al., 2010; Muller-Kahle, 2015). In their codes of 
corporate governance, two central regulatory authorities in Nigeria—the Central Bank of 
Nigeria and the SEC—promote insider ownership as a suitable corporate governance 
mechanism (see Central Bank of Nigeria, 2006, para. 5.1.1; SEC, 2011). The results of 
this study show that increasing insider ownership does not make any significant positive 
difference in performance. Therefore, to improve corporate governance, it is necessary to 
revisit such proposals. There is increasing evidence that monitoring mechanisms such as 
blockholding are more effective than interest alignment mechanisms such as increased 
insider ownership (see Alessandri & Seth, 2014; Gleason et al., 2012; Kim & Lu, 2011; 
Lacoste et al., 2010).  
Conclusions 
Despite the value destruction attributed to diversification and blamed on agency 
problems from low insider ownership, many firms have continued to diversify. DFs have 
also continued to account for significant proportions of economic activity, worldwide 
(Matvos & Seru, 2014; Sambasivan & Asrarhaghighi, 2016). This study was conducted 
against the background that there is no consensus in the existing literature on the D–P 
relationship and how insider ownership moderates this relationship.  
Most of the previous studies have been focused on the developed countries, and 
researchers know little about these relationships in Africa. I focused this study on 
Nigeria, the most populous country and one of the largest economies in Africa, given the 
calls to explore these relationships in institutional contexts that are different from those of 
the developed countries (Benito-Osorio et al., 2012; Erdorf et al., 2013; Picone & 
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Dagnino, 2016; Sun et al., 2017; Zechser, 2019). Moreover, the methodological 
deficiencies of some of the studies in which researchers have used data on Nigerian firms 
have resulted in limited understanding of the D–P relationship in Nigeria. Importantly 
too, only a few authors have directly examined the relationship between insider 
ownership and the performance effects of diversification. In Nigeria’s case, I am not 
aware of any author that has examined the relationship between insider ownership and 
the performance effects of diversification. I attempted to bridge this gap with this study.  
I used data from firms listed on the NSE to examine these relationships. The study 
advanced knowledge of how diversification is related to firm performance in Nigeria and 
how insider ownership impacts this relationship. The findings indicate that firm 
diversification in Nigeria is not the value-creating strategy that IBT predicted for 
emerging markets. In other words, the diversification decision is irrelevant. It also 
indicates that in Nigeria, insider ownership is not the performance-enhancing governance 
mechanism that agency theorists present. These findings have implications for theory, 
practice, and positive social change, as I indicated in the preceding sections. 
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